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(a) 
SIMIAHY 
Networks were f i r s t used i n B r i t i s h s o c i a l anthropology i n the 1 9 5 0 ' s . 
By the l a t e 1 9 6 0 ' s there had been an enormous increase i n in t e r e s t i n 
network a j i a l y s i s . During the 1 9 7 0 ' s the concept of network seems to 
have become an accepted part of anthropology's terminology and conceptual 
repertoire. 
The thesis examines why networks should have become so prominent at 
these p a r t i c u l a r times. I t i s apparent that the problem of s o c i a l 
change encourages the adoption of ego-orien^d concepts including 
networks. An i n a b i l i t y to cope with change i s the major f a i l i n g of 
the s t r u c t u r a l i s t / f u n c t i o n a l i s t pa3?adigm i n t h e s e s of many anthro-
pologists and i t i s th i s which makes them look for new orientations. 
I n t r a c i n g the developments of the notion, i t i s essential to point 
to developments within anthropolo^ as a whole, which are reflected 
i n , or are r e f l e c t i o n s of wider changes i n other academic d i s c i p l i n e s 
and i n western society. I t seems that anew paradigm - i n Thomas 
Euhn's terms - has: entered anthropology. 
Network analysis has been used i n conjunction with both the nev; 
and the old paradigm. Since network analysis i s only a method, the 
theories with which i t i s linked are of enonnous importance. Allied-
with aspects of the old paradigm the method becomes s u p e r f i c i a l and 
adds l i t t l e to the understanding of tie society described. VJhen i t 
(b) 
i s linked with new anthropological approaches which stress a 
humanistic viev of man, and the importance of meaning, i t can 
provide a useful method of ordering data, and conceptualising 
society. 
The t h e s i s attempts to point to the ideas implied i n various net-
viork studies to show how the method has been used productively i n 
some cases and unproductively i n different contexts. I n this v/ay 
.it i s possible to suggest how networks m i ^ t contribute further 
to s o c i a l anthropology. 
(c) 
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( i ) 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
One of my major arguments i n this thesis i s that anthropologists 
should be more w i l l i n g to appear i n t h e i r own works. They should 
try to make th e i r e x i s t e n t i a l position and i t s attendant values 
available f o r scrutiny. I am aware that my attitudes towards network 
analysis have changed as I have worked on t h i s t h e s i s . 
My experiences at University, and to an even greater extent whilst 
working on a research project i n Ireland, altered my ideas about 
network analysis and anthropology. I can point to some of the ways 
i n which t h i s has happened and I f e e l i t i s worth trying to do so, 
a l t h o u ^ , inevitably, any such description i s not complete. 
I am not trying to apologise for the arguments which I set down i n 
thi s thesis but merely to make the point that I am aware that they are 
a r ^ l t of certain experiences and that, i n time, and^the l i g h t of 
d i f f e r e n t experiences, I may modify them. 
I hope that the argument of the thesis w i l l be c l a r i f i e d i f I present 
a b r i e f outline of the period I spent i n working ;^o produce i t . 
I n 1 9 6 9 when I registered at University College, London, I and my 
supervisor. Dr. Peter Fry, f e l t that the method had enormous potential 
and would probably provide a way of tackling anthropology's problems 
i n coping with complex and urban s o c i e t i e s . When Dr. Pry l e f t j t h e r e 
was no-one who was p a r t i c u l a r l y interested i n the topic at University 
( i i ) 
College, so I l e f t to return to Durham. 
The most important thing I learnt at U . C o L o , apart from a considerable 
broadening of my horifons, and understanding of the workings of academic 
l i f e , was the importance of [Thomas Kuhn's view of s c i e n t i f i c revolutions. 
This I learnt i n one of Mary Douglas's seminars, I also worked with 
Lynn Oeser on a project involving family networks. I was trying to 
help analyse information on networks collected i n interviews which 
I did not conduct. I found the data very inadequate but blamed i t 
on the interview schedule and the interviewers. Throu^ Lynn I met 
Elizabeth Bott, -ette was writing her "Reconsiderations" for the 2nd 
edition of "Family and Social Network", Lynn and I helped her to 
c o l l e c t the studies that had been written since she had been concen-
t r a t i n g on psycho-analysis. 
In Durham I read a l l the network studies I could lay my hands on 
and continued to think that such a method - i f formalised meaining-
f u l l y - would provide a way for anthropology to advance o I s t i l l 
saw networl^s potential as l y i n g i n the production of r e a l l y clear, 
concisely defined concepts which would be applied i n many sorts of 
research. 
I found myself forced into the role of defender of networks ( t h i s 
had also happened at U C L )O I had to find reasons to j u s t i f y t h e i r 
existence and thereby that of my t h e s i s . By the end of that year 
I had started to write and had also decided that network concepts 
( i i i ) 
had been badly applied i n many cases. 
I then r e t i r e d to Cornwall with a l l my books but well away from 
any other anthropologists. As I wrote I became increasingly 
d i s i l l u s i o n e d with the network methodology. I had f e l t a l l t h r o u ^ 
my year at Durham that network's popularity implied some f a r bigger 
changes i n s o c i a l science and I was anxious to make e x p l i c i t what 
I f e l t to be implied by the use of such a method. I also began 
to read more widely^ p a r t i c u l a r l y i n sociology. 
I wrote to professor Boissevain asking him about h i s forthcoming 
books. He was extremely helpful and sent me copies of the papers. 
We corresponded on various topics such as the relevance CS exchange 
theory and I found h i s i n t e r e s t of great value, 
I was applying myself to writing -when I heard I had a job on the 
I r i s h S o c i o l i n g u i s t i c Research Project. This sounded ideal as I 
hoped to have the opportunity of carrying out f i e l d work - using 
network analysis - and so I took i t . I had to leave for Ireland on 
a year's contract at a week's notice. So I abandonedrisy thesis 
and went to Dublin. 
Once there the f i e l d work slowly receded over the next three to 
four months, and I suddenly r e a l i s e d that the job had changed i n 
form e n t i r e l y . 
I had suggested that network analysis might be useful as a means of 
locating I r i s h speakers i n Dublinvithin particular s o c i a l environ-
ments and also to test hypotheses about how important I r i s h speaking 
( i v ) 
was - for instance^ would i t outwei^ factors of c l a s s , age and so on. 
I h|d some reservations about using networks i n a questionnaire context 
as I saw them as an integral of participant observation. However, I 
f e l t that I was being given an opportunity to try to produce a good 
network study. Working as part of a team meant that I expected to be 
told what variables we might consider as p a r t i c u l a r l y relevant, and 
two of us attempted to e l i c i t such variables from the projects directoro 
The assumption seemed to be that network analysis was capable ^ finding 
such variables i n some mysterious, s c i e n t i f i c way, and we were never 
told what we should be examining precisely. As a res u l t our study 
was fcased on i n t u i t i v e understanding of I r i s h speakers i n Dublin -
which was not p a r t i c u l a r l y developed i n my case (fortunately my colleague 
was I i i s h ) 
It 
I and a sociologist wrote a questionnaire and administeredyto 1^ couples 
I t took us hours and we quickly r e a l i s e d that we were getting informa-
tion i n a p a r t i c u l a r l y tedious way. However, our diagrams were greeted 
by the directors with great pleasure. They at leas t provided something 
an 
concrete in/awkward situation - they could be computerised. Although 
I knew the information was, i ^ a c t , very unreliable, I f e l t I could 
not t o t a l l y disown my own idea, and fey this stage I also f e l t there 
was no point i n trying any more to improve relationships on the project. 
There ikad been several meetings i n which we had tri e d to say that networks 
were not able to provide a complete answer to a problem, and to bo uscelr 
e f f e c t i v e l y we had to know what theories were being advanced i n the 
projecto Frederick Barth on ethnicity was referred tOjwhich I found 
encoTiraging^ but there was no l i n k between the h i ^ l e v e l theories and 
the haphazard col l e c t i o n of information by the research a s s i s t a n t s . 
(v) 
At t h i s stage I resigned and began-to- w)rk on my the s i s , I found 
that I was p a r t i c u l a r l y d i s i l l u s i i o n e d with network studies which 
were formalised and quantified, I could see evidence of a new orienta-
tion emerging i n s o c i a l science which related to what was happening i n 
other d i s c i p l i n e s and i n society i t s e l f , I could also see how I 
might use networks within t h i s new schema. 
I was given a thi r d chance to apply networks - th i s time i n a project 
on I r i s h migration i n Condon. The proje^ct was to be run ^  a socio-
logy professor who again aeenp. to f e e l that network analysis could 
be used to analyse data without any theoretical input. I t became 
apparent that I would not be able to work on t h i s project due to 
IgCk of time. However, before that^I had re a l i s e d that my position 
was impossible. As a networkologist I was presumed to know how to 
cope with any problem and to be capable of producing relevant data 
i n network form, I could not convince people that netwsrks could 
only be used i f there was a r e a l theoretical basis which could produce 
concrete ideas to(either(be]tested or presented i n network terms. 
I t seemed to me that the method was used to cover up a lack of such 
o r i g i n a l ideas I t was seen as providing a sure and easy way of 
producing data. Unfortunately, some network analysts have implied 
that the concept i s a panacea, and these people have come -under 
p a r t i c u l a r l y heavy attack i n my th e s i s . I t was i n this frame of 
mind that I wrote most of the th e s i s . The s t e r i l e discussions of 
terms I now find disheartening. I have therefore considered the 
relationships between s o c i a l anthropology, network analysis and a 
new way of thought which I see pervading s o c i a l science and society. 
( v i ) 
Since I wrote the thesis I have been enormously encouraged to 
read Liam Hudson's "Cult of the Fact", which agrees fundamentally 
with what I have argued. He has been able to discuss his ideas i n 
terms of h i s own academic autobiography. Clearly, that i s an inap-
propriate form for a th e s i s , but I f e e l i t i s necessary for me to 
explain how I arrived at my present position = which may well be 
extreme. The major influences have been my experiences i n dealing 
with empirical data i n the l a s t year. 
CHAPTER 1 
1. THE NATURE OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS 
In order to c l a r i f y the way I have approached the topic of -ftie r e l a t i o n -
ship between network analysis and s o c i a l anthropology, i t i s necessary 
for me to suggest how I conceptualize s o c i a l anthropology (Network 
analysis w i l l be discussed i n more d e t a i l l a t e r ) . I see the aim of 
s o c i a l anthropology as making different cTiltures accessible to one 
another by translating s o c i a l action into terms meaningful to a member 
of another c u l t u r a l group, usually that of the anthropologist. Clearly, 
t h i s i s an extremely complex translation since i t involves c u l t u r a l 
ideas of acceptable behaviour, c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s and so on v/hich axe, 
ultimately, unique not only to a culture but to a particular individual 
within that culture. 
The novelist's task i s also translation and he may attempt to cross 
temporal and c u l t u r a l boundaries and to reach any reader. 
"He (the n o v e l i s t ] i s making an imitation, an imitation 
of the l i f e of man on earth. He i s making, i t might be said, 
a working model of l i f e as he sees and fe e l s i t , ..."fwalter 
Allen, The English Novel, I 9 5 4 p.14^ 
However, s o c i a l anthropology has become increasingly specialised and 
has developed a sophisticated set of concepts and a language to describe 
them which i s no longer re a d i l y understood by those outside the d i s c i -
p l i n e . 
"... a l l the time one has to try and develop ana l y t i c a l tools -
concepts which have spe c i a l names - that are s p e c i f i c to the 
profession, that represent one's attempts to try and escape from 
the culture of the society that one i s looking at and to look at i t as 
i t were, from the outside/'^J. Bamesjl971^ 
The sacrifice of t h i s wider audience has had to be made i n order to 
penetrate more deeply into the situation being examined and also to 
cross into areas more c l e a r l y demarcated from the anthropologistfe own 
c u l t u r a l world. To take a crude example, the novelist might treat 
of cannibals i n h i s own work but he would commonly present them as 
being external to 'his' world, e v i l and beyond comprehension; the 
anthropologist's task i s to t r y to enter the cannibals' world and 
discover the norms and values which enable the s o c i a l system to 
e x i s t as i t does. Although he can never evade his own c u l t u r a l l y 
deftned ways of thought, the superimposition upon those categories of 
a way of f^hougirEVanthropological, r e s t r i c t e d to a small (but growing) 
number of people, should make h i s description of exotic s o c i e t i e s more 
accessible to his readers, by increasing i t s i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y . Thus, 
anthropologists should act as a medium of communication between cultures, 
both as receiver and transmitter, i n Colin Cherry's terms. 
Such an object i s extremely hard to achieve, but i t i s the ambition 
of many s o c i a l anthropologists, p a r t i c u l a r l y young writers i n the 
subject. 
"The work of s o c i a l anthropology may be regarded as a 
complex act of translation i n which author and translator 
collaborate. A more precise analogy i s that of the r e l a t i o n 
between the psychoanalyst and his subject. The analyst enters 
the private world of his subject i n order to learn the grammar 
of h i s private language ., i t {[analysis] becomes science to the 
extent that the private language of intimate understanding i s 
translated into a public language however specialised ... But 
the p a r t i c u l a r act of translation does not d i s t o r t the private 
experience of the subject and i d e a l l y i t i s at l e a s t potentially 
acceptable to him as a s c i e n t i f i c representation of it,"(Pocock^ 
l?6i^p,89) 
"One might characterise s o c i a l anthropology as the 
attempt to maJse the behaviour of a l i e n peoples i n t e l l i -
gible by discovering the situation logic underlying i t " 
( j a r v i e , I964, r>U3) 
For Frederik Barthj 
s o c i a l anthropology aims to produce "a map of s o c i a l 
conventions of different s o c i a l situations and what i s regar-
ded as suitable for different persons i n different situations" 
^ e d r i k Earth, I966) 
Levi Strauss says " a l l we can expect of either of them 
(historians and anthropologists) i s to enlarge a s p e c i f i c 
experience to the dimensions of a more general one, which 
thereby becomes accessible as experience to men of another 
country or another epoch"^1958, Pol7j 
I t i s e s s e n t i a l to emphasise that t h i s i s the view of s o c i a l anthropo-
logy taken here, since the implications of definitions which derive 
from those of Radcliffe-Brown (who saw anthropology as a "theoretical 
natural science of human society, that i s , the investigation of s o c i a l 
phenomena by methods e s s e n t i a l l y similar to those i n the physical and 
b i o l o g i c a l sciences"), ma^e t o k l l y different. The f a i l u r e of s o c i a l 
anthropologists to attempt to make e x p l i c i t at l e a s t some of t h e i r 
assumptions by s t a t i n g what they conceive of as the aim of s o c i a l 
anthropology has led to much confusion. Among those using network 
analysis i t has meant that the f u l l implications and potential of the 
method has not been r e a l i s e d . 
Working within the view of s o c i a l anthropology which has j u s t been 
outlined, I have two aims i n view. 
One i s to show that network analysis has been an important element 
i n the reshaping of B r i t i s h s o c i a l anthropology which I see as having 
occurred i n the l a s t ten or f i f t e e n years; to suggest some new f i e l d s 
i n which i t s use might be an advantage, and the modifications 
which network ainalysis requires to increase i t s usefulness i n the 
act of tra n s l a t i o n . 
The other i s to t r y to show what this change i n B r i t i s h anthropology 
i s and why i t has occurred. I n doing so I s h a l l question one aspect 
of Thomas Kuhn's 'Structure of S c i e n t i f i c Eevolutions'5 which I find 
very revealing i n almost a l l other respects, Kuhn says, "the i n d i -
cator of a mature science i s the possession of a paradigm" and that 
" i t remains an open question what parts of s o c i a l science have yet 
acquired such paradigms at a l l " . 
•«-«• 
I f e e l that one reason that Kuhn can argue that anthropology and 
other s o c i a l sciences do not possess a paradigm and that this state-
ment can be accepted by s o c i a l anthropologists amongst others, i s 
that there i s no need for OTor paradigm to be made e x p l i c i t at a l l , 
as i t i s an implied world view, and i n t i y i n g to locate that of the 
network analysts at l e a s t , I have found that i t i s very rare for the 
paradigm to be anything but extremely covertly expressed. This i s 
probably because the anthropologist directs h is work to others whom 
he assumes have the same concepts i n mind - they are part of the 
anthropologist's c u l t u r a l heritage. This assumption, however^valid 
i n times of "normal science'', i s not i n f a c t reasonable/ during a 
period of paradigm change, since the confusing position e x i s t s that 
d i f f e r e n t individuals may adhere to incompatible paradigms within 
the same d i s c i p l i n e . 
"The pre-paradigm period i s regularly marked by frequent 
and deep debates over legitimate methods, problems and 
standards of solution, though these serve rather to define 
schools than produce agreement". (^Kuhnjp.485 1 9 6 2 ^ 
I f the overall view of the d i s c i p l i n e of each anthropologist i s 
not stated i t i s impossible for such definition of schools to 
occur, and anthropologists fi n d themselves working from premises 
which they take to be, but which are not, i n fact, shared. 
Kuhn^ i n the postscript to the I969 second edition of his book^ 
remarks that i t has been pointed out to him that he uses paradigm 
i n twenty-two different ways. B a s i c a l l y he says these break down 
into two different senses. 
"On the one hand, i t stands for the entire constellation 
of b e l i e f s , values, techniques and so on shared by members 
of a given community. On the other, i t denotes one sort of 
element i n that constellation of b e l i e f s , the concrete puzzle, 
solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace 
e x p l i c i t rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining 
puzzles of science." ( 1 9 6 2 , p . 1 7 5 ) 
In f a c t , anthropology i s undergoing a change of paradigm v/hich has. 
dividet anthropologists into s t r u c t u r a l i s t s and i n t e r a c t i o n i s t s , atomists 
and h o l i s t s and separated off different university departments along the 
same basic clea«?age. A l l this i s very reminiscent of the period of 
paradigm change which Kuhn describes as a period i n which 'extraordinary 
research' i s undertaken and a time when " s c i e n t i s t s have turned to 
philosophical analysis for unlocking the riddles of their f i e l d " (?).87 
and 88)^ "Confronted with anomaly and with c r i s i s , s c i e n t i s t s take a 
di f f e r e n t attitude toward e x i s t i n g paradigms, and the nature of their 
research changes accordingly. The p r o l i f e r a t i o n of competing articulations^ 
the willingness to try anything, the expression of e x p l i c i t discontent, 
the recourse to philosophy and to debate over fundamentals, a l l these 
are symptoms of a t r a n s i t i o n from normal to extraordinary r e s e a r c h " ^ . 9 0 - 9 1 ) . 
By these c r i t e r i a , i t i s evident that anthropology i s undergoing a 
period of extraordinary research, from which a new paradigm w i l l be 
derived and a phase of normal science w i l l r e s u l t . 
Kuhn l a t e r remarks^'Let us, therefore^now take i t for granted that the 
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differences between successive paradigms are both necessary {jpi<;3k^ B^  
(Pol02) 
and irreconcilable'/provH.es an answer to Garbett's problem -
"when I began to work out this lecture I hoped to resolve 
the c o n f l i c t between anthropologists focussing on i n s t i t u t i o n s 
and those focussing on ego-centred interaction, I found that 
I could not do so. It'raay be my own weakness or i t may be that 
the subject i s not yet ripe for a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . I t may even 
be that no reconcilation i s possible and that this i s a problem 
for philosophers and not for a f i e l d anthropologist'^p.225-6) ' 
(The reference to the possible need for philosophy lends w e i ^ t to 
the argument that we axe i n a period of extraordinary science). 
However, network analysis has already been a c r u c i a l element i n the 
reorientation of s o c i a l anthropology which has taken place. As Nadel 
says^ "New tools have beei known to f a c i l i t a t e new discoveries. They 
ce r t a i n l y produce i n those who use them a new attitude, a nei-i way of 
working at things which i s probably the decisive s t e p , " ( ^ 1 9 5 6 , p.?) 
I n B r i t i s h anthropology, the introduction of the concept of network 
analysis^ coincided with the collapse of the old structural/functional 
paradigm, and the introduction of one based upon concepts of choice, 
communication, manipulation, exchange, generation of forms and above 
a l l process and an emphasis upon the i n d i v i d u a l ^ what Harre'has called 
'the ethogenic way' (See Chapter I V ) . 
My most important and interesting task w i l l be to show that this 
d ifferent paradigm r e a l l y does e x i s t i n B r i t i s h s o c i a l anthropology, 
and to i l l u s t r a t e the connection between i t and network analy s i s . My 
contention i s that networks have not been u t i l i s e d within the framework 
of t h i s new paradigm, and as a r e s u l t the method i s not being 
developed i n ways which w i l l make i t in s p i r i n g to new generations 
of anthropologistso Some network studies i l l u s t r a t e that t h i s need 
not be soo 
I do not claim to have been comprehensive i n my analysis of network 
studies made by B r i t i s h s o c i a l anthropologists<> I have included 
studies by non-British researchers and by workers i n other disciplines, 
I hope, however, that I have referred to the major works i n the f i e l d 
by B r i t i s h anthropologists. I have t r i e d to consider studies which 
add to the development of the method, or suggest theoretical concepts 
which have influenced l a t e r network analysts. 
2 . EABLY STUDIES USING THE CONCEPT OF NETWOEK 
I s h a l l consider here both J.A. Barnes's a r t i c l e "Class and 
Communities i n a Norwegian Island Parish"- (Barnes, 1 9 5 4 ) and 
Elizabeth Bott's "Family and Social network" ( l 9 5 7 ) . A s p e c i f i c 
debt i s mentioned to one or both of these studies by over h a l f 
the network analysts whom I s h a l l be considering. The work by 
Epstein and P h i l i p Mayer (Epstein I96I and Mayer I96I) also seems 
to me to deserve inclusion i n a discussion of pioneering network 
studies since they pointed out new ways and areas to use the con-
cept. 
Barnes i s the l a b e l l e r of the s o c i a l network concept, and as such 
i s the most s i g n i f i c a j i t author, Barnes notes i n I969 that he 
derived the idea of the total network from Eadcliffe-Brown and 
was influenced by Fortes i n developing the idea. In l a t e r network 
studies attention was turned to the theoretical expansion and r e f i n -
ing of the concept, and the network had arrived on the anthropological 
scene.. Thus, these early studies are pioneering the use of a concept 
i n the analysis of actual f i e l d data derived from very different 
s i t u a t i o n s , and presenting varied problems of analysis. 
The aims of the different authors axe given as :-
"Comprehending a l l the various ways i n which the members 
of a society s p e c i f i c a l l y interact vfith one another". (Barnes^ 
1 9 5 4 , p . 5 9 ) 
"understand the s o c i a l and psychological organisation of 
some urban families."(^Bott, 1957^ P»l) 
"The limited scope (of the present book) i s to discuss some 
behaviour patterns of country bom Xhosa migrants i n East 
London, (with special reference to the question whether 
these migrants seem to be undergoing urbanisatioi))".rP. Mayer, 
1961, p. 3) 
"to demonstrate the importance of the network i n urban 
s o c i a l organisation and to indicate some of i t s characteris-
t i c s and fimctions .i o' o 6 I take the behaviour they (the texts] 
describe as the unit of analysis through which I seek to 
e s t a b l i s h other sets of r e g u l a r i t i e s present i n urban l i f e . 
I n t h i s respect the present paper looks towards the develop-
ment of a methodology or systematic approach to the anthropo-
l o g i c a l study of urban communities."(jipstein, I96I, p. 80) 
I n attempting the compare these four studies to h i ^ l i g h t their 
most salient areas, the most obvious point i s that three are iirban 
studies, while Barnes i s working i n a r u r a l community. Thus, 
although network analysis i s often associated with African urban 
studies, i t , i n f a c t , had i t s genesis i n quite different s-urroundings. 
During the course of the four analyses of aspects of l i t e r a t e , 
complex s o c i e t i e s , each anthropologist finds himself concerned with 
expressions of prestige and the emergence of s o c i a l classes. Jlj^ 
Barnes spec i f i e s t h i s i n t e r e s t - " I used i t (network) to describe 
how notions of cliass equality were applied". (1969f P«52o) He i s 
concerned to see how c l a s s d i s t i n c t i o n can occur i n a society which 
has an ethos of equality as e x i s t s i n Norway, 
Barnes and Bott see c l a s s as an ordering of society by those within 
the society, a concept which exi s t s i n the mind and i s to a large 
extent subjective; i n contrast, Epstein and Mayer are concerned 
with the existence of prestige groups which can be ordered and 
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observed by an outsider according to variables such as degree 
of "Westernisation". This i s probably a r e f l e c t i o n of the different 
situations i n which they were working since Barnes and Bott were both 
working i n soc i e t i e s where prestige differences are played down to 
some extent, and thus not so c l e a r l y expressed for the outsider to 
comprehend. 
The expression of and adherence to norms of behaviour are of paramount 
importance i n the studies by Epstein, Bott and Mayer, Elizabeth Bott's 
ideas about norms and ideology are extremely penetrating and are more 
f a r reaching than many people who claim to have used her ideas imply. 
She distinguishes between s o c i a l norms - what people think are current 
ideas i n some group or category, 
Norms of common consent - over which there i s actual concensus, and 
Personal norms - which are recognised as being private standards. 
The important point i s made that "Norms are usually only brought forth 
i n times of c r i s i s and c o n f l i c t , when they are used to j u s t i f y one's 
own behaviour and pass judgement on that of others. When nothing much 
i s going wrong, there i s no need to state what the norms are."- (p.202) 
This idea i s implied i n many l a t e r network analyses which tend to focus 
upon a situation which i s problematic to those involved i n i t . The 
However, the emphasis i s s t i l l l a i d firmly upon the emic, P, Mayer 
says "An alternative (to Gluckman's formulations] i s to think of town 
rootedness as something to be apprehended from the migrant's own 
point of view" ( 1 9 6 I ) p. 9<r And Epstein's analysis i s using data 
which derives d i r e c t l y from Chanda's own experiences rather than an 
external observer's viewpoint. 
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f a c t that norms are often inconsistent i n any type of society i s 
preserved as a refutation of the assumption which i s often made 
"that discrepancies and c o n f l i c t s of norms are a sign of s o c i a l change -
an assumption that assumes the "normal" state of the s o c i a l systems 
to be one of harmony and consistency. But norms are seldom consis-
tent even i n small scale s o c i e t i e s that are changing sbwly and i t 
seems l i k e l y that certain types of c o n f l i c t are endemic i n a s o c i a l 
system." ( p . 2 1 1 ) 
A t h i r d c r u c i a l notion which Bott set forth specific§lly i s "the view 
that the external s o c i a l environment permits much choice, and within 
broad l i m i t s individuals can construct; t h e i r own environment i n accor-
dance with t h e i r own*conscious and unconscious needs. Norms and 
ideology which had previously been interpreted as external rules i n t e r -
n a l i s e d by the individua]^ she ( f f i ) t t ] now began to regard as i n part 
constructed by individuals," ^ t t ^ l 9 5 7 j P . 55») This theoretical stance 
taken by Bott has been ignored by p r a c t i c a l l y a l l the succeeding net-
work analysts, and i t i s t h i s which accounts for the somevdiat s t e r i l e 
applications of the idea which have appeared. I t i s a stance which 
c l e a r l y owes a great deal to G;,H. Mead (whose 'Mind, Self and Society"^ 
i s 
1 954/mentioned i n the Bibliography) and symbolic interactionism, and 
also to Simmel, 
Bott's observation that those families which exist within a close-
knit, network i n which most of the; component members know one another -
have l e s s diverse norms to choose between^ provides the basis of P, Mayer's 
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explanation of•the 'encapsulation' of Red migrants. I n town^ 
a l t h o u ^ the "factor of personal choice i s i n f u l l operation" (196I, 
p.14) the Red 'stretches' h i s r u r a l network, rather than expanding 
the network i n town as the School man does. 
A.L. Epstein"^ introduces the notion of "effective network" which 
"consists of clusters of persons f a i r l y closely knitted together. 
The l i m i t s of such clusters - to use Barnes' term - are vague, but i n 
some situations they show an exclusiveness so marked as to suggest 
the existence of groups i n the s t r i c t sense, and to point to recog-
nisable divisions within the community". This he constrasts with the 
"extended network"' which "tends to cut across such divisions" (Epstein, 
1961, p,56) The d i s t i n c t i o n was used by Epstein to describe how norms 
percolate down through a s o c i a l system. The apprehension of choice i s 
important i n t h i s study since Chanda's network i s a r e s u l t of picking 
individuals from certain categories - kin, tribesmen, prestige groups -
according to Chanda's whims» 
Social control i s discussed i n a l l these papers - through the pressures 
exerted by networks^ aid Barnes s p e c i f i c a l l y discusses the p o l i t i c a l 
processes of committees as p a r t i c u l a r l y cogent i n t h i s society based 
upon face to face relationships. Mayer also describes the adaptation 
of the migrant to the town as a r e s o c i a l i s a t i o n t h r o u ^ the network 
chosen when he moves into the town. 
As well as s i m i l a r i t i e s i n subject matter, the methods of each early 
study are of i n t e r e s t . A l l four concentrate upon the "free spheres 
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of personal.life and l e i s u r e - p a r t i c u l a r l y the domestic,kinship, 
recreational and r e l i g i o u s f i e l d s " (P, Mayer, p, 8), as being the 
areas - i n t e r s t i t i a l to i n s t i t u t i o n s - where choice and thus network 
analysis are most relevant. Barnes, i n f a c t , apparently envisaged 
the s o c i a l network as being made up of only these informal l i n k s 
(a view which he has since revised - 1969* 1970) 
Bott, Barnes and Mayer, although a l l basing their analyses upon 
s p e c i f i c f i e l d work, do not use the network concept as a means of 
presentation of data. This i s l e f t to Epstein who follows the move-
ments of an African around town and asks him to record his s o c i a l 
i nteractions. I n t h i s area, as well, the l a t e r network analysts 
have superceded three of these four early studies i n that there i s 
a tendency to t r y to present s p e c i f i c examples of s o c i a l networks, 
t t ^ u ^ t h i s i s s t i l l true of only about half of a l l studies which 
use the idea of s o c i a l networks. 
This allows a va^eness to e x i s t i n the definitions used by the authors 
Barnes - "Thus the s o c i a l network i n Bremnes i s largely a system of 
t i e s between pairs of persons who regard themselves as approximately 
s o c i a l equals"Q.954> V » A A ) 
Bott: - "A network i s a s o c i a l configuration i n which some but not 
a l l of the component external units maintain relationships with 
one another. The external units do not make up aiarger s o c i a l 
whole. They are not surrounded by a common boundary"Ql971 » p,2l6} 
Epstein - "The network as a whole, therefore, provides a correct 
or uniform structure composed of interpersonal links which spread out 
and ramify i n a l l directions, c r i s s c r o s s i n g not only the whole of the 
l o c a l community, but; k n i t t i n g people together i n different towns and 
the town and country. "(^1961^p,56j 
Mayer - "The network i s the t o t a l of ego's interpersonal r e l a t i o n -
ships with other individuals. I n any particular society the indivi= 
dtials concerned do not constitute a group i n the sociological sense; 
they form something which l i k e a kindred can only be defined with 
ego as the central point of reference,"^1961^p,9^ 
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The s p l i t between those who v i s u a l i s e the s o c i a l network as ego-
centric (Bott and Mayer) and those who do not (Barnes) i s apparent 
already. Also the use of a theoretical concept which i s not speci-
f i c a l l y defined socio- or ego-centric but i n practice becomes ego-
ce n t r i c (Epstein). 
In spite of l a t e r developments i t i s quite remarkable how wide 
an area these four authors covered between them, and how accurately 
t h e i r i n t e r e s t s forecasted those of l a t e r network analysts. 
To recapitulate - of the four studies, three occ;ir i n urban situations 
and one i n a r u r a l commiinity, a r a t i o which probably s t i l l p e rsists i n 
network studies. 
A l l were i n complex so c i e t i e s - which whilst not necessarily true of 
l a t e r studies, i s predominantly the case. 
A l l are concerned with the emergence of class and other "groupings" 
i n society; (network analysts are now p a r t i c u l a r l y interested i n 
e t h n i c i t y ) . 
Norms and s o c i a l control are discussed at length. 
C r i s i s , choice and c o n f l i c t are emp|sasised i n Bott's, Mayer's and 
Epstein's studies, though not i n Barnes's. 
The individual's viewpoint i s an aspect of great importance i n defining 
c l a s s groups, urbanisation and,thus, the relationship of the individual 
or group and i t s environment i s stressed. 
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The only r e a l l y new ideas which seem to have appeared i n l a t e r 
studies (apart from the modifications mentioned before) are the 
emphasis l a i d upon p o l i t i c a l manoeuvering which i s an out-growth of 
an i n t e r e s t i n choice, c o n f l i c t and c r i s i s , "the action frame of 
reference" and the generation of s o c i a l forms, which Elizabeth 
Bbtt; pointed out i n 1957,biat which has been overlooked for almost, 
ten years. 
Thus, a close examination of these early studies c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e s 
the future direction of network analysis, including some les s a t t r a c -
t i v e aspects, such as Epstein's claim that "the detailed evidence of 
the narrative which follows puts the reader i n a position to check 
my own analysis and where th i s i s inadequate to. suggest alternative 
and more sat i s f a c t o r y interpretation of the material,'" (See c]:s.pter v) 
The l a t e r work of these authors and the areas of study which they have 
p a r t i c u l a r l y inspired are also of i n t e r e s t , Bott has since -turned to 
psychoanalysis and so has not produced any more network studies u n t i l 
her theoretical '•leconsiderations', written for the second edition of 
"Family and Social Network" produced i n 1971. Several restudies to 
t e s t her hypothesis have been produced i n B r i t a i n and America and she 
i s frequently mentioned by network analysts but the wider implications 
of the o r i g i n a l book are r a r e l y mentioned, as Gluckman has remarked i n 
the preface to the second edition, 
Barnes, who became Professor of Sociology at: Cambridge i n 1969? has 
produced no further network studies using f i e l d data, but he has 
written two a r t i c l e s (Barnes, I968, 1970) refining the idea of network 
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and attempting to give i t s p e c i f i c mathematical relevance (the 
timing the Barnes !6 a r t i c l e s i s evidence of increasing i n t e r e s t i n 
the concept). Again tribute i s paid to his early a r t i c l e i n many 
l a t e r studies but i t seems to be too early (or too d i f f i c u l t ) for 
applications of h i s mathematical uses of the concept to appear, 
Epstein has written a network study (Epstein i n Mitchell I969) 
concerned with a scandal i n Ndola, i n which he attempts to document 
h i s e a r l i e r ideas on the diffusion, maintenance, and sanctioning of 
norms i n urban situations. Apart from this work he has abandoned 
the network concept, 
P. Mayer has written two a r t i c l e s which are concerned with networks 
and urbanisation a t a wider comparative l e v e l than h i s book (a second 
edition of which has j u s t appeared - 1971)• There i s a considerable 
i n t e r e s t i n ethnicity and s o c i a l i s a t i o n at present and a great many 
of the ideas being explored were f i r s t presented by P, Mayer i n I96I, 
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a) Sociometry - M,G, Smith's ' S t r a t i f i c a t i o n i n Grenada' 1965 
Running p a r a l l e l to these s p e c i f i c a l l y anthropological developments 
i n the 1 9 5 0 ' s and the early 1 9 6 0 ' s i s sociometry which involves the 
use of experiments and mathematical techniques to explain human 
behaviour within groups. 
This has c l e a r l y also been an important influence upon l a t e r network 
the o r i s t s , as i s evidenced by the fact that of 1 3 0 references cited 
i n J , C o Mitchell's I 9 6 9 symposium, 3 6 are to ba s i c a l l y sociometric 
soiurces, of fegse 2 3 are p r e - 1 9 6 0 o This interest and mode of analysis 
i s c l e a r l y a formative influence, ' 
An early anthropological study which uses these techniques i s that of 
MeGo Smith. 
I intend to discuss t h i s i n some d e t a i l here, since i t i s the e a r l i e s t 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y oriented ne-twork study made by an anthropologist. 
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I n contrast to Barnes, Bott and Mayer, Smith used the network 
concept i n a very formal way i n fielc^work carried out i n 1952 - 5% 
He attempted to t e s t J.S, Pumivall's theory of pluralism and Talcott 
Parsons's theory of s o c i a l action, by demonstrating the presence or 
absence of a common value system, which i s a functional prerequisite 
for the existence of society according to the action t h e o r i s t s , * * 
Smith was looking for evidence^ i n the form of a "discontinuous status 
order, characterised by abrupt cleavages between component sections 
that are distinguished as genuine status continued by their different 
systems of values, action and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s " - to validate his 
support for the theory of pluralism. 
I n order to obtain t h i s he examined Grenada - a tropical colony i n 
which the main population components were black, brown and white, a 
simpler type of the colonial society with which P u m i v a l l was concerned. 
Smith's study was of the e l i t e only, since folk and e l i t e categories 
were mutually exclusive and t h i s provided a useful way of li m i t i n g 
the study's scope. He was expecting that among these main sections, 
Pluralism involves the co-existence of incompatible i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
systems and this i s reflected i n the f a c t that there i s no status 
continuum, based upon common Values, ihich i s generally recognised 
throughout the society concerned. I t i s , i n fa c t , a society i n 
which "sharp differences of culture, status, s o c i a l organisation and 
often race also characterise the different population categories which 
compose i t . An important feature of this s o c i e t a l type i s the subor-
dination of the majority to a minority which i s also c u l t u r a l l y d i s t i n c t . 
The conditions of dominance and subordination are expressed i n s t i t u -
t i o n a l l y as i n interpersonal r e l a t i o n s , " 
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d i f f e r e n c e s would p o s s i b l y d i s t i n g u i s h " c u l t u r a l sections" r a t h e r 
than s o c i a l classes« 
The f i e l d methods aimed s p e c i f i c a l l y a t " o b j e c t i v i t y " , "appropriateness" 
and "consistency", w i t h the i n t r o d u c t i o n of minimal predicates. The 
use o f s t a t i s t i c s t o express the values u n d e r l y i n g the data obtained 
was also important. 
The i n f o r m a t i o n used f o r the analysis was a series of rankings of the 
444 i n d i v i d u a l s contained i n the Grenada Handbook and D i r e c t o r y of 
prominent i n d i v i d u a l s (405 r a t i n g s were i n f a c t usable). These people 
were ranked by 19 members of the e l i t e , according to d e l i b e r a t e l y 
vague i n s t r u c t i o n s which produced a v a r i e t y of responses s t r u c t u r e d 
i n t o 515 c e l l s which were numbered, l e t t e r e d or occasionally described. 
These were amalgamated t o produce a s i n g l e scale en which a l l 405 i n d i v i -
duals were ranked. This status system, expressed i n numbers from 0 t o 100 
was the independent v a r i a b l e throughout the study. Networks were 
drawn on the basis of a s s o c i a t i o n i n t o cliques (which are " s t a b l e , 
bounded groups of f r i e n d s , most of whom are not k i n " ) w i t h cores 
( i n t i m a t e f r i e n d s , centred t o the group) and periphery areas. These 
structures were l o c a t e d by rec o r d i n g the number of times t h a t the 19 
informants mentioned the existence of a c l i q u e containing p a r t i c u l a r 
persons. As a r e s u l t the cliques could be given an absolute numerical 
r a t i n g - the frequency of r e p o r t which i n d i c a t e d the i n t e n s i t y of 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p involved and enabled the core and the a f f i l i a t e members 
of the cliques t o be i d e n t i f i e d . I40 persons were included i n the 
c l i q u e s , which occurred i n 25 c l i q u e c l u s t e r s ( w i t h overlapping or 
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common core s ) . These c l i q u e c l u s t e r s were each located on the 
stat u s continuum by means of a mean status score ca l c u l a t e d f o r 
each one. 
The r e l a t i o n between st a t u s and a s s o c i a t i o n was f u r t h e r explored 
by an an a l y s i s of "clubbing"' on the i s l a n d . Wealth, occupation, descent 
and marriage were a l l examined w i t h reference t o s t a t u s , using data 
gained from i n v e n t o r i e s o f d i r e c t o r s h i p s , income and occupation 
and observation. A genealogical study of 85 descent l i n e s was also 
analysed as a dependent v a r i a b l e . 
The theory of p l i i r a l i s m i s proved since the expected d i s c o n t i n u i t i e s 
are found expressed as'a d i v i s i o n of the e l i t e i n t o 4 s t r a t a , which 
do not r e l a t e t o any one v a r i a b l e and express value dissonance even 
w i t h i n the e l i t e themselves. The break between the e l i t e and f o l k 
sections i s also demonstrated t o e x i s t . 
More important, f o r my purposes, however, i s the f a c t t h a t Smith has 
s u c c e s s f u l l y " i l l u s t r a t e d " a method o f the f i e l d study and analysis 
of s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n t h a t seems e s p e c i a l l y appropriate t o sma l l 
s o c i e t i e s or to small segments of la r g e s o c i e t i e s and which uses n e t -
work a n a l y s i s as an important element of the method as a whole. I n 
t h i s p a r t i c u l a r study networks are used i n an extremely l i t e r a l and 
f o r m a l i s t i c way, which c l e a r l y departs from those approaches used by 
the other a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s I have so f a r mentioned. Here networks 
take on the r o l e o f a p u r e l y a n a l y t i c a l device, not adding t o hypotheses 
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or explanations as such. I n s p i t e of the lack of emphasis l a i d upon 
network th e o r i e s by Smith, the method reaches a l e v e l of s t a t i s t i c a l 
s o p h i s t i c a t i o n and refinement| which has s t i l l not been approached 
i n other a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l studies u s i n g network a n a l y s i s . 
Later work, by Manchester s o c i a l anthropologists p a r t i c u l a r l y , has 
aimed a t the use of s o p h i s t i c a t e d mathematical techniques, i n a way 
which derives from sociometry, but Smith's study i s r a r e l y i f ever 
c i t e d ( f o r instance, not i n M i t c h e l l ' s 1969 symposium). Thus, 
although i t i n f a c t p o i n t s the way i n which some l a t e r developments 
were t o go, i t cannot be said t o have s p e c i f i c a l l y been an in f l u e n c e 
upon such l a t e r studies i n the way t h a t Barnes, B o t t , Mayer and 
Epstein are. 
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5. EVIDENCE OF INTEREST DJ METtfORK ANALYSIS 
I n order toi demonstrate t h a t network analysis has become an impor-
t a n t element of B r i t i s h s o c i a l anthropology, since the p u b l i c a t i o n 
of the studies mentioned before, I have chosen some quotations from 
a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s i n B r i t a i n and elsewhere, and also from some members 
of r e l a t e d d i s c i p l i n e s o 
Remarks by network analysts themselves ( i n chronological order) 
"Another h e l p f u l analogy which I bel i e v e makes the f i r s t ma.jor 
advance i n the language of sociology since r o l e , i s t h a t of 
'network'."(Prankenberg, I966, p.242) 
I'A d e t a i l e d study of personal networks i n urban studies promises 
t o y i e l d important i n s i g h t s i n t o the s o c i a l behavioiir i n towns." 
(j.C. M i t c h e l l , I966, p.55o) 
"The network concept i s indispensable i n discussion ( p f j those 
s i t u a t i o n s where, f o r examples, the i n d i v i d u a l i s involved i n 
i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s which cut r i ^ t across the boundaries 
o f v i l l a g e , subcaste and lin e a g e " ... " I t i s appropriate where 
enduring groups such as p a r t i e s and f a c t i o n s have not formed and 
where i n d i v i d u a l s are c o n t i n u a l l y r e q u i r e d t o make choices about 
whom they should look t o f o r understanding, help, i n f l u e n c e and 
guidance."(Srinivas and B e t e i l l e , 1964si p.l66^ 
"The an a l y s i s of s o c i a l change i n terms of s o c i a l networks 
( p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h reference t o -urban commimities) seems t o be 
the r e p l a c i n g among a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s , the former more g e n e r a l l y 
accepted method of analysis i n terms of i n s t i t u t i o n s and groups," 
(Oeser, 1969, p.50) 
" I n so f a r as B r i t i s h studies are concerned, the use of 'networks' 
as an a n a l y t i c a l r a t h e r than a metaphorical concept, dates only 
from 1954. Since then there have been a few studies which have 
made extensive use of i t but the idea i s becoming more and more 
popular." ^J.C, M i t c h e l l , 1969, p . l ) 
" I n considering my f i e l d research data on the Ndendeuli and i n 
working out the e x p o s i t i o n presented i n the foregoing chapters 
o f t h i s book, i t seemed t o me t h a t the most s a t i s f a c t o r y frame 
of reference, i n a general sense, was t h a t of 'network'. This 
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i s a term, which along w i t h s i m i l a r cognate ones (web, 
mesh, g r i d , r e t i c u l a t i o n and the l i k e ) , t h a t anthropolo-
g i s t s and s o c i o l o g i s t s have o f t e n used i n the past, p r i n -
c i p a l l y as a convenient metaphor or a'^ s a suggestive analogy,," 
( G u l l i v e r 5 1971, p.345) 
"When we f i r s t used the idea of network I do not t h i n k t h a t e i t h e r 
John Barnes (1954) or I r e a l i s e d i t would become fashionable i n 
B r i t i s h s o c i a l anthropology;''(B6tt, 1971, p.316} 
The opinions of some people who have not worked s p e c i f i c a l l y w i t h networks 
o^ t h e i r importance i n B r i t i s h s o c i a l anthropology. 
"The d i f f i c u l t i e s met by s o c i a l anthropologists i n e x p l a i n i n g 
a l l the problems of the d i v i s i o n of labour i n complex s o c i e t i e s , 
can be most c l e a x l y seen, perhaps, t h r o u ^ an analysis of the 
concepts they employed and coined f o r the study of complex 
s o c i e t i e s , once they found t h a t t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l techniques and 
concepts d i d not s u f f i c e t o deal w i t h a l l the problems inherent 
i n the m a t e r i a l . The most important concepts evolved f o r these 
purposes a r e i 'network', developed by Biimes, 1954 (also used 
by Bott:, 1957)> ' s o c i a l f i e l d * , i n i t i a l l y developed by Fortes 
and Gluckman and h i s students, 1958, and ' s o c i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n ' , 
as developed by F i r t h , 1951."|(Eisenstadt, p. 208.) 
" I t i s only perhaps the concept of network t h a t t o some extent 
provides a p o t e n t i a l l y new a n a l y t i c a l t o o l . I t c l e a r l y describes 
or p o i n t s out the existence of some d i f f e r e n t i a l r e l a t i o n between 
d i f f e r e n t - p e o p l e who are not organised i n corporate groups,and i t 
may help i n the analysis of the r e l a t i o n of d i f f e r e n t persons, 
a c t i n g i n such a network, t o d i f f e f e n t types of s o c i a l r o l e s and 
i n s t i t m t i o n a l frameworks. I n t h i s way the concept of network 
does a t l e a s t p o i n t out one way - beyond embedding i n the s t r u c -
t u r e o f concrete groups - i n which the various r e g u l a t i v e mecha-
nisms can be organised." (Eisenstadt, 1961, p 209) 
"We see here (Barnes, 1954) the i n i t i a l usefulness of a c o n t r o l -
l e d metaphor expanded i n t o a p a r t i a l analogy f o r or d e r i n g and 
c l a r i f y i n g s o c i a l data i n a s i t u a t i o n a t the i n d i v i d u a l l e v e l 
where l i t t l e i s known. Since, moreover, the 'network' can be 
st u d i e d w i t h o u t reference t o phys i c a l or s o c i a l boundaries, the 
method seems, a t l a s t , t o excape from presuppositions of closure 
and e q u i l i b r i u m . I t has the a d d i t i o n a l advantage of supplying 
a s u i t a b l e base from which the studv of r o l e and r o l e expectations 
might proceed." (Reader, I964, p.20) 
"These scholars [ w r i t i n g i n A,S,A.3^and A.J . axe f i n d i n g 
t h a t t h e o r i e s based on concepts of groups, groupings and associa-
t i o n s and dyadic r e l a t i o n s h i p s are inadequate f o r t h e i r problems; 
the network and other forms of quasi-groups, which are ego centred, 
are becoming more s i g n i f i c a n t i n b r i d g i n g the gap between the 
s t r u c t i a r a l framework and i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n . " (^Gluckman and Eggan, 
1966, p, xxxv) 
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"The p o i n t i s t h a t a d e t a i l e d study of networks helps us t o 
i s o l a t e s o c i a l f i e l d s and provides a very u s e f u l t o o l f o r 
i n v e s t i g a t i n g l o c a l communities."(Pahl, I969, p.290) 
"The n o t i o n of s o c i a l network may be applied u s e f u l l y i n 
many a n a l y t i c a l contexts, but i n p o l i t i c a l studies i t i s 
p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l e v a n t where there are no sharp bovindaries 
• w i t h i n the s o c i e t y being i n v e s t i g a t e d , or where there i s no 
obvious d i v i s i o n between the leaders and the f o l l o w e r s . " 
(Swartz, 1968, p54) 
" I b e l i e v e t h a t the most important s i n g l e c o n t r i b u t i o n of the 
A f r i c a n i s t studies under review i s t h e i r focus on ego-centred 
networks and fields."'^Kushner, I969, p.95) 
"This (network^ i s an i n word c,t the moment," Mair, 1971> p.969 
"At the time [ o f f i e l d ^ o r k ] i t d i d not occur to me to make 
a systematic study of personalretworks. "(Lloydd, 1971) (The 
i m p l i c a t i o n being t h a t i n the 1970's t h i s would be a f a i r l y 
automatic procedure). 
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THE DETERMINANTS OF THE INTEREST IN NETWORK ANALYSIS 
My aim i n t h i s s e c t i o n i s t o consider the modes of thought which 
were contemporaneous i n s o c i a l anthropology w i t h the appearance of 
network a n a l y s i s , I am not concerned w i t h t h e i r correctness or other-
wise - f o r instance on the p o i n t of the e x t i n c t i o n of anthropology's 
t r a d i t i o n a l subject matter of p r i m i t i v e s o c i e t i e s , I am merely t r y i n g 
t o l o c a t e p a r t i c u l a r currents of opinion which e x i s t e d and provided 
a context of j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the method's appearance. As a r e s u l t , 
I am i n v o l v e d w i t h the opinions of network analysts r a t h e r more than 
those of other accepted a u t h o r i t a t i v e anthropologists of the time, 
although c l e a r l y network analysts must r e l a t e t o such a mainstream of 
thought. 
a) Change i n anthropology's subject matter 
" I t i s no accident t h a t B b t t , Adrian Mayer and P, Mayer, and 
Epstein, Barnes andJother c o n t r i b u t o r s t o t h i s v o l m e should have 
turned to the n o t i o n of s o c i a l network i n t h e i r quest to under-
stand behavioiir i n the s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s they studied. For the 
s t r u c t u r e of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s of the r u r a l parishioners of 
modem Norway, the f a m i l i e s i n London, the l o c a l p o l i t i c s i n an 
I n d i a n town, or the a c t i v i t i e s of contemporary A f r i c a n townsmen 
accords so l i t t l e w i t h the s t r u c t u r e of communities commonly 
described i n a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l w r i t i n g , t h a t some other approach 
seemed e s s e n t i a l , " M i t c h e l l , 1969» p,48. 
"To understand the s t a t u s of the network concept, I t h i n k i t 
helps t o ask when and why i t was adopted, I t h i n k i t was adopted 
because i t seen^ to o f f e r a way out of the stalemate t h a t s o c i a l 
ajithropology appeared to have got i n t o by the l a t e 1950's. The 
s t r u c t u r a l / f u n c t i o n a l v e i n had been t h o r o u ^ l y mined by the elegant studies 
of Evans-PritchardjItetesp-luckman and t h e i r numerous colleagues and 
studentHi Discontent was i n the a i r . What about s o c i a l change? 
What about complex s o c i e t i e s ? What about v a r i a b i l i t y , choice and 
the choosing i n d i v i d u a l ? " E l i z a b e t h B o t t , 1971, P525 
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E l i z a b e t h B 6 t t uses here a very m i l d term to describe the 
s t a t e of anthropology a t t h i s time as seen by i t s p r a c t i t i o n e r s . 
I t was f o r many of them a time 4o£ c r i s i s . 
This despondent view was p r e c i p i t a t e d by various f a c t o r s , the 
two most c r u c i a l being the apparent disappearance of anthropology's 
t r a d i t i o n a l s u b j e c t matter^ (which r e s u l t e d p a r t i c u l a r l y i n new 
problems o f d e f i n i n g s o c i a l anthropology v i s a v i s s o c i o l o g y ) , 
and the apparent f a i l u r e of s t r u c t u r a l / f u n c t i o n a l ana^sis, which^ 
as Evans-Pritchard put i t ^ 'reigned' i n s o c i a l anthropology i n 
England i n 1950, t o cope w i t h s i t u a t i o n s of change, 
Boissevain c r e d i t s three influences w i t h causing the s h i f t i n 
o r i e n t a t i o n towards the i n t e r a c t i n g i n d i v i d u a l , apparent i n 
B r i t i s h s o c i a l anthropologys-
i ) "the growing a t t e n t i o n s o c i a l anthropologists are g i v i n g 
t o complex s o c i e t i e s " , 
i i ) "as the existence of these non-groups i n complex western 
s o c i e t i e s which have long been under anthropological 
observation, such as loidia and even i n p r i m i t i v e s o c i e t i e s " | 
(a process I hope to i l l u s t r a t e ) , 
i i i ) "the concept of ego-centric i n t e r a c t i o n systems i s becoming 
i n c r e a s i n g l y less a l i e n t o a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l theory^" ^968, p,545) 
Garbett has c i t e d s i m i l a r f a c t o r s , seeing the process of r e - o r i e n -
t a t i o n o c c u r r i n g "as f a m i l i a j r i t y w i t h the main s o c i a l forms, and 
as the s o c i e t i e s which were studied became more heterogenous as 
they underwent r a p i d s o c i a l change, a t t e n t i o n turned to examining 
ways i n which i n d i v i d u a l s i n t e r a c t e d w i t h i n a system. Researchers 
focussed p r i m a r i l y on the means by which i n d i v i d u a l s attempt to 
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resolve c o n f l i c t i n g p r i n c i p l e s of or g a n i s a t i o n aid t o cope w i t h 
discrepant values. I t i s also s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h i s a n a l y t i c a l 
development occurred, i n the main, i n c e n t r a l A f r i c a where s o c i e t i e s 
l a c k lineages and where the m o b i l i t y of populations and the f l u i d i t y 
o f groups i s a marked f e a t u r e , " ( s i c ) ^,219, 1970^ 
These network analysts see the d i s c i p l i n e ^ changing subject 
matter as b r i n g i n g about a r e o r i e n t a t i o n i n B r i t i s h s o c i a l anthro-
pology, one aspect of which i s the emergence of the network concept. 
The change i n subject matter brought about a rea p p r a i s a l of t r a d i -
t i o n a l a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s a t the same time, 
b) The Disappearance of the ' P r i m i t i v e ' Society 
S o c i a l anthropology has f r e q u e n t l y been defined as being concerned 
w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r type of s o c i e t y which served t o demarcate i t s 
f i e l d o f study from other d i s c i p l i n e s . For instance, Evans-
P r i t c h a r d defined s o c i a l anthropology i n 1951 as being t h a t 
"branch of s o c i o l o g i c a l studies which c h i e f l y devotes i t s e l f t o 
the study of p r i m i t i v e s o c i e t i e s , " Anthropologists have long 
feared the demise of such p r i m i t i v e or p r e l i t e r a t e s o c i e t i e s , which 
has always been regarded as i n e v i t a b l e . 
"Ethnology i s i n the sadly l u d i c r o u s p o s i t i o n , not to say t r a g i c , 
t h a t a t the very moment when i t begins t o put i t s workshops i n 
order ,., the m a t e r i a l of i t s study melts av/ay v/ith hopeless 
r a p i d i t y . " (Malinowski, 1922.) 
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By the 1950's i n B r i t a i n - where s o c i a l anthropology has 
d i r e c t e d i t s a t t e n t i o n t o s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s ( r a t h e r than 
c u l t i i r e which Americanshave tended t o see as the sphere f o r 
a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l s t u d i e s , or symbolic systems, which have 
a t t r a c t e d the n o t i c e of the French) - the loss of a d e f i n i n g 
subject matter was seen t o be producing a s i t u a t i o n i n which 
the d i s t i n c t i o n between sociology and s o c i a l anthropology 
•JHt 
could no longer be upheld. 
"With the disappearance of the conditions considered the 
matter o f a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l study i n A f r i c a ^ i t i s l i k e l y t h a t 
the study of p r e - i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s w i l l be taken on by the 
h i s t o r i c a l d i s c i p l i n e s whereas contemporary s o c i e t i e s w i l l be 
studied by sociology."(Maquet^l964, p.48) 
F i r t h had i m p l i e d by h i s use of the term 'microsociology' (l95l) 
t h a t the pos s i b l e f u t u r e fer s o c i a l anthropology l a y i n becoming 
a s p e c i a l i s t branch of sociology/ concerned w i t h the close 
s c r u t i n y of small p a r t s of s o c i e t i e s which were being analysed 
simultaneously on a d i f f e r e n t scale by s o c i o l o g i s t s . 
Since the subject matter of sociology ( i f defined as V/estem 
s o c i e t y ) i s guaranteed ( h o p e f u l l y ) t o f l o u r i s h , the pra?)ect of 
I n f a c t , such pessimism over the f u t u r e of s o c i a l anthropology 
i n B r i t a i n was q u i t e misplaced, since the d i s c i p l i n e a t t r a c t s new 
students and embarks on new research programmes w i t h what seems t o 
be an i n c r e a s i n g f a c i l i t y . The emphasis on subject matter was 
unnecessary, since^as has been recognised f o r many years i n the 
pure sciences, i n the s o c i a l behavioural sciences^ e.g. Gluckman and 
Devons 1964? i t i s the types of r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the objects 
under study, r a t h e r than the objects themselves which serve to 
def i n e a d i s c i p l i n e , and anthropology has a unique way of approa-
ching such r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
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becoming s o c i o l o g i s t s a t t r a c t e d s o c i a l anthropologists a great 
deal a t t h i s time, by a l i g n i n g w i t h a d i s c i p l i n e which t o them 
c l e a r l y had a great f u t u r e ahead, i t was hoped t o escape the awful 
prospect o f e x t i n c t i o n which anthropology and p r i m i t i v e t r i b e s 
faced together. 
Thus, there were various attempts t o i n t e g r a t e the two studies 
which f u r t h e r b l i i r r e d the boundaries between them. An example 
of these was Goody's (1966) f o r m u l a t i o n which dismissed as 'xeno-
phobic' any attempt t o draw l i n e s between s o c i a l anthroplogy and 
sociology, and u s i n g Radcliffe-Brown's conception of s o c i a l anthro-
pology as comparative sociology suggested three main i n t e r l o c k i n g 
f i e l d s o f comparative sociologys-
lo The Sociology of developed s o c i e t i e s . 
2, The sociology of developing n a t i o n s . 
3. The sociology o f simpler s o c i e t i e s . 
The l a s t o f these i s a type of s o c i a l archaeology. 
As w e l l as being f o r c e d , by an i n c r e a s i n g l y e l u s i v e subject matter, 
t o adopt the l a b e l s o c i o l o g i s t , some anthropologists f e l t t h a t "the 
very term**'anthropology', w i t h i t s French counterpart ethnologie ... 
are frowned on i n many qu a r t e r s , they are suspected of being t i n g e d 
w i t h c o l o n i a l i s m . New research p r o j e c t s are not always encouraged 
There i s also an undeniable f a c t t h a t the two d i s c i p l i n e s are c l o s e l y 
r e l a t e d which j u s t i f i e s such a movement. 
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and some A f r i c a n a u t h o r i t i e s manifest more d i s t r u s t than enthusiasm 
when asked t o support or f a c i l i t a t e a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l f i e l d works", 
(Maquet, 196#:, P,47) 
At l e a s t one major exponent o f network analyses p r e f e r s the terms 
sociology t o anthropologys 
"There seems to me t o be no d i s t i n c t i o n a t a l l between 
sociology, as the study o f s o c i e t i e s and s o c i a l a c t i o n i n 
general, and s o c i a l anthroplogy which has t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
spent most o f i t s energy i n studying other peoples organised 
i n s o c i e t i e s which appear t o be d i f f e r e n t t o our own. At one 
l e v e l , t h a t i s t o say, the only d i s t i n c t i o n between them i s 
an h i s t o r i c a l one, which can be explained i n the terms of the 
growth of impe r i a l i s m i n the ninetheenth century aind the need 
to e s t a b l i s h some k i n d of understanding of e x o t i c peoples t h a t 
Europeans came i n t o close contact w i t h d u r i n g t h a t p e r i o d . So 
i t ' s a c o n t i n u a t i o n of an anachronistic form of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . " 
( j . A . Bkmes, 1971) 
Despres, who s p e c i f i c a l l y saw t h i s period as one of the major c r i s i s , 
described the causes as "The impending e x t i n c t i o n of the so-called 
p r i m i t i v e s o c i e t i e s i n which anthropologists have done most of t h e i r 
work and the growing r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t anthraplogy's f u t u r e as a 
s c i e n t i f i c d i s c i p l i n e depends upon the a b i l i t y of anthropologists to. 
d e f i n e and undertake meaningful research i n so-called p r i m i t i v e 
s o c i e t i e s " , ^1968, p.l4.j 
Kingsley Garbett has also pinpointed the importance of subject matter 
as a p o s i t i v e f a c t o r encouraging the use of ego-oriented approaches, 
" I t i s also s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h i s a n a l y t i c a l development occurred 
i n the main, i n Central A f r i c a , where s o c i e t i e s lack lineages, 
and where the m o b i l i t y of populations and the f l u i d i t y of groups 
i s a marked f e a t u r e " (jGarbett^ p.219, 1970,) 
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For the m a j o r i t y of an t h r o p o l o g i s t s a more negative view p r e v a i l s -
i n t h a t a f e a r of the disappearance of subject matter forces a r e a p p r a i s a l 
of methods and t h e o r i e s . Such a view i s s t i l l widespread. 
"The present ' c r i s i s ' i n anthropology has been occasioned by 
two sets o f events i n the wider s o c i e t y . F i r s t there i s the 
v i r t u a l disappearance of the p r i m i t i v e world which i n the past 
provided the d i s c i p l i n e w i t h most of i t s data, as w e l l as the 
major i n s p i r a t i o n f o r i t s key concepts and t h e o r e t i c a l ideas; 
second, there i s a growing demand f o r greater anthropological 
involvement i n and a p p l i c a t i o n t o contemporary s o c i a l problems," 
(Manners and Kaplan^1971^p.I9) 
I f ; i s i n t h i s context t h a t the p o p u l a r i t y of the network concept must 
be understood. 
c) The T h e o r e t i c a l ' c r i s i s * of anthropology 
M i t c h e l l has w r i t t e n ^ " t h e inadequacy of t h i s ( s t r u c t u r a l ] approach 
became apparent when s o c i a l a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s began t o d i r e c t t h e i r 
a t t e n t i o n t o more complex s o c i e t i e s and as Bremnes, to urban communi-
t i e s i n I n d i a and A f r i c a , and t o small-scale s o c i e t i e s v/hich lacked 
s i n g l e pervasive s t r u c t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n tenns of which t h e i r 
morphologies cotild be p r e d i c t e d " . (1969, p.9). 
Network a n a l y s i s appeared a t a time when the t h e o r e t i c a l basis of 
anthropolog;' f o r the previous two decades was being d i s c r e d i t e d . 
The V a l i d i t y or not o f the attacks made upon the s t r u c t u r a l / f u n c t i o n a l 
paradigm i s not the problem f o r the present t h e s i s . The concern here 
i s t o p o i n t t o the areas i n which the o l d paradigm was considered inade-
quate, and t o p o i n t out t h a t i t was these areas t h a t network analysis 
was claimed t o be able t o t a c k l e . 
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i ) The Perceived inadequacies of s t r u c t u r a l / f u n c t i o n a l i s m 
The s t r u c t u r a l / f u n c t i o n a l i s t ' s paradigm has been the subject of 
many c r i t i q u e s and so I i n t e n d t o p o i n t out only the areas i n which 
i t s inadequacies seem to me t o have l e j d s p e c i f i c a l l y t o the deve-
lopment of new approaches and e v e n t u a l l y the production of a new 
paradigm i n s o c i a l anthropology. 
Malinowski described the aims of f u n c t i o n a l analysis as: 
"the explanation of a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l f a c t s a t a l l l e v e l s 
of development by t h e i r f u n c t i o n , by the p a r t which they 
p l a y w i t h i n the i n t e g r a l system of c u l t u r e s , by the manner 
i n which they are r e l a t e d t o each other w i t h i n the system, 
and by the manner i n which the system i s r e l a t e d t o the 
p h y s i c a l surroundings."^Ency, Brit,,15th E d i t i o i i ) 
The r e s u l t should be a theory of 'purely e m p i r i c a l nature'. 
Radcliffe-Brovm's view of s o c i a l anthropology has been o u t l i n e d 
as an attempt t o produce statements about the persistence of 
s o c i a l systems and r e g u l a r i t i e s of s o c i a l change by the a p p l i c a t i o n 
of methods " s i m i l a r t o those used i n the p h y s i c a l and b i o l o g i c a l 
sciences," 1951. 
C r i t i c s have tended t o emphasise the h o l i s t i c view of s o c i e t y i n 
which order p r e v a i l s , and a tendency to ignore the i n d i v i d u a l , 
which are claimed t o be ^ a r t of the approach to society of 
s t r u c t u r a l / f u n c t i o n a l i s t s , 
K, Garbett (1971, p.218) has considered the inadequacies of a 
s t r u c t u r a l approach from the a c t o r - o r i e n t e d perspective so I 
s h a l l not repeat t h i s here. 
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" I t i s r a t h e r the case t h a t tfee f i o n c t i o n a l i s t terms 
of t h e i r { a n t h r o p o l o g i s t ^ analyses, t h e i r preoccupation 
w i t h groups and w i t h r e l a t i o n s between groups, l e f t out 
of account the apprehension these s o c i e t i e s had of the 
i n d i v i d u a l 5 the s o c i a l forms were not seen as i n a sense 
coping w i t h d u r a t i o n , . . The s i t u a t i o n has been reached 
when 'there i s almost an element of abuse i n the e p i t h e t 
'a s t r u c t u r a l / f u n c t i o n a l study'."(Gluckman, I968, p.234} 
As the theory as a whole came under f i r e , the concepts derived 
from s t r u c t v i r a l / f u n c t i o n a l i s m were also questioned and o f t e n 
r e j e c t e d . Notable among the notions which have undergone close 
s c r u t i n y i s t h a t of s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e . 
"This concept of s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e sprang from the 
work o f an t h r o p o l o g i s t s working i n r e l a t i v e l y s t a t i c and 
e t h n i c a l l y homogenous communities. Few such communities 
are being studied by a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s . "(Gutkind^l965, p.52) 
Often the s o l u t i o n suggested t o the problem of s t r u c t u r e has been 
t o combine the idea o f s t r u c t u r e w i t h some new concept, Netv/ork 
an a l y s i s i s seen by many of i t s adherents as p r o v i d i n g a means 
of r e c t i f y i n g the f a u l t s i n st u d i e s , u s i n g the idea of s t r u c t i i r e 
d e r i v e d from the s t r u c t u r a l i s t paradigm and adding to i t the 
elements of i n d i v i d u a l choice and manipulation of s t r u c t u r e whiqh 
are so apparent i n s o c i e t i e s today, 
"Ah im p o r t a j i t p o i n t i n the use o f the n o t i o n of s o c i a l 
networks i n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f i e l d data i s t h a t i t 
i s complementary t o , and not a s u b s t i t u t e f o r , conventional 
s o c i o l o g i c a l or an t h r o p o l o g i c a l frameworks of an a l y s i s . I t 
was introduced i n t o B r i t i s h s o c i a l anthropology i n the f i r s t 
instance p a r t i c u l a r l y because the conventional categories of 
s t r u c t u r a l / f u n c t i o n a l analysis d i d not appear t o be adequate 
when an t h r o p o l o g i s t s began to make studies outside the o r d i f 
nary r un of small-scale, i s o l a t e d ' t r i b a l ' s o c i e t i e s , " 
( M i t c h e l l , 1969, P.S) 
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"Thus s t r u c t u r a l / f u n c t i o n a l analysis o f t e n seeks out 
the r e g u l a r i t i e s i n behaviour, concentrating mainly on 
t h a t s o c i a l a c t i o n which i s c o n s t i t u e n t w i t h the o v e r a l l 
perceived morphology of the s o c i a l system. Because of t h i s , 
s t r u c t u r a l a nalysis o f t e n disregards behaviour which i s 
i r r e g u l a r and not eonsistent w i t h the general s t r u c t u r e o f 
the s o c i e t y s t u d i e d , " (jcapferer, I969, p,185) 
The i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s being t h a t new methods can overcome 
t h i s inadequacy of s t r u c t u r a l an.alysis. 
Another n o t i o n r e l a t e d t o the s t r u c t u r a l / f u n c t i o n a l approach 
which has been severely c r i t i c i s e d , i s t h a t of the group. The 
an a l y s i s of behaviour i n terms of group membership has been found 
inadequate i n -urban and other complex s i t u a t i o n s where the search 
f o r groups has proved unsuccessful. Network analysts have j u s t i -
f i e d the use of the concept of networks as superior t o the idea 
of groups i n many s i t u a t i o n s , S r i n i v a s and B e t e i l l e i n consider-
i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between v i l l a g e s i n I n d i a see t h a t m o b i l i t y -
v e r t i c a l and h o r i z o n t a l - now makes the idea of group inadequate. 
G i i l l i v e r (l97l) has made the same p o i n t ; Barnes says t h a t the 
concept was "developed i n s o c i a l anthropology to analyse and 
describe those s o c i a l processes i n v o l v i n g l i n k s across, r a t h e r 
than w i t h i n group and category l i m i t s " ' . (I969, P»54.) 
B o t t says s p e c i f i c a l l y t h a t she "found the network idea necessary 
because the f a m i l i a r concept of group and corporate grou§ of 
t r a d i t i o n a l anthropology were not e n t i r e l y adequate t o the f i e l d 
data I was d e a l i n g with"'. ^ 971» P.313) 
Yablonsky has remarked upon the existence of a group f u l f i l l i n g 
prophecy "whereby the very o r i e n t a t i o n of the s o c i a l a n t h r o p o l o g i s t 
towards searching f o r endiiring groups, i n terms of which t o analyse 
s o c i e t y , has created such e n t i t i e s i n analysis whether they e x i s t 
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or not on the ground or i n the minds of the observed." ( i n f a c t , 
i t i s probable that such a conceptual scheme had a greater v a l i d i t y 
i n the past, but that i t has outlived i t s usefulness, A tot a l 
cynicism over such a point as t h i s eliminates a l l anthropological 
writing as being the imposition of the anthropologist's categories 
of thought upon the observed society and i s c l e a r l y very unproductive.) 
I n place of the groups network, quasi-group and faction^ have pro-
vided means of analysis i n many situations, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 'large 
complex and changing s o c i e t i e s ' where structiiralism i s inadequate 
(Srinivas and Beteille)« Gulliver's study (l97l)> amongst others, 
demonstrates that such an approach has a wider potentialo 
Network analysts propose to concentrate upon the i n t e r s t i t i a l areas 
of s o c i a l choice, manipulation and interaction which either cross 
or e x i s t outside the institutional and group l i m i t s , which were the 
concepts of the previous structural/functional studies. The method 
has thus been used p a r t i c u l a r l y i n situations of change, urbanisation 
and p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y which involves areas beyond those defined as 
"political'jfin the past, Gulliver has also foimd i t useful i n d i s -
cussing a society of the " t r a d i t i o n a l " anthropological type where 
he was "seeking to avoid the past r i g i d i t i e s of structural/functionalism 
and presumptions of e q u i l i b r i a . " Gulliver, 1971» P«5« 
As the major concepts of structure and group had to be rethou^t, other 
related ideas have been rejected or reconsidered. Defining areas of 
study has become more problematic and the boimdaries between ethnic 
groups have become of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t . 
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I t would seem that the use of network analysis implies a concern 
to overcome the inadequacies perceived to be inherent i n a struc-
tural/functional analysis, v/hich requires a concern with facts 
of a rather different order from those commonly regarded as the 
basis of an anthropological study. The nuances and subtleties 
of s o c i a l interaction are now the focus of i n t e r e s t . This type 
of reorientation i s at the basis of T. Kuhn's study of s c i e n t i f i c 
revolutions - that such a revolution occurs not simply because of 
the introduction of new data, or the refutation of a theory, but 
because the whole view of what i s admissable as fact undergoes 
d r a s t i c reorientation. 
An analogy with l i n g u i s t i c s i s useful, since the essence of the 
Chomskian revolution i s the attempt "to construct models of what 
i t i s the native speaker knows about the structure of his language 
moreover what he knows i n t u i t i v e l y . " ^ , Thome^ 1971.^  The current 
paradigm of B r i t i s h s o c i a l anthropology admits into the realm of 
f a c t more than the purely observable actions which E a d c l i f f e -
Brown emphasised so much. The i n t u i t i v e knowledge of a situation 
held by the participants i s what i s sought - the receipe knowledge 
of Luckman and Berger - which constitutes the soci a l stock of 
knowledge. 
Thus the greatest potential of network analysis has been missed 
by those who i n s i s t that the observable 'facts' are the only ones 
with which the s o c i a l anthropologist should be concerned. As 
Bailey has put i t (l970) - we do not wish to be merely where the 
action i s but where the mind i s . Network ajialysis can help us 
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to a t t a i n t h i s end by ordering our approach to an apparently 
confused and complex situation. In th i s respect i t has potential, 
but before t h i s can be f u l l y u t i l i s e d , i t must be coupled with 
the new ways of thought which are not those of a modified s t r u c -
tural/fimctionalism. 
I t i s only by using a r a d i c a l l y different approach to the study 
of society that B r i t i s h s o c i a l anthropologists w i l l be able to 
escape the constraints of a structural/functional type of analysis. 
Among the network analyses actually carried out, the main f a i l i n g s 
l i e i n a hesitancy or i n a b i l i t y to make the break with previous 
approaches and to accept and use the f u l l implications of such a 
method. 
"Ta draw attention to the 'somewhat narrow exegesis by 
Radcliffe-Brown of Diprkheimian sociology' i s not merely 
an act of h i s t o r i c a l inaccuracy. I t can be shown to have 
had f i n a l l y a severely l i m i t i n g effect upon s o c i a l anthro-
pology and given b i r t h to conceptual distinctions which 
have occasionally degenerated into dogmas. The veiy nature 
of the soci e t i e s studied under his influence precluded the 
inadequacies of his theory from being revealed ... After 
Radcliffe-Brown, s o c i a l anthropology i n England could only 
advance by r e j e c t i n g h i s theories, not by developing them." 
^ocock, 1961 jjp. 60 and 62") 
I t i s my contention that the inconsistencies and inadequacies of 
cert a i n previous network studies may be traced to a f a i l u r e to 
r e j e c t the theories of Radcliffe-Brown and i n fact a desire to 
j u s t i f y the network concept by reference to his designation of 
s o c i a l structure as an "actually existing network of relations". 
The motivating force behind the adoption of the new technique of 
network analysis was for many " a growing d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with 
structural/functional analysis and the search, consequently, for 
alternative ways of interpreting s o c i a l a c t i o n . " ( k i t c h e l l , 1969? P. 1*^  
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This d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n was most apparent and was i n many cases 
instigated by the s p e c i f i c i n a b i l i t y of structural/functional 
analysis i n coping with s o c i a l change. 
i i ) Problems i n explaining s o c i a l change as precipitating the 
d i s i l l u s i o n with functionalismT 
"As might be expected, the f a i l u r e of the functionalist-
view comes out most c l e a r l y when we are faced with situations 
of upheaval and r a d i c a l change, "^ocock ^ 1961, p.110^ 
"The empirical value of Hadcliffe-Brown's work decreased 
as his statements about the nature of society became more 
dogmatics s o c i e t i e s were natural organisms and their study 
i n terms of functionalism and integration precluded the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of discussing the evident f a c t of change. The 
application of individual psychology to so c i a l phenomena 
was r i g h t l y rejected, but the individual for whom words and 
action have meaning, was eliminated with i t j a natural 
science must not concern i t s e l f with speculative history, 
therefore history and the methods of historians were i r r e -
levant. Hnpiricism became speculative i n the v;orse sense 
and there was an evident need to return to the authurity 
of human choice," QPocock, 1961^ p.7'2) 
"Contemporary sociology i s wedded to the fimctional analysis 
which i s s a t i s f a c t o r y for the study of soc i a l phenomena within 
a given s t r u c t u r a l context but which does not explain change." 
("p. Cohen, I968, p, 174) 
As a r e s u l t of the dominance o f / s t r u c t u r a l / f T i n c t i o n a l i s m paradigm 
"the a n a l y t i c a l contribution of modem anthropology to the 
imderfftanding of so c i a l change has been limited,"(^F. Earth, 
1967, p66l) 
The equilibrium modeji derives from structural/functional approaches 
to the study of s o c i a l change, but by I964 Reader was able to writes 
" L i t t l e more can be done with the equilibrium s o c i a l structure 
model i n the study of s o c i a l change. I t remains useful i n 
cases of Wilsonian 'ordinary' change, which cam be contained 
within the strucutre9,in other words i n repetitive s o c i a l 
systems (Gluckman, 194-2). By the techniques just mentioned 
(those of Evans and Pritchard) including an exciirsion into 
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history, the model may be extended to cover cases of 
'rad i c a l ' change providing the changing systems can be 
regarded as h o l i s t i c , 'closed' and i n successive states 
of quasi-equilibrium. These conditions, however, break 
down i n many communities, noticeably those i n modem 
emergent A f r i c a . Two problems then a r i s e , l ) the setting 
up of new models for apparently disintegrated, non-
homogeneous communities, and 2) the treatment of continu-
ing s o c i a l change within them." (Reader^1964, p.14) 
rt; i s not relevant to the present discussion to embark upon an 
attempt to j u s t i f y or refute the charge that structural/functiona-
lism i s unable to cope with situations of s o c i a l change. From 
the point of view of many s o c i a l anthropologists, i n the late 
1950's and the 1960's i t was a f a c t that structure/functionalism 
was inadequate i n th i s area and so the search had to be made for 
a- new theoretical stance, which could overcome the problems. 
Network analysis was one of the products of this search. 
I t i s often argued that a theory which explains the persistence 
of s o c i a l forms must provide an explanation for situations of 
change and i t would seem that t h i s must be l o g i c a l l y true. Thus, 
the exploitation of t h i s lack i n structural/functional analysis 
can be seen as r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n ex poste facto. 
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i i i ) General theoretical discontent 
As well as a s p e c i f i c concern oveir the v a l i d i t y of the struc-
tural/fimctional approach i n the consideration of changing or 
complex s o c i e t i e s , anthropology has been castigated for i t s 
lack of theoretical development. Thisj i s sometimes said to be 
because the d i s c i p l i n e i s a r e l a t i v e l y new one which has not yet 
developed i t s own theories. The lack, i s also blamed by some upon 
the effect of previous approaches which stressed the 'fieldwork 
mystique' and inhibited comparison between so c i e t i e s , 
Gellner writes; 
"anthropology i s facing a c r i s i s i n any case. This c r i s i s 
a r i s e s roughly from the f a c t that Malinowskian anthroplogy 
has brought forth a very r i c h harvest i n the form of knov/ledge 
and understanding of individual s o c i e t i e s . I t has not been 
so f e r t i l e as some might have hoped i n providing general 
comparative theories,"(1964) 
Bmnet and Maclntyre i n t h e i r review of the state of the s o c i a l 
sciences claim thats 
" B r i t i s h anthropologists for the l a s t generation at any rate 
have concentrated on f i e l d studies, using structural/functional 
concepts i n order to see each system studied as a system of 
int e r r e l a t e d s i t u a t i o n s . Tiis has led to detailed p a r t i c u l a r 
studies, and also to caution i n producing cross-cultural 
generalisations. Where there has been talk of general laws 
this has been a programmatic hope rather than aji actual 
attempt at formulating and testing such laws."(1970, p . x i j 
Manners and Kaplan s i m i l a r l y c r i t i c i s e the anthropologists' theoriess 
"Anthropologists use the term theory i n a great variety of 
ways - almost whimsically - sometimes as ^ynonym for a con-
cept or as a synonym for an inductive generalisation, or for 
a model (often i n i t s e l f a term used i n a number of different 
ways) sometimes merely to lend dignity to the obvious."Q968jP,4j 
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One of the attractions of network analysis i s that i t seems to 
offer a way of ordering data so that i t can be readily analysed 
and compared with that of other f i e l d workers, to produce genera-
l i s a t i o n s and laws and thus eventually an empirically based 
deductive theory. 
i v ) Quantifications p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
Mitchell suggests that the second major factor i n encouraging 
the adoption of the network concept (the f i r s t being for him 
the f a i l i n g s of the struct\iral/f\mctional approach) i s "the 
development of non-quantitative mathematical ways of rigorously 
s t a t i n g the implications entailed i n a set of relationships among 
a number of persons."(p.1. , 1969^ 
not 
This factor i s / s o important as those of subject matter and theore-
t i c a l orientation, since i t motivates only some of the network 
analysts i n t h e i r studies and i s not, as yet, very f u l l y developed 
by any of them. 
I t i s , however, a part of the desire to al i g n anthropology with 
the 'hard' sciences such as physics and biology which are widely 
seen as having more prestige. The idea of anthropology as a natural 
science i s a throwback to RadcliffS-Brown and tends to s t i f l e 
rather than develop the usefulness of network analysis or any 
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other anthropological work. I s h a l l consider the implications 
of the s c i e n t i f i c paradigm, and the related desire f o r for quanti-
f i c a t i o n i n d e t a i l l a t e r . For the moment i t i s s i i f f i c i e n t to 
point out that the desire to produce quantitative data which 
would enable comparisons to be inade has given impetus to the 
development of network analyses. The work of Wolfe, Mitchell and 
Barnes i s p a r t i c u l a r l y indicative of t h i s . 
d) Paradigm Change within Anthropology anilfelated Disciplines 
Attempts have been made to gloss over the reorientation currently 
oucurring i n B r i t i s h s o c i a l anthropology and other s o c i a l sciences, 
Gluckmann and Eggan wrote: 
"There are many new ideas i n these essays (A.S.A. monograph ^ 
but no author has attempted to put forward an altogether new theore-
t i c a l approach or even to recast the basic orientations of the subject ,., 
The basic orientation i n these essays i s therefore s t i l l the acceptance 
that the events which comprise human behaviour exhibit r e g u l a r i t i e s 
whose foims are mutually interdependent, over and above the i r i n t e r -
dependence, i n the personality-behavioiu? systems of each individual 
actor. As Radcliffe-Brown put i t , there are s o c i a l systems whose 
structures can be analysed. An interdependence of cultural i n s t i t u -
tions each of which has an elaborate structure would perhaps be the 
p a r a l l e l Malinowskian formulation."(1966^p.xxx.) 
G?his rather complacent view of what the younger generation of B r i t i s h 
s o c i a l anthropologists was up to seems to have altered i n Gluckman's 
a r t i c l e on the equilibrium model i n the analysis of so c i a l change 
written two years l a t e r , where he says that the answer to the problem 
of why structural/functional analysis has been discredited "may i n the 
widest terms, be that each new generation wishes to outdo i t s predeces-
s o i s , and wholesale condemnation i s an easy way of beginning. " ^ 68, p.234,) 
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I n f a c t , as I have argued previously, and as Pocock has pointed out, 
i t i s e s s e n t i a l i n any d i s c i p l i n e i f a school i s to progress and make 
a contribution to the d i s c i p l i n e involved, that i t asserts the primacy 
of i t s own theories. The attempt to build upon previous ideas i s 
mistsLken and only leads to inconsistency. 
This view of s c i e n t i f i c progress has gained wide acceptance since 
T. Kuhn's book set i t out so c l e a r l y . There i s competition between 
schools of thougiit i n academic d i s c i p l i n e s to define the area of 
study, the 'facts' which are relevant, and the problems with which 
i t i s concerned. One school presents an approach which becomes the 
paradigm of the d i s c i p l i n e at the expense of previously held views. 
This gives a different complexion to the ideas of 'progress' i n 
academic ways of thought and overturns the^Meathat the most recent 
ideas derive from t h e i r predecessors - i t would seem to be more true 
to say that they represent a reaction to prior theories. Such a 
view may seem s u p e r f i c i a l , and derogatory to the efforts of any 
science, but i t need not be regarded as such - rather i t proposes that 
the e s s e n t i a l element of chance and human idiosyncracy i s re-emphasised, 
which r e s u l t s i n a respect for the individual's view and vagaries, at 
the expense of an unnaturally s t i f f and abstract view of the nature of 
s c i e n t i f i c 'truth'. 
This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y healthy i n the s o c i a l sciences, where the human 
being has tended to be overlooked i n the search for a structure and 
group. 
44. 
" I n general, the attempt to develop a s o c i a l anthropological 
approach - a process inevitably tied up v/ith considerations of 
academic status - has often led to an emphasis on 'difference' 
rather than 'similarity'"' (Goody commenting on Eisenstadt's a r t i c l e 
1961) 
The implication here and i n Gluckman's remark that the consideration 
of academic status i s something unnecessary and ridiculous seems to 
obtain i n s p i r a t i o n from the 'de-bunking' (Bums) theories of sociology 
(and some s o c i a l anthropologists) which point to causes of action 
hidden from the actors. I n f a c t , the different approaches - i n 
Gluckman's case of himself and yo\mger anthropologists, i n Goody's 
case of sociologists and s o c i a l anthropologists - are genuinely 
d i f f e r e n t , 
Gluckman writes i n the same a r t i c l e ; 
" I believe firmly that anthroplogy i s a science and therefore 
progressive and cumulative, i n that speaking for myself, I f e e l 
that we pass the t e s t that the fool of the younger generation 
outdoes the genius of the previous generation."^968^p,238^ 
Yet he camnot accept that those who propose an alternative model of 
s o c i a l change are doing much more than attempting to establish them-
selves at the expense of others. No doubt, i f one was f e e l i n g unchari-
table, he might be aecased of fighting for survival i n much the same 
way, with a rear guard action. He does not seem to be respecting 
the fools of the generation below himself anyway - rather- impugning 
t h e i r academic motivation. 
The point of t h i s discussion i s to dispose of the assumption that 
there i s any j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n attempting to build upon old theories 
once a paradigm change has occurred, and to propose that the better 
alternative i s to exploit to the f u l l the new ideas and concepts which 
a paradigm s h i f t brings about. 
45. 
The paradigm s h i f t which has taken place i n anthropology i s a r e s u l t 
of, or at any rate i s j u s t i f i e d i n terms of, the factors outlined 
before. But i t has a wider base than t h i s alone. 
As F i r t h has said i n a different context; 
"Hie present day i n t e r e s t i n dynamic theory for s o c i a l anthro-
pologists i s partly a response to increasing perception of 
deficiencies i n e a r l i e r theoretical approaches. But i t i s 
p a r t l y a response to changed conditions i n our f i e l d of obser-
vation i t s e l f , and i t has been influenced by modem i n t e l l e c -
tual movements of a more general kind. Of this we must take 
advantage.'^962, p.28) 
Although I s h a l l concentrate on the changed B r i t i s h s o c i a l anthropolo-
g i c a l paradigm, I intend to mention other movements which I see as 
important i n bringing about this s h i f t . One of these i s the move 
i n l i n g u i s t i c s to concentrate upon meaning as the most important-
element of a n a l y s i s . 
I n an;^opology the change has been from an interest i n explanation 
through function, to one also based upon meaning - the meaning of a 
si t u a t i o n and i t s component parts to the individuals involved. 
46. 
5. EMPIRICAL AREAS OF INTEREST 
A breakdown of the areas i n which studies using the concept of 
s o c i a l network have been made by s o c i a l anthropologists should 
i l l u s t r a t e what has already been said about the causes of interest-
i n the notion, and support e a r l i e r statements on the influence of 
the network studies made i n the 1950's and early 1960's on l a t e r 
work. The. areas have been hinted at i n the quotations used to 
provide evidence of in t e r e s t i n the third section of this chapter. 
No systematic attempt seems to have been made to order by subject 
matter the network studies already made, even i n Elizabeth Bott's 
overview of the f i e l d i n heijl^ll "Reconsiderations". The problems 
of such a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n are enormous. 
I t i s , f i r s t l y , extremely d i f f i c u l t to distinguish between different 
applications of the network - for instance, metaphorical, a n a l y t i c a l 
and empirical. I have included only anthropological work which i s 
related to s p e c i f i c f i e l d material, so I have noit considered theore-
t i c a l exhortations to network analysts to embaxk upon studies of 
pa r t i c u l a r topics. The work I have included I have bcoken down into 
two types!-
a) B n p i r i c a l - i n which actual relationships are described and networks 
constructed. 
b) Simile - i n which the concept of network i s used to conceptiialise 
some f i e l d data, but no s p e c i f i c set of I'elationships i s analysed 
i n d e t a i l , 
A second, even more problematic c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s allocating each study 
to a p a r t i c u l a r category of subject matter. 
47. 
I have t r i e d to divide the studies into twelve categories which 
appear to me to be the most pertinent, and I have attempted to 
include a l l the 54 studies which I am considering i n t h i s t h e s i s , 
(Whitten*s work "Personal networks and musical contexts inlfae P a c i f i c 
Lowlands of Col\Mnbia and Ecuador" and the tests of Bott's hypothesis 
I have been unable to place i n these broad categories). I t i s 
impossible i n most cases to distinguish one part of a s t u d y s i t s 
major focus, and so many works appear more than once. Also an author 
may specify that he was working i n a situation which he saw as, for 
instance, complex and unstinictured, when another writer discussing a 
s i t u a t i o n which i s apparently similar, does not stress t h i s . In such 
cases I have categorised the s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioned area, but not that 
which i s only a fortuitous aspect of the study as f a r as the analyst 
i s concerned. There i s , therefore, an arbitrary element i n assigning 
a work to a p a r t i c u l a r category, but as this i s inevitable when dealing 
with secondary sources, aid since I have t r i e d to point to the most 
problematic areas (which are r e l a t i v e l y minor) I f e e l j u s t i f i e d i n 
presenting t h i s a n a l y s i s . I hope the table i s of some help i n c l a r i -
done 
fying what exactly has been/using the notion of soci a l network i n the 
past. The majority of the work i s by B r i t i s h s o c i a l anthropologists 
but I can see no reason, other than jingoism, to exclude.- other 
authors when th e i r work has related to, and often influenced, the 
development of network analysis, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n B r i t a i n . 
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CHAPTER 2 48. 
1. NETWOHKS 
"When one contemplates the language - t o t a l netv;ork, personal network, 
egoi^centric network, set, action - set, reticulmn quasi- group, f i e l d 
s t a r , zone, personal community, ambience, s o c i a l c i r c l e , faction, party, 
clique, grouping, group and corporate group - one f e e l s oneself teetering 
on the brink of terminological, i f not conceptual disaster" ,,, "In the 
present state of a f f a i r s I doubt i f any sets of terms w i l l be universally 
adopted, however c l a r i f y i n g and precise, 'Network' i s suffering the fate 
of some other beisic. sociological concepts such as ' ^ a t u s ' and 'role'. I t 
i s being used f o r so many purposes that i t v / i l l taJce some time before we 
get a sense of what i t i s most useful for. I n the meantime I suggest we 
put up with the muddle and keep the p o s s i b i l i t y of eventual c l a r i f i c a t i o n i n 
mind," ,,. "Hiere i s of course some danger of 'neti^rk-ology' - getting l o s t 
i n c l a s s i f icatory exercises for the fun of i t , but so long as one i s firmly 
rooted i n empirical f i e l d studies one i s unlikely to indulge i n c l a s s i f i c a ^ 
tory games." (KLizabeth Bott, 1971»pp.319» 321, 322.) 
I t i s e s s e n t i a l to est a b l i s h more c l e a r l y iirhat the concept of network has 
involved for different writers i n different contexts. The clearest v/ay to 
do t h i s seems to be to comment i n d e t a i l on pa r t i c i i l a r definitions. 
I have not presented a l l the definitions used i n the works I have read, but 
I hope that I have picked out the most important ones, I have t r i e d to 
choose definitions that are rather different i n t h e i r implications so that 
I can i l l u s t r a t e the range of ideas associated with the method. At the 
sa^ae time, however, I have avoided giving definitions which are idiosyn-
c r a t i c that they u n l i k e l y to be taken up by other writers, 
I have chosen to discuss the definitions chronologically as I think this 
makes cl e a r e r the development of the concept of network, 
"The image I have i s of a set of points, some of which are joined 
by l i n e s . The points i n the image are people or sometimes groups and 
the l i n e s indicate which people interact with one another,"Cj.A, Barnes 
1954, P.46) 
Barnes was attempting to describe the emergence of a class system i n Bremnes. 
He defines c l a s s as "a network of relations between apris of persons accor-
ding 4ach other approximately equal status" (p.45), Class and the network 
appear only i n the imstructured f i e l d of relationships l y i n g outside 
49. 
t h e i r f i s h i n g and t e r r i t o r i a l f i e l d s . 
For Barnes, i n 19.54» network i s c l e a r l y not egocentric and includes 
only interaction which i s informal. The use of the word 'interact' implies 
that he intends to include a l l relationships, however casual, i n the unstruc-
tured f i e l d , but, i n f a c t , t h i s cannot be so. Some degree of positive affect-
must be involved. People interact i n the most general sense of the vrord with 
t h e i r s o c i a l i n f e r i o r s and superiors and l i m i t only more intense r e l a t i o n -
ships to s o c i a l equals. 
Barnes t e l l s how he rejected the term 'web' f o r this concept as he speci-
f i c a l l y wants the image to be three-dimensional. He points to ideas of 
Moreno, Armstrong and Chappie and Coon yhlch are e s s e n t i a l l y similar to 
h i s notion of network. 
"A network i s a s o c i a l configuration i n which some but not a l l of the 
component external units maintain relationships \irith one ano-ther. The 
external units do not make up a larger s o c i a l whole. They are not 
s-urrcunded by a common boundary." ^E, Bott, 1971, p.2l6) 
"The idea of network i s often met i n anthropological, sociological 
and psychological l i t e r a t u r e , a l t h o u ^ i t does not alv/ays bear this 
name e,g. River's concept of the 'kindred', (Rivers 1924), Fortes »web' 
of kinship (Fortes 1949), Armstrong's 'grouping' (Armstrong 1928), see 
also Merton (1949), Moreno (1934), and Loomis and others (1953). ^lost 
of these authors are more concerned with the fac t that a person has 
relationships with a number of people than with the pattern of r e l a t i o n -
ships among these other people themselves. Radcliffe-Brown used the 
term metaphorically, as i n his de f i n i t i o n of s o c i a l structure as'a complex 
network of s o c i a l relationships / ( R a d c l i f f e-Brown ^1940.) 
"In finding i t convenient to use the term 'network' to describe a set of 
s o c i a l relationships for which there i s no common boundary'follow the 
recent image of John Barnes .,, "^tt,1971 p.59) 
Elizabeth Bott states that she i s u t i l i s i n g Barnes •£> notion of neti/ork. For 
her p a r t i c u l a r purposes certain features of the coxept become relevant. 
50. 
!nhe negative features of 'not making up a s o c i a l whole' and not being 
's\jxro\inded by a common boundary' become important because she v/ants to 
emphasise the f a c t that none of the families i n the study belongs within 
a circumscribed group of people. ISae network i s seen here as ego-centric 
which provides a major contrast with ]^mes ?s e a r l i e r formulation. I h i s 
difference stems from the f a c t that Bbtt i s talking i n l e s s abstract 
terms than Barnes - for her the networks have been described by the p a r t i -
cular persons upon whom they are centred. 
The nature of the l i n k s i n the network i s l e f t vague s t i l l - 'relationships'^ 
i s the word used. I t i s not en t i r e l y c l e a r but i t seems that these are 
only informal relationships of friendship and aquaintanceship. Bott, l i k e 
Barnes, points to the use of similar concepts vdiich have existed i n anthro-
pology for some time. (Even i n 1971 she includes i n a consideration of 
networks related concepts - such as s o c i a l c i r c l e s . The dynamics of so c i a l 
processes are of more central concern to her than precise terminologies). 
Althougji Bbtt says she follows Barnes: i n her usage of the term 'network', 
I f e e l that two different -iradiions have derived inspiration from these t\!0 
w r i t e r s . I t seems to be obligatory to acknowledge both Barnes and Bott i n 
l a t e r network studies, which points to confusion between these two traditions 
(which w i l l emerge l a t e r I hope) and a lack of close attention to v/hat the 
two anthropologists a c t u a l l y said. 
"By network ... I mean the interlocking of relationships v/hereby the 
interactions i m p l i c i t i n one determine those occurring i n others." (p.16) 
"Me a r r i v e a t the structure of a society through abstracting from the 
concrete population and i t s behaviour the pattern or network (or 'system') 
of relationships obtsaning between actors i n the i r capacity of playing 
ro l e s r e l a t i v e to one another"(p.12^ , 
51. 
"Network and pattern are not meant as synonyms. Rather they are 
intended to indicate two different types or perhaps l e v e l s of overall 
structuring ... f o r which, frankly, I have not been able to find very 
s a t i s f a c t o r y terms. The best way I can describe them i s by saying that 
one type of structuring i s abstracted from interactions, the other from 
di s t r i b u t i o n s . " ^ a d e l , I957, j^).14-15^ 
Nadel's definitions have apparently received l i t t l e attention from net\/ork 
analysts. He places a strong emphasis upon the determination of re l a t i o n -
ships by interactions occxirring arovmd them. The abstraction of re l a t i o n -
ships from role playing i s also a central element. These ti-ro features are 
almost diametrically opposed to the ideas upon which net\'/ork analyses using 
exchange and so on are based, i n which the manipulation of the netvroxk by the 
individuals concerned i s c e n t r a l . Similarly networks have been seen as a 
f i r s t stage of abstraction rather than a f i n a l one. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to see. 
what would be l e f t i n a network of relationships abstracted from role 
playing. 
"Chanda .. i s i n touch with a number of people, some of whom may be 
i n touch with each other, and some of whom may not"(p.l09) , 
"A network i s made up of pairs of persons who interact with one another 
i n terns of s o c i a l categories and who regard each other therefore as approxi-
mately s o c i a l equals, i ^ o i r i n g i n this context the s l i ^ t differences i n 
s o c i a l status there may be between them. The net^rork as a whole, therefore, 
provides a covert or informal structure, composed, of interpersonal l i n k s 
which spread out and ramify i n a l l ddLrections, c r i s s - c r o s s i n g not only the 
l o c a l community but l i n k i n g together people i n different towns and town 
and country, " ^ s t e i n , I96I, p. 110.} 
Epstein follows Barnes (1954) c l o s e l y p a r t i c u l a r l y since t h e i r areas of 
in t e r e s t overlap. However, he seems to have united Barnes definitions of 
network and s o c i a l c l a s s by r e s t r i c t i n g the network to pairs of persons v/ha^  
i n t e r a c t regarding each other as approximate s o c i a l equals. He also l i m i t s 
the network to informal t i e s of friendship and so forth. The notion of 'inter-
personal l i n k ' i s again l e f t vague. 
For Epstein the network provides a, way of ordering an apparently confused 
urban si t u a t i o n , and of uniting geographic areas i n terms of s o c i a l linkages. 

52, 
OMs he does by analysing the s o c i a l l i f e of a pa r t i c u l a r individual. 
"The network i s the t o t a l of ego's interpersonal relations with 
other individuals. I n any par t i c u l a r the individuals concerned 
do not constitute a group i n the sociological sense they form 
something which l i k e a kindred - can only be defined v/ith ego 
as the central point of reference" (P. Mayer, 196I, p.9}^ 
Mayer bases h is concept on that of Bott. He i s concerned with the 
notion's negative aspects - the network i s not a group. The t o t a l i t y 
of ego's relationships i s important as th i s implies a move avreiy from 
the purely informal nature of previous network relationships. Relations 
are s t i l l not defined however. He e x p l i c i t l y sees the concept as ego-
ce n t r i c , a notion which he shares with Bott and Epstein. 
"... mapping out the concrete relations between individuals i n 
t h e i r diverse r o l e s . " 
"A group i s a bounded u n i t . A netvrark on the other hand, ramifies 
i n each direction, and f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes stretches out 
i n d e f i n i t e l y ... I t has a dynamic character. New relations are 
forged and old ones discarded or modified." ^Srinivas and B e t e i l l e 
1964, p.166.') 
Srinivas and B e t e i l l e imply that network i s a method. They i n s i s t 
also upon the concept-^s dynamic nature, foreshaxiowing i t s involvement 
with s o c i a l change. 
"A network i n effect i s the t o t a l of ego's interpersonal r e l a t i o n s . 
I t i s a quasi-stmicture, depending on Ego, and related almost 
automatically to a ro l e model made up of Ego and his contemporary 
inte r a c t o r s . \toere these roles can a l l or mostly be ascribed to 
53. 
- S p e c i f i c and definable statuses a structure, or a semblance 
of a structure may be b u i l t . When th i s i s not possible as 
i n highly fluid, situations a role model, pointed by a network 
metaphor i s a l l that i s l e f t o " (Reader, I964, p.28^ 
Reader sees networks as ego-centric, and including a l l of an ego's 
relationships. For him a network e x i s t s when a role structure i s 
i l l - d e f i n e d . The network i s viev/ed as a s o c i a l structure with some 
elements - orderly statuses and so on - missing'it i s a negative 
concept again. 
" I n s t i t u t i o n a l networks ... are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of two types of 
small scale African urban neighbourhoods, F i r s t l y , there are 
those based on ethnicity ... Secondly, there are those v;hich i n 
which ethnicity i s l e s s important. The i n s t i t u t i o n a l network i s 
based on economic (occupational) and s o c i a l ( c l a s s ) categories ... 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l networks are also defined i n terms of a c l e a r l y 
i d e n t i f i a b l e structure, such as formal s o c i a l position. 
"Situational networks are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of secondary relations 
which are generally of short duration and designed to meet non-
t r a d i t i o n a l and s p e c i f i c urban needs. Such networks are defined 
i n terms of action rather than formal structure of chaiige rather 
than ascribed s o c i a l positions," (Gutkind, 1965» P.124) 
Gutkind attempts to separate more and l e s s transient networks. His 
d e f i n i t i o n of i n s t i t u i o n a l networks seems to ov;e i t s emphasis upon class 
to Barnes and Bott. The def i n i t i o n of situational networks seems to 
be more useful but the l i m i t a t i o n of needs to those which are non-
t r a d i t i o n a l and s p e c i f i c urban makes this concept rather obscure. 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g that Gutkind very c l e a r l y sees a l l relationships as 
part of the networks. His emphasis upon change within the si t u a t i o n a l 
network i s also relevant to future developments of the concept. He seems 
to be groping towards the l a t e r formulation of the action set, as opposed 
to the s o c i a l network, which A.C. Mayer produced a year l a t e r , indepen-
dently of Gutkind's work. 
54. 
"The network of personal l i n k s which i n d i v i d u a l s b u i l d around 
themselves ,.,"^,Co M i t c h e l l , I966, P o 5 4 ) 
This e a r l y d e f i n i t i o n of M i t c h e l l ' s implies t h a t only i n f o r m a l l i n k s 
are a p a r t of the network. The b i o g r a p h i c a l nature of the network i s 
stressed. 
"0.0 there has been an attempt by s o c i a l anthropologists to put 
forward two concepts f o r d e a l i n g w i t h s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s i n which 
c o l l e c t i o n s of people are fo-und t h a t do not form groups. One i s 
the" 'unbounded' network of r e l a t i o n s h i p s between p a i r s of people 
making up a f i e l d o f a c t i v i t y . The other i s the f i n i t e set of 
linkages i n i t i a t e d by an ego, which forms p a r t of a s o c i a l network." 
(A.C. Mayer, I966, p.l02) 
Mayer i s concerned t o make the contra s t between the unbounded network 
and the f i n i t e , ego-centred, p a r t of a network involved i n a p a r t i c u l a r 
event which he defines as an a c t i o n s e t , 
" t h a t group of persons who maintain an outgoing s i g n i f i c a n c e i n 
each others l i v e s by f u l f i l l i n g s p e c i f i c human needs."(Speck,1967^ p.209) 
Speck i s a psychotherapist. I include h i s d e f i n i t i o n of network since 
i t i l l u s t r a t e s c l e a r l y the way i n which concepts must be r e l a t e d t o 
problems. He i s concerned only w i t h people i n close r e l a t i o n s h i p s t o 
one another, who exert an i n f l u e n c e upon ego's p e r s o n a l i t y and u l t i m a t e l y 
h i s s a n i t y . For each ego t h i s i s a w e l l - d e f i n e d set of people and Speck 
uses the term group. He i s thus c o n t r a d i c t i n g the usage of almost a l l 
the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s who s p e c i f i c a l l y c o n t r a s t and oppose network and 
group. 
55. 
"By s o c i a l or personal network I mean the chain of persons 
w i t h whom a given person, ego, i s an a c t u a l contact or v/ith whom 
he can enter i n t o contact» The personal network i s d i s t i n c t 
although i t may touch and very o f t e n overlap those of others. 
That i s , they have several members or linkage chains i n common. 
I n some respects a l l of s o c i a l l i f e can be seen as a network. 
This network i s the s o c i a l m a t r i x from which groups and other s o c i a l 
forms c r y s t a l l i s e or are constructed I t has d e f i n i t e s t r u c t u r a l 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . " ^ o i s s e v a i n ^ 1968^  p.546) 
Boissevain's d e f i n i t i o n introduces a f u r t h e r vagueness about the l i m i t s 
of the network; he includes the contacts of contacts. This may be 
because he developed h i s ideas i n a contact of patronage i n Malta i n 
which chains of contacts were used t o o b t a i n p a r t i c u l a r favours. 
The egocentred personal network "may touch" those of others. This implies 
t h a t linkages are a c t u a l l y defined r a t h e r p r e c i s e l y since otherv/ise 
i t i s obvious t h a t a l l peBsonal networks overlap to an enormous extent 
w i t h those of other egos. 
The i n c l u s i o n of a l l s o c i a l l i f e i n the network and i t s conceptualisation 
as a m a t r i x from which other s o c i a l forms emerge, broadens the scope 
of the network enormously. Ideas of generation of s o c i a l forms are 
intr o d u c e d . 
"The personal network as used i n t h i s symposium e x i s t s s i t u a t i o n a l l y , 
i n the sense t h a t the observer perceives only those l i n k s which are 
a c t i v a t e d and being used by the act o r a t any one moment and which 
the observer considers are s i g n i f i c a n t f o r the problem we are i n t e r e s t e d 
i n o " ( j o C , M i t c h e l l , 1969^ p.20) 
M i t c h e l l says t h a t the studies published i n the 1969^ "Social netvrarks i n 
Urban s i t u a t i o n s " ^ show a considerable advance '.'<.. on em p i r i c a l data on 
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s o c i a l networks a t present available and f o r t h i s reason alone, i r r e s -
p e c t i v e of the i n t r i n s i c i n t e r e s t of the analyses themselves, are 
worth p u b l i s h i n g " (1969^ pvi). ¥e are i n v i t e d to accept the a r t i c l e ^ 
i n t e r e s t as d e r i v i n g from t h e i r use of the network concept. 
M i t c h e l l ' s own d e f i n i t i o n stressed the s i t u a t i o n a l - short term, 
•unstructured everyday aspects of the personal netv/ork, v;hich i s taken 
as ego-centred. The d i s c r i m i n a t i o n of the observer decides v;hich l i n k s 
are t o be seen as important a t any one moment. From t h i s s^ems a vast 
confusion over the precise p o s i t i o n of the observer. I s he to remain 
somehow t o t a l l y outside the network he observes? I f so how can he i n 
any meaningful way decide which l i n k s are important? He must r e l y on 
h i s understandings of the s i t u a t i o n which r e s t on h i s ovm commonsense 
and be u l t i m a t e l y derived from h i s knowledge of people and s o c i a l 
l i f e . I f he uses informants he may attempt to present t h e i r under-
standing of the s i t u a t i o n and r e l a t e i t to t h e i r s o c i a l p o s i t i o n . I t 
i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t he explains how he decides which r u l e s are important, 
and t o t h a t extent a t l e a s t he must abandon h i s "low p r o f i l e " and enter 
i n t o h i s own data. 
Reticulum - " t h a t p a r t of a t o t a l network which i s defined ego-
c e n t r i c a l l y " - "the d i r e c t l i n k s r a d i a t i n g from a p a r t i c u l a r Ego 
t o other i n d i v i d u a l s i n a s i t u a t i o n , and the l i n k s which connect 
— .those i n d i v i d u a l s who are d i r e c t l y t i e d t o Ego to one another." 
^ p f e r e r ^ l 9 6 9 , p. 182^ 
Kapferer introduces the term " r e t i c u a m i " f o r ego-centred abstracts from 
the network. His p r e s e n t a t i o n i s p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r m a l i s t i c and he 
provides more q u a n t i t a t i v e ; data than any other analyst so f a r mentioned 
here. He recognises t h a t networks provide only a method and a l l i e s the 
method w i t h exchange theory. 
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" A l l the human resources an i n d i v i d u a l can muster i . e . h i s 
s o c i a l network," ( i o s w e l l ^ 1969^ p.285^ 
Boswell's d e f i n i t i o n r e l a t e s p a r t i c u l a r l y to the problem i n hand - t h a t 
of m o b i l i s i n g support i n a s o c i a l c r i s i s through the manipulation of 
the s o c i a l network. 
"Each i n d i v i d u a l i n a s o c i e t y has s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h a large 
number of f r i e n d s and acquaintances. A l l these r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
^together c o n s t i t u t e what has been c a l l e d a personal network," 
(wheeldon^l969,P0I52} 
Wheeldon l i m i t s the network t o t i e s of f r i e n d s h i p amd aquaintance. 
This gives the concept a p a r t i c u l a r l y Western biais, since i t i s so 
p o s i t i v e l y valued. I n t h i s way, the d e f i n i t i o n i s ethnocentric. Again 
such a f o r m u l a t i o n r e l a t e s t o Wheeldon's problem - the operation of 
networks w i t h i n v o l u n t a r y a s s o c i a t i o n s . 
John Barnes has w r i t t e n an a r t i c l e which appears i n the same symposium 
(though i t was v / r i t t e n i n I966) which i s e n t i r e l y a t h e o r e t i c a l s t a t e -
ment on the network concept. 
He i s o l a t e s the t o t a l network which consists of people and the r e l a t i o n -
and 
ships between them. The people impinge or not upon one another/this 
n o t i o n i s d e l i b e r a t e l y l e f t vggue a t f i r s t . The t o t a l netv/ork i s a 
f i r s t order a b s t r a c t i o n from r e a l i t y and contains as much in f o r m a t i o n 
as p o s s i b l e , I t i s a "model t h a t we seek t o make as close to r e a l i t y 
as p o s s i b l e , r a t h e r than t o idea's i n someone's mind"^p.56),The r o l e 
o f the observer i s assumed t o be t h a t of a camera. Although i t i s 
apparent that Barnes i s anxious t o describe events i n an o b j e c t i v e way 
by r e f u s i n g t o consider the observer's p o s i t i o n he removes any p o s s i b i -
l i t y of o b j e c t i v i t y from the study. 
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Since t h i s i s t r u e of the r e l a t i v e l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d t o t a l network, 
which contains e v e r y t h i n g p o s s i b l e , i t i s even more t r u e of l a t e r 
a b s t r a c t i o n s such as the p a r t i a l network based upon "some c r i t e r i o n 
a p p l i c a b l e throughout the network"(g,57}. 
Barnes also names the s t a r and zone, and d e l i m i t s f i r s t , second e t c , 
orders, (A s t a r i s the set of r e l a t i o n s h i p s r a d i a t i n g from or conver-
g i n g on Alpha, a zone contains also the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between Alpha's 
contacts pp,58-60), 
Barnes discusses the concepts of boundedness and f i n i t e n e s s , 
" I f there i s ^boundary there are some persons known t o e x i s t who 
are not i n the network or who can be reached only by a very c i r -
cuitous r o u t e " . 
This i m p l i e s t h a t t o be a p a r t of a netvrork a person must do more than 
impinge on, or Icnow about, other pe'^ple i n the network. Although 
Barnes says t h a t h i s a r t i c l e i s concerned w i t h hov; t o l i m i t such 
n o t i o n he nowhere appraaches t h i s d i f f i c u l t problem. Further he implies 
t h a t some s o r t of standard measure could be found and applied to a l l 
networks. The i m p l i c a t i o n s of a standardised methodology applied by 
an observer who does not impinge, himself, upon the netivork are immense. 
"On the one hand networks are understood as egocentric s t r u c t u r e s 
which defined w i t h regard t o a s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a l . Hence the name 
personal network. These networks are, as i t were, personal creations 
o f an ego and d i s s o l v e when ego d i e s . On the other hand, networks 
are concieved as r a m i f y i n g chains of dyadic r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n v o l v i n g 
s p e c i f i c f i e l d s o f a c t i v i t i e s ,.. the assimption u n d e r l y i n g these 
approaches i s t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s can be separated from the s t r u c t u r e s 
which they form w i t h other people. Though t h i s perception i s under-
w r i t t e n by o r d i n a r y language, i t h a r d l y corresponds v;ith what one 
a c t u a l l y observes, what we c a l l ' i n d i v i d u a l ' and 'society' a l l 
aspects of men t h a t belong together," (Blok, 1972^ 
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Blok has pointed c l e a r l y t o the two t r a d i t i o n s v/hich I mentioned as 
d e r i v i n g from the work of Barnes and Bott r e s p e c t i v e l y . That derived 
from the former involves the a b s t r a c t i o n i n some way of networks of 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s from the s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n . As Blok points out t h i s 
has no v a l i d a t i o n i n r e a l i t y . 
U l t i m a t e l y such an approach leads t o the r e t u r n to a r i g i d f o r m a l i s t i c 
concept. S i m i l a r l y such a d e f i n i t i o n of network i s not concerned w i t h 
dynamic s o c i a l processes any more than the notions i t i s sa i d t o have 
superce(ied - such as group and s o c i a l st3?ucture. 
The o t h e r t r a d i t i o n r e l a t e s analysis t o p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s involved 
i n a s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n . From t h i s approach course the concepts of a c t i o n -
s e t , quasi-group and so on such an approach requires the c l e a r presen-
t a t i o n o f the sources of data which includes the actor's understandings 
of the s i t u a t i o n . 
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I t i s not t r u e t o say t h a t an overt s p l i t has appeared between 
network analysts u s i n g a b s t r a c t s o c i o c e n t r i c concepts and those using 
egocentred n o t i o n s . However, there i s a growing d i v i d e between those 
who f e e l the method w i l l b e n e f i t from f u r t h e r refinement of concepts, 
and who seemi^ t o be l o o k i n g f o r a widely a p p l i c a b l e method of q u a n t i -
f y i n g data on i n t e r a c t i o n , and those who f i n d the terminologies u s e f u l 
i n a more vague way. 
The removal of the observer from the a c t i o n (on which he must be impinging) 
seems to be an e s s e n t i a l p a r t of the r e f i n i n g , q u a n t i f y i n g school of 
thought. As a r e s u l t i t i s profoundly u n s a t i s f a c t o r y and belongs i n 
the o l d s t i n i c t u r a l | f - u n c t i o n a l paradigm, r a t h e r than i n the new o r i e n t a t i o n 
o f anthropology. 
The p o t e n t i a l of network an a l y s i s l i e a i n development i n q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t 
d i r e c t i o n , as I hope I s h a l l argue convincingly by demonstrating t h a t a 
new paradigm e x i s t s and t h a t networks can f u l f i l / the requirements of 
such a paradigm. 
For instance E l i z a b e t h Bott^who says her own s o l u t i o n to problems of 
terminology i s t o use network i n the sense of totalnetwork, s t a r and 
zone, but t o use a d j e c t i v e s t o d i s t i n g u i s h them where necessary(j),321 j l 9 7 l } , 
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Network Analysis/ 
Network analysis as i t i s used i n t h i s t h e s i s involves u s i n g the idea 
of network t o analyse a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l data. I n some cases i n f o r m a t i o n 
i s presented i n terms of networks^ i n others the concept i s used meta-' 
p h o r i c a l l y t o describe s o c i a l processes. 
C l e a r l y the exact d e f i n i t i o n of network v a r i e s as i t i s r e l a t e d to 
s p e c i f i c problems. Depending on the t o p i c under s c r u t i n y d i f f e r e n t 
aspects of the concept become r e l e v a n t . 
At the e m p i r i c a l l e v e l precise d e f i n i t i o n of the type of r e l a t i o n -
ship t o be included i n the network i s r e q u i r e d and t h i s again must 
r e l a t e c l o s e l y to the problems a t hand. Analysis of d i f f e r e n t t o p i ^ (XK^<^ 
d i f f e r e n t types of r e l a t i o n s h i p become important. 
I n order to preserve the f l e x i b i l i t y of the concept i t i s necessary 
to keep the general d e f i n i t i o n of the concept as broad as possible, 
and r e f i n e i t as r e q u i r e d t o analyse p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s . 
The broad network concept i s - a set of people and t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
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I l l THE BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF NETIVORK ANALYSIS 
l o The Role of Domain Assumptions-
" A l l groups have a body of b e l i e f s which are taken f o r 
granted merely because no-one disputes them, and which 
o f t e n t u r n out t o be i l l u s i o n s . Assent i s induced by 
cdinforming i n f l u e n c e s not t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t from those 
o p e r a t i n g i n r e l i g i o n or p o l i t i c s , " / C o o l e y , 1962, Manis 
and Meltzer Eds. p.70,^ 
Amongst some a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s , one b e l i e f seems to be t h a t t h e o r i s i n g 
i s a 'bad' t h i n g and can be escaped by c o l l e c t i n g e m p i r i c a l data. For 
insta n c e , Pelto recognizes t h a t there are various types of theory 
i n v o l v e d i n any a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l work; 
meta-theory 
personal theory, and 
e x p l i c i t a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l theory. 
He even w r i t e s , 
"a t h e o r e t i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n i s not l o g i c a l l y possible - t h a t a l l 
research i s s t r u c t u r e d i n terms of some s o r t of t h e o r e t i c a l con-
s t r u c t s , however i m p l i c i t and unrecognised by the researcher. I n 
s p i t e o f the ubiq u i t o u s presence of theory, anthropologists ( and 
other researchers) vary a great deal i n the extent to which they 
organize research i n terms of e x p l i c i t t h e o r e t i c a l systems,"(19719 
And y e t , h i s answer t o the problem i s not t o attempt t o elucidate as 
f a r as possible the d i f f e r e n t t h e o r e t i c a l systems which bear on a 
p a r t i c u l a r piece of work, bu.t r a t h e r t o circumvent the problem a t a l l 
costs, 
"My p o s i t i o n i s t h a t , regardless of which s p e c i a l theory or theories 
serve as the frame of reference f o r p a r t i c u l a r instances of research 
the main pathway t o e l i m i n a t i n g a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l ' c r e d i b i l i t y gaps' 
i s t o concentrate methodological a t t e n t i o n a t the r e l a t i v e l y lov/ -
a b s t r a c t i o n end of the research paradigm. That i s the most pressing 
problems i n improving a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l research design l i e i n the 
s t r u c t u r e of primary data g a t h e r i n g - i n the a c t u a l f i e l d research 
operations. Once the procedures and concepts of primary anthropo-
l o g i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n have been systematized, rigorous c o n t r o l l e d 
comparisons can be developed and theory b u i l d i n g can then proceed 
on much f i r m e r foundations,"Q.97191?)o 19 and 20j 
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Such a proposition r e s t s firmly i n the mainstream of deductive science. I t 
i s also apparent that networks have been noted as one of the means of attempting 
•systematized rigorous controlled comparisons' by many of their practitioners, 
notably those of the Manchester School. 
Pel to presents a diagram representing his view of relationships between 
fac t s and theory: 
General Theory and Models 
Middle range Theiory 
Low Order propositions 
Modes of Observation 
Real world of events and things 
I t i s one which i s shared to some degree by many anthropologists. 
Nadel also takes theory to be deductive inform: 
"they (the interconnected propositions or generalisations of a theory^ 
are such that the empirical facts within the range covered by the theoiy 
are deductable from i t , so that th e i r being what they are i s predicted 
(by the theory)and understood ( i n the l i g h t of the theory)." (l957^P.l) 
Nadel's next sentence i s of i n t e r e s t : 
"But 'theory' can also be understood i n another, l e s s ambitious sense, 
namely as a body of propositions ( s t i l l interconnected) which serve to 
map-out the problem area end thus prepare the grotind for i t s empirical 
investigation by appropriate methods." 
This points to a c n ^ c i a l omission ftom Pelto's diagram which invalidates his 
conclusions on the correct way to overcome the problems posed by his diagram. 
The relationship between the elements of his diagram i s not l i n e a r but c i r c u l a r . 
Theory modifies and determines our experience of the world - i t taaps out' and 
selects areas of relevance i n s o c i a l l i f e . 
General theory middle range theory 
Real world of events and things low order proposition 
modeEE of observation 
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Our t h e o r i e s of what man i s l i k e , how we expect our f e l l o w hiMan 
beings t o behave, a l t e r our perception of the ' r e a l world of events 
and t h i n g s ' , and are, i n t h e i r t u r n derived from our experience of 
the ' r e a l world of events and t h i n g s ' . 
Every i n d i v i d u a l , whatever h i s s o c i a l p o s i t i o n , possesses a world 
view, which i s , u l t i m a t e l y , imique t o hi m s e l f , but l a r g e p a r t s of 
such a world view are shared, ' o b j e c t i v e ' feiowledge. 
"V/e a t t a i n a p o i n t of vantage from where we f i n d out t h a t we 
are c o n f e r r i n g meaning upon the world instead of l e t t i n g the world 
shove i t s meanings down over us. We become a c t i v e i n forming 
' o n t i c ' d e c i s i o n s , t h a t i s t o say decisions about the being of 
thi n g s .,, we do i n f a c t more or less 'process' what we see a t 
the r e t i n a l l e v e l . What i s f i n a l l y sent along to the b r a i n as 
i n f o r m a t i o n has been heg,vily processed a t the r e t i n a , and a s o r t 
of temporary hypothesis about what the eye i s seeingis t r a n s m i t t e d 
r a t h e r than any d i i e c t i n f o r m a t i o n about what there i s 'out there'. 
N e i t h e r A nor B'sees 'the r e a l i t y ' , but both have t h e i r ' v i s i o n ' 
of the r e a l i t y , both thus confer ' o n t i c ' meanings and s i g n i f i c a n c e s 
upon what i s .jxperienced, and thus the world of t o t a l s u b j e c t i v e 
r e l a t i v i t y i s created," (R. Poole^1972, p73.} 
I t i s t h i s processing which many anthropologists ignore. Their mistake 
leads t o a hollowness i n many an t h r o p o l o g i c a l works<> However, othery 
more perceptive a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s have recognised^ the i n e v i t a b l e s u f f u s i o n 
to some degree of the ant h r o p o l o g i s t s world view i n t o h i s vrork. 
B e a t t i e has w r i t t e n : 
"aLthough t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between d e s c r i p t i v e and a n a l y t i c a l studies 
i s indispensable, i t can be misleading, e s p e c i a l l y i n s o c i a l science. 
I t i s not one between studies which imply a b s t r a c t i o n aid studies which 
do n o t . I t i s r a t h e r one between l e v e l s and kinds of a b s t r a c t i o n , 
f o r even the most m a t t e r - o f - f a c t d e s c r i p t i o n s are shot through v/ith 
a b s t r a c t i o n s , u s u a l l y \manalysed 'common sense'"<,^'eattie^l968. 
Manners & Kaplan, poll8^ 
The question a r i s e s , however, of what e x a c t l y the f i l t e r which acts 
before i n f o r m a t i o n t r a v e l s from the r e t i n a to the b r a i n , c o n s i s t s . I n 
T, Kuhn's terminology the f i l t e r i s a paradigm. He remarks; 
65. 
"something l i k e a paradigm i s a prerequisite to perception 
i t s e l f , " ^ . 112) " I f that body of b e l i e f (a paradigm) i s not 
already i m p l i c i t i n the correction of fects w i n which case 
more than 'mere f a c t s ' are at hand - i t must be externally 
supplied, perhaps by a current metaphysic, by another science, 
or by personal and h i s t o r i c accident" p»17 , 1 9 6 2 . 
Duiicheim (Rules of Sociological Method ^ 9585 P, 2 5 ) remarks that theory 
must be present at the outset of any sociological investigation or the 
fa c t s presented would be completely random. 
Gouldner has segregated e x p l i c i t l y formulated assumptions - 'postulations' -
from background assumptions which are unpostulated and unlabelled. The 
l a t t e r operate alongside a theory as s i l e n t partners, and govern domains 
of different scope. 
"Domain assumptions are the background assumptions applied only 
to one domain; they are, i n effect, the metaphysics of a domain" 
( 1 9 7 0 , p . 2 9 ) 
!Dhus, c r u c i a l domainEBsumptions i n sociology and s o c i a l anthropology 
concern the nature of mam as I suggested e a r l i e r . They are also e x p l i c i t l y 
metaphysical or philosophical, as Gouldner says. Domain assumptions are 
of great importance since: 
",o, i n some part, theories are accepted or rejected because 
of the background assvunptions embedded i n them. In particular, 
a s o c i a l theory i s more l i k e l y to be accepted by those X'iho share 
the theory's background assumptions and find them agreeable," 
(oouldner^ 1970| p.29,3 
The context of j u s t i f i c a t i o n thus depends a great deal upon shaxed back-
ground assumptions. 
"V/hat i s accepted as true i s accepted as true because of 
an already exi s t i n g structure of b e l i e f i n the individual, an 
e x i s t i n g structure of i n t e r e s t and fear. I t i s to a person 
who already e x i s t s , complete i n his hopes and fears, complete 
i n h i s perspectival history, that one addresses one's arguments 
He possesses already a v i s i o n of the world, a visio n peculiarly 
h i s , which he has b u i l t up over years with care and concern. 
What he does not want to understand, he w i l l not accord the 
status of an argument. What runs against h is own interest, i s 
not a 'fact'. What i s antipathetic to his own view, i s not 
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'objective', V/hat he disapproves of i s 'immoralV/hat 
he does, is' r i g h t , V/hat he stands for i s not to be questioned," 
^ooie, 1 9 T 2 p P c l 2 l ) 
Michel Poucault has written of the 'positive unconscious' of know-
ledge - " a l e v e l that eludes the consciousness of the s c i e n t i s t and 
yet i s part of s c i e n t i f i c discourse which he (Foucault) seeks to 
reveal rather than dispute i t s (knowledge) v a l i d i t y and seeking to 
diminish i t s s c i e n t i f i c nature"(l970^ p . x i ^ „ 
He places the positive unconscious at a deeper l e v e l than the paradigm 
or domain assumptions, since he e x p l i c i t l y denies that elucidation i s 
possible by those immersed i n the d i s c i p l i n e at the time, 
"What was common to the natural history, the economics, 
and the grammar of the c l a s s i c a l period was certainly not 
present to the consciousness of the s c i e n t i s t ; or that part 
of i t that was conscious was s u p e r f i c i a l , limited and almost 
f a n c i f u l ; but, unknown to themselves, the n a t u r a l i s t s , 
economists and grammarians employed the same rules to define 
the objects proper to t h e i r own study, to form "ftieir concepts, 
to build t h e i r theories o I t i s these rules of formiilation, vrhich 
were never forniulated i n t h e i r own right, but are to be found 
only i n widely d i f f e r i n g theories, concepts, and objects of 
slnidy, that I have t r i e d to reveal ooo" (Poucault^1970^Poix) 
I would accept that there probably exists a l e v e l of the positive 
unconscious of knowledge which i t i s impossible to penetrate at present 
i n our own search for knowledge. At the l e v e l of paradigm and domain 
assumptions i t seems clear that we can attempt to explore our assumptions o 
Nigel Harris has described the existence of i m p l i c i t systems of 
ordering data - the f i l t e r of Poole's description; 
"What I mean by ' h i ^ e r - order system' are those complicated, 
schemata which make possible experience at a l l , which organise 
the raw, imidentified perceived data i n forms comprehensible 
within lower order systems <,,. what we know of the higher order 
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systems comes to us i n the form of l o g i c a l postulates, of 
axioms, of apparently arbitrary ru l e s , without which we 
can undertake no examination of the world at a l l . " / l 9 6 8 
pp«32 and 35) 
Rarely Available- Readily Available Concepts 
Harris Higher Order Lov/er order systems 
Gbuldner Domain assumptions Postulates 
Foucault Positive Unconscious Episteme 
Kuhn Paradigm 
The terms of Gouldner and Kuhn are the ones which I find most useful, 
although I may ref e r to the others as wello 
Jbs we have seen^Pelto and others of his i l k y would attempt to evade 
domain assumptions by concentrating on an empirical l e v e l i n which 
i t i s hoped, theorising can be avoidedo The collection of 'pure' data 
i s t h e i r aim. Such an aim i s both unattainable, and produces grave 
di s t o r t i o n s , A better aim i s to try to explain and be aware of the 
postulates and assumptions which always operate, 
" S c i e n t i f i c work, a n a l y t i c a l l y speaking, goes on at 3 not 2 
distinguishable l e v e l s ; besides empirical work and logico-
deductive theory, we have the equally important, the a l l too 
i m p l i c i t , frameworks models or philosophies that inform our 
approach to both cf the former," (Buckleyjl967ii P v i i i j ) 
What I intend to do i s to try to pick out the postulates made by net-
work analysts, and also approach the domain assumptions which i t seems 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g that Harris reverses the usual way of looking at such 
embedded concepts - higher order would make most persons think of the 
more consciously imposed orders. Clearly Harris i s thinking i n terms 
of l e v e l s of abstractness. 
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to me are inherent i n using such a methodology. 
Gellner has concluded, at the end of his book "Words and things" that 
explicitness i s e s s e n t i a l . 
"Whatever may be the l i m i t s of meaningful discourse, the f i r s t 
p r i n c i p l e of semantics must be; 'Whatever can be insinuated 
can be s a i d . I n e f f a b i l i t i e s , and f a r worse, the camouflaging of 
presuppositions and values as procedural rules, v ; i l l not do.'" 
"That which one would insinuate, thereof one must speak",^968^p.296^ 
I s h a l l t r y to speak for network analysts by making e x p l i c i t what I 
see as the theoretical and sub-theoretical leve l s of their approacho 
I n doing so I s h a l l be putting the case for network analysis as i t has 
already been used i n anthropcSogy. Later I s h a l l examine the v a l i d i t y 
of these domain assumptions ( l do not want to argue that the assumptions 
I present underly a l l network analyses. I am trying to locate broad 
themes), 
Ardener seems to f e e l that network analysts are aware of the structuring 
of a f i e l d before analysis occurs, 
" I have already suggested ( 1 9 7 1 a) Ixxv) that Earth's transactions 
and Bames, Bottb and Mitchell's networks, and such developments, 
can thus be designated as steps towards the highest stage of func-
tionali'sm; That i s : a functionalism become aware (ocr about to 
become aware) that the f i e l d of behaviour or action, even when 
a r b i t r a r i l y i s o lated from the ideological programme that determines 
i t s meaning, must i t s e l f be structured by the observer before i t 
can be ' o b s e r v e d ' . " ( i 9 7 l ( b ) ) 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g that he places networks firmly within a functionalist 
framework. I would also question whether a l l network analysts are aware 
of the complexities of the operation of domain assumptions. I s h a l l 
« 
examine t h i s now. 
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The Presentation of Raw Data 
Some network analysts^ are concerned to present a description which 
resembles 'r e a l i t y * a s closely as possible, 
J,A, Barnes has written that the t o t a l network " i s a model which 
explains v/hat actually happens, not what people think happens, or 
might happen".^969^Po56^ 
He derives t h i s idea from Radcliffe-Brown whose definition of s o c i a l 
structure as being "a network of actually existing r e l a t i o n s " ( 1 9 5 2 p,190) 
he quotes. I n the same paragraph he writes - " s t r i c t l y speaking, no 
s o c i a l relationship'actually e x i s t s ' i n the same sense that you and I 
and other r e a l people e x i s t . But these s o c i a l relationships are 'actually 
existing' i n the sense that they form part of a model that v/e seek to 
make as close as possible to empirical r e a l i t y i n a l l relevant particu-
l a r s , rather than to some ideas i n someone's mind"(l969yP.5^. Barnes 
/ here indulges i n the fantasy that there can e x i s t thou^t and ideas 
without a thinker. 
Another pioneer i n the netv/ork methodology i s Mitchell. He seems to 
have the same view that i t i s possible to present throijigh netv/orks 
a view of r e a l i t y untouched by human mind, as i t were. He remarks about 
~> 
theory that "the closer the f i t of theory to r e a l i t y the better i t i s " 
i n h i s introduction to Van Velsen's book "The P o l i t i c s of ICinship" ( 1 9 6 ^ 
70, 
Mitchell has also written on the relationship which exists between 
network and i n s t i t u t i o n a l analysis. 
" I t should be c l e a r that t h i s does not mean that -^ tie analysis of 
s o c i a l relationships i n terms of s o c i a l networks i s a substitute 
for an analysis i n terms of s o c i a l institutions. The tv/o types 
of analysis s t a r t with the same basic empirical data but proceed 
to make absitractions i n different ways. The sequence of abstrac-
tions a f t e r the i n i t i a l act of observation, i s from actual behaviour 
to multiplex linkages i n networks, from miltiplex relationships 
to what Barnes c a l l s ' p a r t i a l networks', ... to the i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
structures",(1969^ P.49^ 
One observes i n an unstructured way, and l a t e r imposes whatever l e v e l 
of order i s suitable for a p a r t i c u l a r problem. 
Barnes and Mitchell are dominant figures i n network analysis, and their 
opinions must be regarded as being of corresponding importajice. However, 
other writers have exporised the method i n order to escape observer bias. 
Epstein has remarked that; 
"The detailed evidence of the narrative which follows, puts the 
reader i n a position to check my own analysis and, where this i s 
inadequate, to suggest alternatives and more satisfactory i n t e r -
pretation of the material. " ( 1 9 6 9 , P.80) 
Boissevain also implies that the reader i s able to analyse the data 
he presents for himself, as i f i t were unstructured by Boissevairis domain 
assumptions and processes of perception: 
"Before eximining the networks i n d e t a i l , the reader might l i k e 
to apply what he knows of network struct\ire to the background 
of Tony and Cikku to see i f he can formulate hypotheses regarding 
the structures of the two networks, the i r s i m i l a r i t i e s and 
differences. He can then compare his hypotheses with the conclu-
sions and analysis set out i n the r e s t of t h i s paper", ( 1 9 7 2 ^ p.123 
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Srinivas and B e t e i l l e have also located o b j e c t i v i t y within network 
a n a l y s i s . 
"Therefore, once we s h i f t from the individual actor and his 
network of concrete interpersonal relations to the productive 
system ajid i t s corresponding network we move from the 'subjective' 
network of the actor to the 'objective' one of the observer.« 
( J . 9 6 4 ^ p . l 6 7 ) 
Aronson claims that network an a l y s i s ; 
" i s c l e a r l y 'grounded' i n ponderable observation of r e a l behaviour 
and at l e a s t begins by assuming very l i t t l e about the nature of 
that behaviour," ( l 9 7 0 ^ p , 2 2 3 ) 
S i m i l a r l y G u l l i v e r says that; 
" i n the end ray own emphasis i s on what men did as f a r as this 
could be recorded, for however faulty my own understanding, I 
seek to give the evidence on which an understanding may be based. 
I have de-emphasised the search for ^ e a l rules and modes, ju s t 
as I have eschewed apt illus.trations, suppositional cases, and 
generalised examples , " ^ 9 7 1 9 p80^ "By concentrating on these 
events i t i s proposed to get away from over-vaguej generalisation 
coloured by ideas and formal conceptualization. " ^ 9 7 1 ^ P . l J l ) 
G u l l i v e r aims at accurate 'reporting' of Ndendeuli s o c i a l l i f e . 
I t i s surprising how few people who use networks stop to discuss 
exactly how they are embarking on the task. Amongst those v;ho do, the 
implication would ,seem to be that networks provide a way of presenting 
raw, unprocessed data. 
This idea i s p a r t i c u l a r l y prevalent among analyses of the l^Ianchester 
school who are the dominant group of network analysts i n B r i t i s h anthro-
pology and thus of considerable importance to this discussion. The 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t to imagine what Gulliver i s presenting. He cannot hope 
to present everything he observed i n his field^ork, and presumably he 
i s not choosing inappropriate material, or Durkheim's random f a c t s . 
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idea permeates even to workers using related concepts other than 
networks. 
Van Velsen; 
"By t h i s method [ s i t u a t i o n a l a n a l y s i s ] the ethnographer not 
only presents the reader with abstractions and inferences 
from h i s f i e l d material, but he also provides some of the material 
i t s e l f . This should put the reader i n a better position to 
evaluate the ethnographer's analysis not only on the basis of the 
i n t e r n a l inconsistency of the argument but also by comparing the 
ethnographic data and the inferences drawn from them ,,, I v/ould 
suggest that i n a s i t u a t i o n a l analysis, incorporating co-ordinated 
case material, the reader i s i n a better position to examine for 
himself the basis and v a l i d i t y for the other's selection. More-
over i f the reader does not agree with the ethnographer's selection 
or interpretation of the material, he w i l l be better equipped! to 
attempt a different interpretation or to test different hypotheses 
because he w i l l have more material to work on. Thus an author 
using s i t u a t i o n a l analysis i s more exposed - he hgs to put more 
cards on the table." (l964^p,Kxvi^ 
Some anthropologists who use the ccQCK.pt are concerned with problems 
of the observer's domain assumptions, but I f e e l that the notion of 
presenting pure data must be considered a dominant motif of network 
a n a l y s i s . 
One of t h e i r most important domain aesumptions i s that i t i s possible 
to e;scape from the effects of such assumptions, by vforking at a low 
l e v e l of abstraction and using a c l e a r l y defined method - network 
ana l y s i s . 
Co-ordinated by whom, and for what purpose? - by the author to i l l u s t r a t e 
h i s argument. 
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Network Analysis as a s c i e n t i f i c method 
The s o c i a l sciences have long t r i e d to emulate the 'hard' sciences 
of physics, chemistry and so on. V/ithin B r i t i s h s o c i a l anthropology 
when Malinowski began h i s search for a theory of a 'purely empirical 
nature' i n 1926 the movement was underway. Radcliffe-Brov/n was the 
major exponent of the s c i e n t i f i c nature of the d i s c i p l i n e , I have 
quoted h i s d e f i n i t i o n of anthropology elsewhere but another i l l u s t r a t i o n 
of h i s emphasis i s worthwhile. I n Chicago i n 1 9 3 7 he was arguing for 
the B r i t i s h study of s o c i a l structure, as opposed to the American con-
centration upon culture, 
"You cannot have a science of culture. You can only study culture 
as c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a s o c i a l system, therefore, i f you are going 
to have a science i t must be a science of a s o c i a l system." 
I n America, Kroeber and Hoebel also promulgated a view of anthropology, 
as a science. 
The concept of science i s s t i l l equated for many with methodological 
rigour as Pelto s p e c i f i e s . He defines sciences as; 
"the structure and the processes of accumulation of systematic 
and r e l i a b l e knowledge about any r e l a t i v e l y enduring aspect of 
the universe, carried out by means of empirical observations, and 
the development of concepts and propositions for i n t e r r e l a t i n g 
anandi explaimjig such observations." ( 1 9 7 I , p.29) 
As Jarvie observes, s c i e n t i f i c method becomes the object of a cult among 
s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s - "a cargo c u l t " . Network analysis must be seen i n 
the l i g i i t of t h i s desire to emulate the hard sciences. 
I have already pointed out that Bames d i r e c t l y r e l a t e s h is concept 
of network to Radcliffe-Brown's formulation of socials structure. Barnes' 
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present position i s of i n t e r e s t , 
"The notion of sociology as a s o c i a l science with i t s own hard 
concepts c l e a r l y defined transculturally and with i t s ovm corpus 
of tested and i n t e r r e l a t e d propositions along the l i n e s of the 
natural science paradigm,is of course, the hallmark of Comte 
and the p o s i t i v i s t t r a dition whose claims so offended Sidgwick. 
During the l a s t ten years or so many younger sociologists have 
rejected the apparently unproductive search for universally v a l i d 
generalisations, for s o c i a l laws analogous to the lav;s of gravity 
and thermodynamics i n the natural sciences. Indeed positivism 
has become a deaxgatory term i n a way that would have met with 
Sifewick's approval. But whereas Sidgwick merely protested against 
the over-ambitious pretensions of nineteenth-century sociologists 
and looked forward to the day when thei r claims to have discovered 
the laws of s o c i a l development might be validated, many present 
day c r i t i c s of positivism r e j e c t t h i s s c i e n t i f i c quest entirely, 
and seek to promote a sociology that i s p a r t i c u l a r i s t rather 
than generalizing, that emphasizes the emic categories of the 
actor, rather than the e t i c categories of the outside observer, 
and that stresses the s o c i a l function of c r i t i c i s m rather than 
the s c i e n t i f i c function of explanation, 
" I t seems to me important that we should not abandon the search 
for a f i i l l e r understanding of the nature of order and disorder 
i n s o c i a l l i f e merely because the natural science paradigm used 
by the early p o s i t i v i s t s and by most l a t e r mainline sociologists 
has proved inadequate and largely unrewarding. Without some 
attempt to aiapt the rigorous methods of s c i e n t i f i c testing and 
v a l i d a t i o n to the more d i f f i c u l t f i e l d of s o c i a l l i f e , v/e have 
to f a l l back on t r a d i t i o n a l wisdom, common sense and rules of 
thumb, on s o c i a l technology as i t were rather than s o c i a l science," 
^ames^lL97L, ^ . 1 8 - 1 9 ) 
I t seems that Barnes, whilst recognising the obvious f a i l u r e of the 
natural science paradigm when applied to s o c i a l science i s s t i l l , l i k e 
Pelto, determined that the rigorous methodology of the hard sciences 
i s e s s e n t i a l to sociology. His recent (1969? 1970) developments of 
the network methodology also give credence to this viev;. He i s seeking 
a method so well formulated that i t can be applied to any problem by 
anyone and y i e l d the same r e s u l t s - a method to r i v a l the experiment 
of the hard sciences. 
" I c e r t a i n l y think that they [ s c i e n t i f i c methods] cannot be taken 
over without very careful scrutiny ,,. I f e e l tfiat we have to learn 
to appiy the methods of the natural sciences to what I regard as 
the much more d i f f i c u l t problems of s o c i a l enquiry. We are dealing 
with actors who think, f e e l and believe and whose actions are 
determined by t h e i r motives and their purposes and these purposes 
Since he s p e c i f i e s (See Chapter l ) that he can see no grounds for 
separating s o c i a l anthropology ahd sociology, these remarks are equally 
relevant for both studies. 
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and b e l i e f s are part of the data which we have to take into 
accoimt. In that sense we are dealing with subjective data. 
But that does not mean that we cannot deal i n a s c i e n t i f i c 
and v a l i d way with data which i n t h e i r origin are subjective," 
(james ^ 9 7 1 o l 
The approaches of Mitchell and the others of the Manchester school, 
seem to r e f l e c t the same search for a universally applicable method. 
The idea that anthropology i s and must be s c i e n t i f i c has been force-
f u l l y put for them by Gluckman, 
" I believe firmly that anthropology i s a science,"QL968^)^ p.225^ 
and "The status of sociology largely depends upon how f a r i t can claim 
to be s c i e n t i f i c i n i t s procedure and the results i t obtains."^944f p.26.^ 
The d e s i r a b i l i t y of s c i e n t i f i c status and methods for anthropology i s 
accepted, and i t i s a domain assumption, shared by many network 
analysts and other anthropologists. 
For instance, "Comparison i s a methodological equivalent of experi-
ment" (Barth^l966^ p,2), (myj^mphasis) ^  Gulliver says his book i s presented 
as "an experiment or series-of experiements i n sociologocal analysis 
where the material happens to come from the s o c i a l l i f e of a parole 
i n any e a r l i e r period" (p,v^ 1 9 7 1 ) (mj^mphasis). Despres describes 
anthropology as a science - the comparative study of culture. 
Network analysis f i t s p a r t i c u l a r l y well into such a view of anthro-
pology since i t appears to be the hoped for standard methodology which 
can be applied to almost any problem. The question arises as to why 
exactly the par.adigm of the natural sciences has been so attractive for 
so many anthropologists, Gluckman provides a hint when he says the 
'status' of sociology depends on i t s preference to be s c i e n t i f i c . 
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"Poets and historians and theologians and philosophers are 
sometimes scorned for 'being so anthropomorphic about men.' 
But t h i s charge of being merely anthropomorphic about men, 
of treating men as human beings, i s one that i s also sometimes 
made against the s o c i a l , behavioural, human s c i e n t i s t s themselves 
because i n science, as among birds, there i s a pecking order. 
And the p h y s i c i s t looks do-im on the biologists, on the physio-
l o g i s t perhaps, and he i n turn looks down further on the experi-
mental psychologist. I f the experimental psychologist v;ants to 
peck somebody, he has to go down to the sociologist or perhaps 
the s o c i a l anthropologist, and they i n ttirn have to be content 
with despising b e l l e t r i s t i c l i t e r a t u r e . " ^Remford Bembrough^ 197];). 
The reasons for the existence of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r pecking order, and 
anthropologists consequent desire to emulate hard science, i s to be 
found i n the apparent success of the natural sciences, 
"The p r a c t i c a l success of s p a t i a l science i n enabling us to 
predict, and even to control, the behaviour of the material 
world about us, has given i t vast prestige and brought about 
a f e e l i n g that the more a l l our mental processes are l i k e i t , 
the more perfect they v d l l become." (Cooley i n Manis & Meltzer^ 
1962, ed.^p.70^ 
Quantification and Mathematization 
Mitchell gives us his second reason for the recent popularity of 
T network analysis "the development of non-quantitative ways of vigorously N 
s t a t i n g the implications entailed i n a set of relationships among a 
number of persons"(1969^p.l) , 
Anthropology has long been regarded as a f i e l d i n which s t a t i s t i c s \-/ere 
only able to contribute to a small extent, Nadel has said that anthro-
pologists are biographers of single societies and that their use of 
intensive studies of small-scale s o c i e t i e s precludes the use of s t a t i s t i c s < 
I would l i k e to emphasise the 'apparent success' here since I do not agree 
that either t h i s , the proposed hierarchy of d i s c i p l i n e s , or the ideas 
imputed to, are v a l i d . However, these ideas do seem to have influenced many 
network analysts. 
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I n contrast, sociology has developedi s t a t i s t i c a l analysis i n many 
ways, A rapprochement between the two d i s c i p l i n e s i s implied again 
i n that t h e i r methods are increasingly coming to overlap, (Manners 
and Kaplan^1972), 
I t i s c l e a r that for Mitchell and other analysts, networks present a 
means of introducing mathematical concepts into anthropological studies. 
The presumed advantages of s t a t i s t i c a l analysis- are several - the a v a i l -
a b i l i t y of readily comparative data, and the p o s s i b i l i t y of extrapola-
ting rates of change, being two of them. S t a t i s t i c s are seen as over-
coming the problems presented by vague generalizations - such as divorce 
i s frequent/infrequent, 
Colson s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l a t e s i n t e r e s t i n s t a t i s t i c s to the present state 
of anthropology and i t s claims to be s c i e n t i f i c , 
"The present i n t e r e s t i n the comparative method undoubtedly r e f l e c t s 
the f a c t that anthropology has reached a new stage i n i t s struggle 
to become a "science", V/ith the use of compaxative method comes 
the application of s t a t i s t i c a l techniques." (_1967^p,l.) 
Colson also quotes Driver who imkes the same point that; 
"Ve must obtain more quajitification of every kind v/herever i t i s 
possible to do so o,, i f one of the goals of ethnology i s to 
a r r i v e at patterns, configurations, or structures of cultures, 
these must be determined inductively from adequate numbers of 
a.ctual facts i f they are to s a t i s f y the standards of science." 
(Driver^1953, P55) 
The desire to use mathematical cojicepisis a common one within anthro-
pology and one which has been of importance for at l e a s t thirty yeaxs. 
Networks are presented as being one means of standardising the c o l l e c -
tion and presentation of data on behaviour, thereby making i t amenable 
to manipulation by mathematical processes. This i s the j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
for the presentation of abstract t r e a t i s e s such as those of Mitchell, 
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Wolfe and Barnes, which suggest detailed methodologies to be follovred 
by other workers: 
"The conceptual scheme and the procedures we have i l l u s t r a t e d 
here demonstrate, we believe, that the need for standardised methods 
of recording networks can be met ... we o u ^ t not to cower before 
the r e a l i s a t i o n of the vastness of the s o c i a l network; that part 
of i t which affects a given decision i s l e s s than i n f i n i t e ; and 
electronic devices and mathematical models permit us to manipulate 
much more dia than we were previously capable of dealing with." 
<5roife^l970,:pp.236-257) 
I t i s hoped by these writers that once a standard method has been adopted 
the network concept w i l l reach i t s f u l l potential. 
"This ( f a i l u r e to develop a standard method of netv/ork a n a l y s i s ] 
i s p a r t ly because the study of personal networks requires meti-
•-"^  culous and systematic detailed recording of data on s o c i a l i n t e r -
action for a f a i r l y large group of people, a feat which few writers 
can accomplish successfully. Certainly the e a r l i e s t writers who 
made use of the notion have not provided enough systematically 
recorded d e t a i l i n t h e i r accounts to make i t possible to check 
t h e i r interpretationsc"(Mitchell^l9699 p.11,^ 
A refined network methodology i s suggested as a means of providing such 
systematic data which i s then available for mathematical analysis. I n 
t h i s way the 'rather highly idiosyncratic ex poste facto interpretation 
of data o r i g i n a l l y collected for other purposes' which as Wolfe remarks 
(1970, p.229) has characterised previous netvrork analyses v / i l l be avoided. 
As well as suggesting methods of gathering data, Wolfe and Gaxbett 
have suggested means to record the information. Sociometric methods, 
and graph theory have also given impetus to the attempts to use 
mathematical techniques i n network analy s i s . The studies by HaraTy, 
Norman and Cartwright, Coleman and C a r t w r i ^ t and Zander are referred 
to p a r t i o n l a r l y i n t h i s context. ( l have read these texts but cannot 
see how t h e i r methods would be meaningfully applied. As yet they have 
not been), ©illiver (l971» P«349) suggests that network analysis may 
only reach i t s f u l l potential when a l l i e d with sociometric methods. 
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However, the limitations of quantification are also pointed to by 
several of the analysts, 
"Quantification, however, while i t i s an important method of 
data correction, should be an aid to, and not the purpose of 
f i e l d work. Just what should be counted and how f a r the counting 
should be taken should be dictated by the sort of theoretical 
propositions the anthropologist i s trying to establish. Theory 
should determine h i s use of s t a t i s t i c s ; h i s s t a t i s t i c s should 
not delimit h i s theory," .,," Quaaitification has no magical 
property to confer accuracy on the data; i f the basic observations, 
are inaccurate or incomplete, s t a t i s t i c s derived from them w i l l 
assuredly also r e f l e c t those weaknesses. What quantification 
achieves i s a condensation of facts so that the reg u l a r i t i e s 
and patterns i n them are more readily discernible. I t follows 
that the quantification must be made i n terms of categories of 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n that are meaningful for the ptirpose the observer 
has i n mind." (Mitchell, 1967,pp.21 and 26.J 
S p e c i f i c a l l y writing on quantifying network analyses, AoC, >Iayer remarks 
that; 
"Quantification must adequately express the to t a l configuration, 
rather than merely categorise the properties of single l i n k s and 
paths, i f this can be done, action sets and consequently quasi-
groups can be more e a s i l y compared,"(1966^p,118^ 
ii^aj o r factor i s to ascertain that "we take measurements not for the 
joy of counting, or to provide computer fodder, but i n order to prove 
or disprove some h y p o t h e s i s " , A , Barnes, I968, p,109») 
Network analysis has been committed by some of i t s more i n f l u e n t i a l 
exponents to the production of quantifiable data collected by standar-
dised methods. How f a r the claims made for i t i n this sphere^ have 
been , i s another matter. 
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5. Abstraction or generation - the role of the individual and the network 
I t would seem that i n order to j u s t i f y i t s focus upon the individual 
and h i s network, network analysts woiild have to accept as a domain as-
sumption, or elaborate as a postulate, the pimacy of the individual 
and his interactionss within s o c i a l l i f e . I n fact this problem i s r a r e l y 
e x p l i c i t l y discussed. This omission i s quite reasonQ.ble, the only draw-
back being again that ultimately i t means some of the potential of the 
method i s l o s t . 
A commitment to the extreme position of methodological individualism -
a b e l i e f that " a l l attempts to explain s o c i e t a l and individual pheno-
mena are to be rejected unless they r e f e r exclusively to facts about 
individuals'* (Lukes^l970^ p,82) - i s not necessary to j u s t i f y the ego-
centred approach of network analysis, and so I s h a l l not duplicate t u k ^ 
discussion of t h i s position here. 
The stand of Gluckman, who says "Transaction between individuals cannot 
explain i n s t i t u t i o n a l structures" (1968, p.JO) would seem to undermine 
the relevance of analysis using exchange theory which i s a theme of 
many network studies. Thus, i t becomes necessary to assume that net\-7ork 
analysts believe that interaction between individuals can explain the 
workings and generation of s o c i a l forms. 
Gull i v e r has apparently committed himself to such a view, 
"The recurrent mobilisation of more or le s s the same body of 
supporters i n sequences of action set recruitment and operation, 
by one individual i n a narked and successful leadership role, i s 
the baisis of quasi-group formation and of p o l i t i c a l factions^" 
(197I; p.240) 
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These ideas derive inspiration from A.C. Mayer's I966 a r t i c l e , and 
underly many other network analyses, A concentration upon decision 
models also implies the acceptance of a particular view of s o c i a l 
forms as generated by interacting individuals. 
"Such a model, f u l l y worked out, would provide a set of 'rules' 
f o r making decisions and for deciding among possible choices i n 
recurrent c u l t u r a l contexts. From such a model i t would be 
possible to conceive of the effective s o c i a l units of s o c i a l 
action and interdependence that are the epiphemonena of people's 
decisions",(Gulliver, I 9 7 I , p ,26,^ 
The view that s o c i a l forms are the epiphenomena of interaction of 
individual choices and decisions, gives added importance to network 
studies. I t i s i n f a c t a widely held view, but i s r a r e l y stated -
probably because i t i s seen to be a perspective which i t i s not 
necessary |t^'do^atically\ espouse. 
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6, Theories e x p l i c i t l y used by network analysts 
One of the f a i l i n g s o f many network studies recognised by the method's 
proponents i s the lack of any e x p l i c i t reference t o p a r t i c u l a r bodies 
of theory - a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l or otherwise. 
"What i s badly needed now i s the development of a theory v/hich 
presents a r e a l a l t e r n a t i v e t o s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l i s m ; t h i s 
l a s t has been d i s c r e d i t e d but i t has not y e t been replaced. 
U n t i l a r i v a l theory i s developed t h a t resolves a l l the anomalies 
of s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l a n a l y s i s , the t h e o r e t i c a l c r i s i s i n 
s o c i a l anthropology w i l l continue. Network a n a l y s i s , exchange 
theory and c u l t u r a l b i o l o g y (Harris^ I 9 6 8 ) are reactions which 
express d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h s t r u c t a r a l - f u n c t i o n a l i s m . They 
a l l move away from i t , y e t , as Kapferer has shown, they can i n 
p a r t be made t o converge. \Iha.t i s needed now is^'a greater degree 
o f synthesis t o b r i n g the various a l t e r n a t i v e t h e o r i e s , as i t v/ere, 
together,, t o combine them i n t o a u n i f i e d theoiry which can enlarge 
our understanding' of human behaviour and the patterns i t formso" 
(JBoissevain, 1972J 
I do n o t see network a n a l y s i s as anything more than a method which 
must be a l l i e d w i t h a theoryo I would agree w i t h Boissevain t h a t 
network a n a l y s i s i s p a r t of a movement away from s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l i -
Sation, but t h a t u n t i l the general o r i e n t a t i o n of such a method i s set 
f o r t h we s h a l l not be able t o reach the methods f u l l p o t e n t i a l . 
Exchange Theory 
Exchange theory i s the most f r e q u e n t l y c i t e d theory used by the 
network a n a l y s t s . A.C. Mayer's study of the exchanges o f f e r e d 
by p o l i t i c a l candidates i n Dewas provided i n s p ^ a t i o n to many other 
w r i t e r s . He pointed out the d i s t i n c t i o n between patrons and brokers 
i n the types of exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n which they engage, and 
mapped out the 'outward', v a r i e d t r a n s a c t i o n s , which vrere r e c i p r o -
cated by 'inward' p o l i t i c a l support. 
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Exchange theory also provides l i n k u p w i t h important ideas of 
generation of s o c i a l forms which are ga i n i n g acceptance i n 
anthropology, n o t a b l y througti the work of Frederik Bartho 
Boissevain - i n a personal communication - has said t h a t he 
sees considerable p o t e n t i a l i n the use of t h i s theory, I would 
question t h a t i t has any l a s t i n g v a l i d i t y - i n f a c t , I v/ould 
expect i t t o be superceded i n the near f u t u r e , f o r reasons which 
I s h a l l suggest, 
b^ ) Game Theory 
Game theory i s c l o s e l y l i n k e d w i t h t r a n s a c t i o n a l i s m and exchangeo 
The network studies f o r m a l l y using game theory are, i n f a c t , fewo 
H a l k i n discusses a l l i a n c e s between Konso towns i n these terms, 
but on the whole reference i s made t o , f o r instance, a zero-sum 
game, on the assumption t h a t the reader can then more c l e a r l y 
•understand the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s concerned, v/ithout a s p e c i f i c 
game theory analysis being presented, 
A most f r u i t f u l example of t h i s i s V^hitten's comparison of h i s 
i n c o r p o r a t i o n i n t o s o c i a l networks by Ecuadoran and Nova Scotian 
negroeso He concludes "although personal networks are s t r u c t u r a l l y 
s i m i l a r i n northwest Ecuador and Nova Scotia, the s t y l i z e d c u l t u r a l 
game of exchange t h r o ' them i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . "(po400) 
Thus vague concepts from exchange and game theory are used by many 
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a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s , but can be p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l e v a n t w i t h i n a 
network a n a l y s i s . 
"The p a r t i c u l a r formalism of the Theory of Games i s not 
as important f o r a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l purposes as i s the theory's 
fundamental character as a generative modeV ^ a r t h ^ 1966, p.5^ 
I t i s on t h i s l e v e l t h a t game theory has been used by network 
a n a l y s t s . 
c) F i e l d Theory 
Again l i t t l e e x p l i c i t reference i s made t o t h i s theory. Bott 
however remarks "the basic conceptual model (of Family and Social 
Network) i s t h a t of f i e l d theory" (p.4) As such the theory must 
be given some prominence i n a consideration of netv/ork a n a l y s i s . 
The formal aspects of Kurt Lewin's ideas have been overlooked and 
I the main c o n t r i b u t i o n has been the stress upon the^ interdependence 
of the i n d i v i d u a l and h i s environment, which i s a basic premise 
of network method and approaches. Lesser has sai d f i e l d t h eoiy 
b r i n g s : 
" i n t o one f i e l d the study of those patterned i n t e r p e r s o n a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s u s u a l l y considered merely a matter of h i s t o r i -
c a l accident and those t h a t are an i n t e g r a l p a r t of a p a r t i -
c u l a r s o c i a l aggregate. I t breaks down the idea t h a t h i s t o r y 
i nvolves mere happenstance - which i n t e r f e r e s w i t h the analysis 
of s o c i a l process i n system of r e l a t i o n s - h i s t o r y and synchronic 
a n a l y s i s become p a r t s o f one universe o f discourse, of one order 
or l e v e l of the h man s o c i a l processi* ( l 9 5 1 ; P« 34 ) 
The broad i m p l i c a t i o n s of the theory I r are again more u s e f u l than 
i t s f ormal a p p l i c a t i o n . 
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d) Symbolic I n t e r a c t i o n i s m 
E l i z a b e t h B o t t also r e f e r s t o the theories of (GcHo Mead i n 
her book "Family and Social Network". She w r i t e s , 
"The basic argument of both chapters [JE and Yll] i s 
t h a t people do not acquire t h e i r i d e o l o g j j norms and values 
s o l e l y by i n t e r n a l i s i n g them from outside. Th^' also 
rework the standards they have i n t e r n a l i s e d , conceptualise 
them i n a new form and p r o j e c t them back on the e x t e r n a l 
s i t u a t i o n . The more v a r i e d t h e i r s o c i a l experience and the 
more unconnected the standards they i n t e r n a l i s e , the more 
i n t e r n a l ^ rearrangement they must make. And the more loose-
k n i t t h e i r networks, the greater the necessity f o r them to 
use constructed reference groups, a b s t r a c t categories of 
person, as the r e f e r e n t s of t h e i r norms and ideology"fp.223, 
This places the analysis f i r m l y w i t h i n the t r a d i t i o n of sjnnbolic 
i n t e r a c t i o n s i m . For instance, Shibutani has w r i t t e n on reference 
groups as perspectives which r e l a t e s to Bott's understanding i n 
terms of s o c i a l networks. (I967) 
I t i s t h i s p a r t i c x i l a r theory which I see as h o l d i n g the greatest 
i n t e r e s t f o r f u t u r e analyses. I t is, also the area v;hich has 
received l e a s t a t t e n t i o n from l a t e r w r i t e r s even v;hen they have 
c i t e d B b t t ' s work, B o i s s e v a i n perhaps comes c l o s e s t to t h i s perspec-
t i v e when he w r i t e s ; 
" S o c i a l forms do not drop ready-made from heaven. Nor 
are they merely taken over b l i n d l y from preceding generations, 
o r simply borrowed from neighbouring s o c i e t i e s . They are 
generated or adapted by i n d i v i d u a l s and aggregates of i n d i v i -
duals a c t i n g i n accordsince w i t h t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s v.dthin 
the l i m i t s ? imposed by e x i s t i n g s o c i a l forms and values v/hich, 
i n t h e i r t u r n , when generated or adapted i n the same vfay i n 
the past. The s o c i a l behavioiu: of man shapes the so c i e t y i n 
which he l i v e s " , (1968 )Pc545) 
This wide-treaching theory has not received the a t t e n t i o n i t deserves 
and although I do not wish t o suggest t h a t i t s adoption w i l l solve 
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a l l the problems of network analysis, I f e e l that i t could be 
a useful alternative to the currently more popxilar exchange theory. 
e) Other theories 
Other e x p l i c i t l y mentioned theoretical bases for network analyses 
have beens 
1. configu3?ational sociology - Norbert E l i a s u t i l i s e d by Banck, 
1972. This theory, l i k e f i e l d theory, emphasises the impossi-
b i l i t y of considering an element - individual, group, etc. -
i n i s o l a t i o n . 
2. communication theory - Mitchell would l i k e to l i n k this with 
the mathematical constructs of Harary, Norman and C a x t w r i ^ t . 
3. sociograms - Mitchell^ again, i s one of the chief proponents of 
such bases. He claims that Bott, Mayer and Epstein are involved 
i n the analyses of sociograms. 
4. r o l e theory - networks are seen as superseding role theory 
and yet using many concepts which have been f i r s t discussed 
with reference to role-sets (see D.H. Reader). For Bott's team^ 
role was almost the only concept they shared. 
5. c u l t u r a l materialism - \ ^ t t e n (1970) has united the concept 
of network with c u l t u r a l materialism. Hovrever, t h r o u ^ a use of 
thearies of minimax the end r e s u l t i s not d i s s i m i l a r to analysis 
using exchange theories. 
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There are c l e a r l y more theories than the ones I have mentioned 
which have been related to network analy s i s . I hope I have isolated 
the most important^however, and discussed those which have been 
act u a l l y applied i n empirical studies rather than simply l i s t i n g 
ideas which have been suggested as having possible relevance v;hich 
has not yet been demonstrated. 
Erratum? 
Page 92 has been bound i n the wrong order and occurs here d i r e c t l y 
a f t e r page 89, Pages 90 and 9 I f o l l o w . 
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CHi^PTER IV 
INTRODUCTION 
I have argued so f a r t h a t the development o f network a n a l y s i s 
w i t h i n B r i t i s h s o c i a l anthropology at t h i s p a r t i c u l a r time ( t h e 
l a t e 1960s and 1 9 7 0 s ) i s i n e x t r i c a b l y bound up w i t h the appear-
ance o f a new paradigm w i t h i n the d i s c i p l i n e . I t i s e s s e n t i a l 
t o d e s c r i b e the l a t t e r i n more d e t a i l t o i l l u s t r a t e t h i s c e n t r a l 
t e n e t o f the t h e s i s , and t o appraise the r o l e o f network method 
i n such a paradigm. 
I s h a l l be drawing on m a t e r i a l from r e l a t e d d i s c i p l i n e s as w e l l 
as a n t h r o p o l o g y since I f e e l t h a t i t i s not p o s s i b l e or d e s i r a b l e 
t o i s o l a t e i n t e l l e c t u a l areas. I f we accept the i n f l u e n c e o f 
experience upon i d e a s , the c e n t r a l t e n e t o f the study o f the 
s o c i o l o g y o f knowledge, i t i s i n e v i t a b l e t h a t the changes w i t h i n 
academic d i s c i p l i n e s are l i k e l y t o be r e l a t e d , i f not s i m i l a r , 
t o one another at any p a r t i c u l a r t i m e . 
" I mean by "new" t h a t something has a l r e a d y happened i n 
B r i t i s h s o c i a l anthropology (and t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
a nthropology i n r e l a t e d ways) such t h a t f o r p r a c t i c a l 
purposes tex t b o o k s which looked u s e f u l , no longer are; 
monographs which used t o appear exhaustive now seem 
s e l e c t i v e ; i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t h a t once looked f u l l o f 
i n s i g h t now seem mechanical and l i f e l e s s . I t i s also 
new t h a t these changes are understood ( o r misunder-
stood) by some i n q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t l i g h t ; t h a t 
monographs have g i v e n way t o l i g h t w e i g h t essays; 
where once was reason, unreason r e i g n s ; f o r v e r i f i a b l e 
p o s t u l a t e s s p e c u l a t i o n i s s u b s t i t u t e d ; i n s t e a d o f 
" r e a l i t y " we have cosmological ^ ^ ^ g r ^ ^ ^ . ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ p^^^^^ 
* The s i m i l a r i t y o f Ardener's c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f the new 
anthropology w i t h T o f f l e r ' s statement o f how the w o r l d appears 
t o people s u f f e r i n g f u t u r e shock i s s u r p r i s i n g . 
92, 
l e w i s Beck was able t o p o i n t t o the f a l l a c i e s o f the 
'hard' science paradigm as e a r l y as 1 9 4 9 , 
"When s p l i t t i n g o f f from philosophy i n order t o become 
s c i e n t i f i c , the s o c i a l s t u d i e s took a had moment t o 
i m i t a t e the n a t u r a l sciences. They d i d so j u s t 
b e f o r e the n a t u r a l sciences themselves began t o imder-
go major changes. The r e s u l t i s t h a t many s o c i a l 
s c i e n t i s t s p r i d e themselves on being n a t u r a l s c i e n t i s t s 
or r e g r e t t h a t t hey cannot be, whereas the science they 
emulate or would l i k e t o emulate became obsolescent 
f i f t y years ago..... There was no unanimity on the 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s c u r r e n t among the n a t u r a l 
s c i e n t i s t s , and the ' u n i t y o f the na-tural sciences' 
by which they might have served as an unequivocal 
model, was an i l l u s i o n even before the death o f 
Gomte." 
L a t e r he p o i n t s t o the s o c i a l s e t t i n g which encouraged the 
a d o p t i o n o f such a model. 
"Every p r i m i t i v e people sees nature by an analogy 
w i t h i t s s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . Science began when 
laws, l i k e those g i v e n by governments and t r i b u n a l s , 
were p r o j e c t e d i n t o n a t u r e . " 
( i n Manners and Kaplan, 1 9 6 8 ) 
Thus we have the sad s p e c t a c l e o f a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s f o l l o w i n g 
an i d e o l o g y , which as J a r v i e says i s o f the order o f a cargo 
c u l t , i n the b e l i e f t h a t i t w i l l p r o vide a panacea, when i t 
has a l r e a d y been abandoned by the 'hard' sciences i n f a v o u r , 
i r o n i c a l l y , o f more s u b t l e t y and g r e a t e r emphasis upon the 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s i n t e r v e n t i o n and c r e a t i v i t y . 
"Science, as J.B.S.Haldane used t o m u t t e r , i s not a 
s c i e n c e . I t does not operate l i k e Mathematics, 
wo r k i n g w i t h r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v i t y from problem t o 
s o l u t i o n , u n t i l i t reaches a Q.E.D. I n s t e a d , a l l 
the t r u e advances i n human knowledge have been 
gained by hunches and guesses, acc i d e n t s and c o i n -
cidences, making e r r o r s , but c o r r e c t i n g them on the 
way." 
(j-len B r i e n , New Statesman ^  
4 June, 1 9 7 1 . ^ 
{Such i s the t h e s i s o f Thomas Kuhn's book, i n which he draws on-
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Ardener's view o f what i s happening i n anthropology 
i l l u s t r a t e s c l e a r l y t h a t , i n Kuhn's terms, a paradigm has 
o c c u r r e d . This i n v a l i d a t e s much o f the past work done i n 
the d i s c i p l i n e and creates enormous confusion over what i s 
' f a c t ' and ' r e a l i t y ' . Ardener sounds here as i f he i s an 
adherent o f the o l d paradigm but I r e a l i s e t h a t t h i s i s a 
Catch-22 type o f a c c u s a t i o n - i n t h a t i f he does not accept 
as t r u e what I a l s o b e l i e v e i t i s a l l too easy t o dismiss 
i t i n those terms. However, i t i s of enormous i n t e r e s t 
t h a t w h i l e many people recognise t h a t a change has occurred^ 
the d i r e c t i o n o f the change i s taken as t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t 
by d i f f e r e n t a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s . I suspect t h a t Ardener and 
myself would disagree p r o f o u n d l y on almost every p o i n t . 
"There has occurred an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l break o f 
an i m p o r t a n t k i n d . So f a r , i n t h a t sense t h e r e 
i s a new and an o l d anthropology. There i s a 
p o s i t i o n acquainted w i t h n e i g h b o u r i n g d i s c i p l i n e s , 
whch sees the new a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l movements as 
p a r t o f a change o f mind i n science i t s e l f . " 
(Ardener^ 1971 , p.4 4 9 ) 
I t i s t h i s l a t t e r p o s i t i o n which I would l i k e t o discuss now. 
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The R e j e c t i o n o f the 'Hard' Science Paradigm 
I n c l a i m i n g t h a t the 'hard' science paradigm i s 
i r r e l e v a n t f o r the present t h e o r e t i c a l p o s i t i o n of an t h r o -
pology, I do not wish t o e n t e r i n t o a d i s c u s s i o n o f the 
d i s c i p l i n e s a r t i s t i c or s c i e n t i f i c s t a t u s . 
The search f o r laws w i t h which t o p r e d i c t and c o n t r o l s o c i a l 
l i f e , and the s t r i v i n g towards an o b j e c t i v e t r u t h are major 
d i s t o r t i o n s of a n a t u r a l science paradigm which has dogged 
the s o c i a l sciences. I t i s t h i s p o s i t i v i s t d i s t o r t i o n o f 
the n a t u r e o f science which has now been r e j e c t e d . 
I can see t h a t t h e r e are enormous d i f f e r e n c e s between the 
work o f the a r t i s t and the s c i e n t i s t . 
As Bateson has s a i d "The a r t i s t i s content t o describe 
c u l t u r e i n such a manner t h a t many o f i t s premises and the 
i n t e r r e l a t i o n s o f i t s p a r t s are i m p l i c i t i n h i s composition. 
He can leave a great many o f the most fundamental aspects 
o f c u l t u r e t o be p i c k e d up, not from h i s a c t u a l words, but 
from h i s emphasis. He can choose vrords whose very sound i s 
more s i g n i f i c a n t than t h e i r d i c t i o n a r y meaning and he can 
so group and s t r e s s them t h a t the reader almost unconsciously 
r e c e i v e s i n f o r m a t i o n which i s not e x p l i c i t i n the sentences 
and which the a r t i s t vrould f i n d i t hard - almost impossible -
t o express i n a n a l y t i c terms. This i m p r e s s i o n i s t i c 
technique i s u t t e r l y f o r e i g n t o the methods o f science..." 
( 1 9 3 6^P . 1 ) 
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examples from the p h y s i c a l sciences t o i l l u s t r a t e t h i s c r u c i a l 
p o i n t i n great d e t a i l . ) 
The awareness o f how haphazard s c i e n t i f i c advance i s , and 
the enormous r o l e the i d i o s y n c r a c i e s o f the i n d i v i d u a l p l a y 
i n i t , i s increased by r e a d i n g such books as The Double H e l i x 
by James Watson^ i n which he describes the d i s c o v e r y o f D.N.A. 
i n v e r y personal terms. I n f a c t Cooley has p o i n t e d out t h a t 
a rapprochement o f q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t k i n d i s p o s s i b l e . 
"There i s indeed one way i n which p h y s i c a l and s o c i a l 
science may be a s s i m i l a t e d . ¥e may f i n d t h a t atoms 
and e l e c t r o n s are not so u n i f o r m and r e l i a b l e as has 
been b e l i e v e d , t h a t the supposed p h y s i c a l laws are 
o n l y s t a t i s t i c a l , c o v e r i n g d i v e r s i t y i n the phenomena 
somewhat as s o c i a l s t a t i s t i c s cover the d i v e r s i t i e s 
i n i n d i v i d u a l men. Indeed vm are t o l d , by men 
a p p a r e n t l y competent t h a t 'the present s t a t e o f 
p h y s i c s lends no support whatever t o the b e l i e f t h a t 
t h e r e i s a c a u s a l i t y i n p h y s i c a l n ature which i s 
founded on r i g o r o u s l y exact laws. I n some such way 
as t h i s the g u l f may be b r i d g e d , but never, I t h i n k , 
by r e d u c i n g the human w i l l t o zero." 
(Cooley^p.80^ i n 
Manis & M e l t z e r ) 
Gooley wrote i n 1956, and since then the p h y s i c a l sciences 
have moved i n j u s t the d i r e c t i o n s he suggested, even t o t h e 
e x t e n t o f having t o admit t h a t the act o f o b s e r v a t i o n o f an 
experiment may a l t e r i t s course. 
The sad f a c t i s t h a t s o c i a l sciences have f o l l o w e d an 
a l r e a d y redundant paradigm, when t h e i r own h e l d the key. 
As Kuhn p o i n t s out i t i s i r o n i c a l t h a t ^ s i i e n t i s t s should have 
w r i t t e n t o c o n g r a t u l a t e him on h i s book 'The S t r u c t u r e o f 
S c i e n t i f i c Revolutions'^ remarking t h a t i t resembles c l o s e l y 
t h e way t h e i r d i s c i p l i n e s advance, when he h i m s e l f d e r i v e d 
those ideas from s o c i a l science. 
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There i s another issue at stake here, however. I f one were 
t o accept the p a r t i c u l a r paradigm supposedly prevented by the 
'hard' sciences w i t h i t s emphasis upon o b j e c t i v e deduction 
o f laws - hovr f a r can i t be a p p l i e d t o s o c i a l studies? I t 
seems d o u b t f u l t h a t i t can be o f any relevance. 
Remford Bambrough has l i k e n e d t r y i n g t o analyse s o c i a l 
phenomena i n the terms o f the n a t u r a l sciences t o a M a r t i a n 
o b s e r v i n g a game o f chess. He can see the moves and p a t t e r n s 
but cannot understand the system. The i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f d e a l i n g 
w i t h a c r e a t u r e who can monitor h i s o\m performance, deceive, 
understand as a human b e i n g does, i n the concepts and terms o f 
n a t u r a l science i s obvious. • 
I t a l s o leads t o p r e t e n s i o n s and laughable conclusions. 
"Harvey Sacks, a s o c i o l o g i s t w i t h an uncanny s e n s i t i v i t y 
- t o l i n g u i s t i c behaviour, demonstrated t h a t a c o nversation 
i s a h i g h l y s t r u c t u r e d event and the ruleS' o f sequence 
o r g a n i s a t i o n can be f o r m a l l y d e s c r i b e d . Several years 
o f c a r e f u l s tudy o f conversations have p a i d o f f i n the 
d i s c o v e r y o f many s u b t l e aspects o f t h i s speech event. 
I n h i s p r e s e n t a t i o n at the conference, he argued t h a t 
c o n v e r sations can be c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n terms o f two 
g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s towards which p a r t i c i p a n t s always 
o r i e n t themselves. 
1. At l e a s t one and no more than one person t a l k s 
at a t i m e . 
2. Speaker change r e c u r s . " 
J o e l Schezer 
Language Sciences 
Quoted i n P r i v a t e Eye, May 1971. 
In'^pseuds cornei^ a p p r o p r i a t e l y enough, which i s s u r e l y a place 
t o be avoided! / 
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"¥e s h a l l say t h a t a 'human science' e x i s t s 
wherever t h e r e i s a n a l y s i s - w i t h i n the dimension 
proper t o t h e unconscious - o f norms, r u l e s , and 
s i g n i f y i n g t o t a l i t i e s which u n v e i l t o conscious-
ness the c o n d i t i o n s o f i t s forms and co n t e n t s . 
To speak o f 'sciences o f man' i n any o t h e r case 
i s simply an abuse o f language. He can see, then, 
how v a i n and i d l e are a l l those wearisome d i s -
cussions as t o whether such and such forms o f 
knovrledge may be termed t r u l y s c i e n t i f i c and t o 
what c o n d i t i o n s they ought t o be s u b j e c t e d t o 
become so. The 'sciences o f man' are p a r t o f 
the modern episteme i n the same way as chemistry 
or medicine or any o t h e r science,... But t o say 
the y are p a r t o f the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l f i e l d means 
si m p l y t h a t t h e i r p o s i t i v i t y i s r o o t e d i n i t , 
t h a t i s where t h e y f i n d t h e i r c o n d i t i o n o f e x i s t -
ence, t h a t t hey are not merely i l l u s i o n s , pseudo-
s c i e n t i f i c f a n t a s i e s motivated at the l e v e l o f 
o p i n i o n s , i n t e r e s t or b e l i e f s , t h a t t hey are not 
what o t h e r s c a l l by the b i z a r r e name o f 'ideology'. 
But t h a t does not n e c e s s a r i l y mean t h a t they are 
sciences." / T , -,nrTi\ 
(p•365^ Foucault^1971j. 
I do not i n t e n d t o embark on t h a t wearisome d i s c u s s i o n 
s i n c e I f e e l my case t h a t anthropology can never be a science 
i n the sense t h a t the emulations o f the 'hard' sciences hope 
f o r , r e s t s f i r s t l y upon the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f being o b j e c t i v e 
i n t h e sense r e q u i r e d by t h a t paradigm, and secondly upon 
the f a c t t h a t the paradigm i s not t h a t o f sciences such as 
ph y s i c s at present anyway. 
The n a t u r a l sciences are no longer r e v e r e d as r e p r e s e n t i n g 
a way -of thought which p r o v i d e s a v a l i d model f o r the ' s o f t ' 
s c i e n c e s . I n f a c t a t t i t u d e s -to science have a l t e r e d , as has 
the form o f science i t s e l f . 
Anthony S t o r r speaks f o r many when he says 
" I t seems t o me th e r e ' s a very great s i m p l i f i c a t i o n 
i n t h i n k i n g t h a t t h e r e i s something c a l l e d science, 
w i t h a c a p i t a l S, and t h a t other t h i n g s t h a t don't 
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q u i t e measure up t o that paradigm are d i s r e p u t a b l e . . . 
i t ' s l o n g been my s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t some o f the 
p i c t u r e s o f the modern w o r l d , which f o r i n s t a n c e , 
modern p h y s i c s presents us w i t h are a c t u a l l y much 
more s u b j e c t i v e c o n s t r u c t i o n s than s c i e n t i s t s 
would l i k e t o have us t h i n k - u s e f u l but not 
bedrock, as proveable i n r e a l i t y " . (l97l) 
Many netvrork a n a l y s t s are i n disagreement w i t h t h i s aspect o f 
the new paradigm. As I have shoim^they seek t o emulate the 
'hard' sciences i n many ways. 
The Focus upon the I n d i v i d u a l and M i c r o a n a l y s i s i n B r i t i s h 
S o c i a l Anthropology 
Malinovrski saw needs as e x p l a i n i n g the behaviour o f 
i n d i v i d u a l s , w h i l e groups e x p l a i n e d the s o c i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n 
o f a c u l t u r e (1939). He f e l t t h a t the two l e v e l s o f 
a n a l y s i s should be c a r r i e d out at the same ti m e . Since 
then t h e emphasis has s h i f t e d towards the i n d i v i d u a l and 
h i s d e c i s i o n s as d e t e r m i n i n g the form o f the s o c i a l o r g a n i -
s a t i o n . This i s c l e a r l y a r a d i c a l r e o r i e n t a t i o n , and one 
which i s i n e x t r i c a b l y l i n k e d w i t h emic approaches and the vrider 
concept o f i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y . 
E a r t h has adopted a p o i n t o f view which emphasises the hap-
hazard way i n which s o c i a l forms appear as a r e s u l t o f i n d i v i d u a l 
a c t s . 
" I would argue t h a t i t i s not u s e f u l t o assume t h a t t h i s 
e m p i r i c a l p a t t e r n ( o f behaviour) i s a sought f o r con-
d i t i o n which a l l members o f the community e q u a l l y and 
w i l f u l l y m a i n t a i n . Rather i t must be regarded as an 
epiphenomenon o f a g r e a t v a r i e t y o f processes i n com-
b i n a t i o n , and our problem as s o c i a l a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s i s 
t o show how i t i s generated ... The u b i q u i t o u s beer 
p a r t y guest, who i s exchanging labour d i r e c t l y f o r beer, 
does not ask h i m s e l f how w i l l t h i s a l l o c a t i o n a f f e c t our 
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system of s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n ? Yet h i s a l l o c a t i o n s 
made on the b a s i s of l i m i t e d considerations do i n f a c t 
create d i r e c t i o n s and constraints on possible change." 
(Barth^ 1967^B ^ pp.222-3) 
As Leach has s a i d , the anthropologists problem becomes -
" J u s t how [^oes^ the s o c i a l f a c t of normal behaviour 
emerge from a s e r i e s of seemingly a r b i t r a r y i n d i v i d u a l 
choices?" 
(1961^ p.98) 
I t i s argued, for instance, by Manners and Kaplan (l97l) that 
one of the s p e c i a l i z a t i o n s of s o c i a l anthropology which can 
save i t from e x t i n c t i o n , or absorption into sociology i s i t s 
p a r t i c u l a r concentration upon microprocesses, and small group 
a n a l y s i s using p a r t i c i p a n t observation. I n t e r e s t i n such 
methods as s i t u a t i o n a l a n a l y s i s , s o c i a l dramatisation and 
extended case a n a l y s i s i n anthropology also emphasises 
the importance of the i n d i v i d u a l i n s o c i a l science. Other areas 
of i n t e r e s t r e f l e c t t h i s - for instance the study of l o c a l l e v e l 
p o l i t i c s and of manipulation of an e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l structure 
by the i n d i v i d u a l s involved i n i t . A new view of man i s 
implied - a man who i s able to manipulate h i s s o c i a l environ-
ment, ajid even to create i t . 
Pons claims that h i s d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n -
ships "showed conclusively how interpersonal r e l a t i o n s and 
"small-group" i n t e r a c t i o n s were r e l a t e d to the 
continuous processes of elaborating norms, of 
communicating " c i v i l i z a t i o n " to newcomers, and of 
a s s e s s i n g newcomers i n terms of t h e i r a b i l i t y to 
e s t a b l i s h v a r i e d sets of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s within 
diverse s i t u a t i o n s . " 
(1969^ p.274) The i n t e r e s t 
i n communication and s o c i a l i s a t i o n i s part of a far wider s h i f t 
i n the c u r r e n t l y accepted philosophies of s o c i a l l i f e . 
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Southall has also s a i d that small groups provide a useful 
l e v e l of a n a l y s i s with t h e i r consequent focus upon the i n d i v -
i d u a l . Such a study 
" c o n s t i t u t e s a s p e c i a l approach to the study of 
face-to-face r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n small c l u s t e r s 
w i t h i n l a r g e r populations which seem to lack 
corporate s t r u c t u r e s except as a wide impersonal 
framework. The object i s both to study small 
groups for t h e i r ovm sake and to see how the 
wider corporate s t r u c t u r e s impinge upon those 
who compose them, that i s how continuous chains 
and i n t e r l o c k i n g networks of r o l e r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
l i n k the members of small groups of the structures 
of the wider s o c i e t y and the people who play key 
r o l e s i n them. The small groups themselves may 
not n e c e s s a r i l y be the units of a n a l y s i s , there 
may seem to be few i f any coherent small groups 
at f i r s t s i g h t . The object of study then i s 
to discover the type and the channels of i n t e r -
action between persons, and the extent of regular-
i t i e s which give a minimum of coherence and order 
to s o c i a l l i f e .. The e f f e c t of t h i s approach i s 
to enlarge the f i e l d of p o s i t i v e knowledge by 
defining, or approaching a d e f i n i t i o n of s i t u a t i o n s 
h i t h e r t o regarded as presenting an unstructured 
f l u i d i t y which defied possible a n a l y s i s . " 
(I96l^p.25) 
Thus i t seems apparent that a general s h i f t towards the micro-
l e v e l of s o c i a l a n a l y s i s has occurred. 
This has been brought about p a r t l y because anthropologists 
studying urban areas have been forced to accept that s o c i a l l i f e 
continues and i s i n t e l l i g i b l e to the i n d i v i d u a l s concerned, 
although i t at f i r s t appears hopelessly confused to the out-
side observer. This r e f l e c t s back to Pocock's suggestion 
that we must think how the Nuer, for instance^ see s o c i a l change, 
and r e l a t e i t to ourselves. I have quoted extensively from 
Plo t n i c o v and other w r i t e r s i n Chapter I to i l l u s t r a t e t h i s 
point. I t i s worth r e i t e r a t i n g again to emphasise that i t 
also encourages a concentration upon the i n d i v i d u a l . 
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"This c r i s i s [^6^ unemployment] and i t s e f f e c t s , although 
shaping the s i t u a t i o n which t h i s study i s concerned 
to describe, did not provide e n t i r e l y new structures 
or patterns of organisation. I t simply introduced 
new f a c t o r s with which the e x i s t i n g organisation had 
to contend. One can best understand and analyse 
these f a c t s by using the approach that the c i t i z e n s 
of L e o p o l d v i l l e , whatever t h e i r status must l i v e 
according to the r e a l i t i e s of the s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n . 
These r e a l i t i e s f a l l into various categories -
p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l , economic, which one may term 
s e t s of "givens" or "frameworks".... I f i t h i n each 
framework the r e g u l a r i t i e s of s t r u c t u r e , common 
b e l i e f s and a c t i v i t i e s can be analysed with reference 
to the goals of c i t i z e n s who manipulate the givens 
to further t h e i r oim aims. I n Leopoldville, leaders 
and followers operate within the same frameworks, but 
leaders seek p r e s t i g e , influence and power, whereas 
ordinary men seek merely to l i v e . " 
(La Fontaine^ p. 4^  1970) 
Gutkind makes the same point -
"The emphasis should be l a i d c l e a r l y on the words 
"apparent l a c k of unity" simply because there i s 
order and r e g u l a r i t y i n A f r i c a n urban areas, however 
heterogenous, but integration takes place around 
v a r i a b l e s which i n the past have notbeen associated 
with s t r u c t u r a l r e g u l a r i t y . " 
(1965^ p.128) 
Reader also emphasises the place of the i n d i v i d u a l i n urban 
anthropological s t u d i e s . 
"Two basic presuppositions to the urban approach now 
seem to receive f a i r l y general assent. One, as 
L i t t l e has s a i d of West A f r i c a , i s that instead of 
viewing the contemporary urban s i t u a t i o n as a j u x t a -
p o s i t i o n of two or more di f f e r e n t c u l t u r e s , i t i s 
be t t e r to conceive i t as a process of adaption to new 
circumstances. (Little^l957^p.580) The other i s 
that where s o c i a l heterogeneity makes i t impossible 
to work from the concept of society i t i s helpful to 
proceed from the reference point of the s o c i a l 
i n d i v i d u a l . The s o c i a l environment .... becomes a 
construct over which they have some control by 
seeking some r e l a t i o n s and avoiding others, by 
accepting the norms of some reference groups and not 
(1964 , Reader,^.28 ajid 21) 
This r e a p p r a i s a l of the unstructured urban environment i s 
c l e a r l y a part of a paradigm s h i f t , i n which the very f a c t s 
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" of a science are challenged. In-jhis p a r t i c u l a r case, actor-
oriented approaches have become p a r t i c u l a r l y relevant within 
anthropology as a r e s u l t . 
The d i s t i n c t i o n between actor-oriented and emic studies 
" i s / i n t h i s area, to some extent one of degree. I n other s i t -
uations i t becomes c l e a r l y one of kind. The influences which 
have brought both approaches to prominence i n recent years, are 
s i m i l a r , however, and are also responsible for the i n t e r e s t i n 
networks. 
" C e r t a i n l y no modern anthropologist vrould consciously 
t r y to separate thought from action i n the society 
he s t u d i e s . But the understanding he communicates 
i s better to the extent that he departs from the 
conventional s o c i o l o g i c a l view that the i n d i v i d u a l 
i s i r r e l e v a n t . " 
(Pocock^l96l^p.llO) 
Network analysts have for the most part embraced t h i s 
aspect of the new paradigm wholeheartedly, but not a l l have 
u t i l i s e d the ideas of ethnoscience, which are a l o g i c a l extension 
of the focus upon the i n d i v i d u a l , 
Emic Approaches and Bthnoscience i n Anthropology. 
A most important s h i f t i n emphasis within anthropology i n 
recent years has been towaxd the a n a l y s i s of emic u n i t s . 
Such an approach has been much i n evidence i n America f o r 
the past decade but received l i t t l e attention i n B r i t i s h s o c i a l 
anthropology u n t i l r e c e n t l y , and has not yet been much u t i l i s e d 
i n network s t u d i e s . 
"One diagnosis that has been offered for the t h e o r e t i c a l 
and methodological ' c r i s i s ' i n anthropology holds that 
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our problems grow out of a p a r t i c u l a r kind of weakness 
i n the strategy of conceptualisation i n most ethno-
graphic d e s c r i p t i o n s . According to t h i s view, c u l t u r a l 
behaviour should always be studied and categorised i n 
terms of the " i n s i d e view" - the actor's d e f i n i t i o n -
of human events. That i s , the u n i t s of conceptualisa-
t i o n i n anthropological theories should be "discovered" 
by analysing the cognitive processes of the people 
/ s t u d i e ^ ^ rather than imposed from cross c u l t u r a l (hence 
ethnocentric) c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s of behaviour. This point 
of view i s v a r i o u s l y r e f e r r e d to as "New Ethnography" 
"Ethnoscience" or "ethnosemantics" ." 
(Pelto^l97() pp.67-68) 
The commitment becomes toward explaining or understanding 
meaningful behaviour i n i t s own terms. This has f a r ranging 
im p l i c a t i o n s and r e l a t e s to many other new emphases i n anthro-
pology. 
As Pelto remarks 
" I f e i t h e r the emic or the e t i c 'side' of the argument 
i s overvrhelmingly r i g h t i n i t s a s s e r t i o n s , the vrork 
of the other must be regarded as nearly t o t a l l y 
worthless. The main d i r e c t i o n s of future anthropolo-
g i c a l study are c l e a r l y involved i n the controversy." 
(Pelto^ 1970^ p.82) 
I t i s therefore e s s e n t i a l to examine the present p o s i t i o n of 
network a n a l y s i s v i s a v i s t h i s problem, and to suggest what 
re o r i e n t a t i o n s might or should be made. 
I s h a l l argue that one of the major f a i l i n g s of network 
a n a l y s i s has been an attempt to present objective data ( i n 
the terms of a 'hard' science paradigm). I also suggest that 
one of the best ways to overcome the problems posed i n i f r i t i n g 
about s o c i a l l i f e i s to attempt to expose one's own bias (not 
meant as a derogatory term here) and understand i t as f a r as 
p o s s i b l e oneself. The danger of sole'cism i s eliminated i f 
i t i s possible to accept that to make knowledge more u s e f u l . 
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more a v a i l a b l e to other people, i s to make i t objective i n a 
meaningful way. C l e a r l y , the desire to explain one's oivn 
standpoint i s not enough however. There must be some other 
perspective to be substituted for our own. as f a r as p o s s i b l e . 
The only relevant one i s that of the people being observed 
(with whom as observer one i s i n t e r a c t i n g ) . 
I f i n d myself i n agreement when Gluckman ivrites of R a d c l i f f e -
Brown and the following generation of B r i t i s h s o c i a l anthropol-
o g i s t s , that 
" I n order to demonstrate the existence of system at 
a l l , we discarded much of the l i v i n g r e a l i t y about 
which we had c o l l e c t e d material." 
(p.i x forevrord to 'Schism and 
^Continuity'^ 1957) 
Such studies containing mixtures of emic and e t i c (the 
l a t t e r predominating) are f u l l of unsupported generalisations 
and are d u l l to read because meaning has s u c c e s s f u l l y been 
eliminated along with other problematic features of man's i n t e r -
a c t i o n s . They belong outside the t r a d i t i o n i n B r i t i s h s o c i a l 
anthropology which i s at present providing the most stimulus 
to the d i s c i p l i n e s development. 
This l a t t e r t r a d i t i o n derives from the work of Evans-Pritchard^ 
who placed s o c i a l anthropology as a branch of historiography^ 
r a t h e r than of the natural sciences. He envisaged the f i r s t 
stage of anthropological work as the understanding of a culture 
and i t s t r a n s l a t i o n into terms understandable by members of 
another c u l t u r e . I n h i s study of the Nuer the importance of 
context became evident for instance i n the use of the word 
"home" -
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" I f one meets an Englishman i n Germany, and asks him where 
h i s home i s , he may reply that i t i s i n England; i f one 
meets the same man i n London and asks him the same 
question he w i l l t e l l one that h is home i s i n Oxfordshire, 
whereas i f one meets him i n that county he w i l l t e l l me 
the name of the tovm or v i l l a g e i n which he l i v e s . " 
(The Nuer^p.136) 
Pocock has pointed out that such thought owes more to the French 
school r a t h e r than the B r i t i s h . He says that 
"the authors r e f u s a l to make e x p l i c i t the s h i f t i n 
emphasis had c e r t a i n t a c t i c a l advantages. No storms 
brew up which might have obscured the presentation 
under a storm of dust, a sense of continuity was 
preserved..." 
But the s h i f t was to an acceptance of the actor's d e f i n i t i o n 
of the s i t u a t i o n 
" and t h i s must be the anthropologists s t a r t i n g point." 
(I96l^p.79) 
The attempt to take the actor's view has become a major element 
i n much of B r i t i s h s o c i a l anthropology. For instance, J a r v i e 
has c a l l e d for the use of Popper's s i t u a t i o n a l l o g i c to explain 
ho\T a person chooses between the a l t e r n a t i v e s open to him i n 
a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n . Swartz has s a i d that p o l i t i c a l r u l e s , 
which are for him a major part of p o l i t i c a l anthropology 
" c o n s t i t u t e the actor's model of h i s ovm s i t u a t i o n " . Pons 
has remarked on the f a c t that apparently i r r a t i o n a l urban 
behaviour can be seen to be understandable i n i t s own terms. 
Pl o t n i c o v also has s a i d that 
" i f contradictions Q n a person's a c t i o n s ] are present 
they are i n the mind of the observer not the observed. 
For the p a r t i c i p a n t the i n s t i t u t i o n s e x i s t to be used 
and exploited, neglected or avoide^^^^^ ^ 
Burridge has expressed the same idea with reference to his study 
of cargo c u l t s -
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"New i d e a l s , new assumptions c e r t a i n l y (which e x i s t vrith 
cargo c u l t s ) . But whether or not they are b i z a r r e i s 
e n t i r e l y s u b j e c t i v e . No one, i t may be assumed, does 
s e r i o u s l y what he himself thinks i s b i z a r r e . Just as 
other kinds of seemingly strange and e s o t e r i c a c t i v i t i e s 
i n foreign cultures have yielded t h e i r mystery to 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n , so again and again the apparently 
b i z a r r e i n m i l l e n a r i a n a c t i v i t i e s has been shorn to 
be unexceptionable i n the circumstances, given the 
premises 
(I969^p.9) 
Of wider i m p l i c a t i o n i s the f a c t that Exchange theory must 
u l t i m a t e l y r e s t upon an understanding of the r e l a t i v e values of 
the transactions as perceived by the actors themselves. As 
Barth has s a i d pay-offs 
"must be seen from the point of view of actors or other 
concrete u n i t s of management that dispose over resources 
and make a l l o c a t i o n s . " (Barth^ 1967^  B^p.667) 
I have already discussed the overwhelming importance to network 
a n a l y s i s of exchange theory and since i t i s c l e a r that the actor's 
d e f i n i t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n i s c r u c i a l to that theory, i t i s 
apparent that the emic approach and network an a l y s i s must be 
r e l a t e d i n many ways. 
However, there have been extremely few netvrork studies 
which have made use of t h i s orientation s p e c i f i c a l l y . 
E l i z a b e t h Bott presented her a n a l y s i s of c l a s s as a subjective 
vrorld view which r e l a t e s to the i n d i v i d u a l ' s experience of that 
system. She was also w e l l aware of the f a c t that the i n t e r -
a c t i o n between interviewer and interviewee would colour the 
information which was c o l l e c t e d . The awareness of such sub-
tleties i s rare i n network analyses. Whitten's comparison of 
Ecuador and Uova S c o t i a p a r a l l e l s t h i s - i n fact he perceives 
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the d i f f e r e n c e s i n the c u l t u r a l game of exchange i n terms 
of the way i n which he was incorporated into the two 
s o c i e t i e s . P a r k i n s i m i l a r l y views h i s fieldwork experience 
as "developing into a type of network a n a l y s i s , with 
myself as an i n t e g r a l part of the network". 
(1969^ p.v) 
The attempt to present a network study i n vrhich an i n t e g r a l 
part of the network - the anthropologist - i s e n t i r e l y omitted 
i s a f a t a l mistake, and stems from a b e l i e f i n p o s i t i v ^ i c 
a n a l y s i s and a lac k of d i s t i n c t i o n drawn between emic and e t i c 
approaches. 
"The c h i e f value of an anthropological approach to 
s o c i o l o g i c a l questions l i e s i n my view, not i n the 
intensive a n a l y s i s of multiplex r e l a t i o n s as has 
sometimes been suggested (Bantonyl964) hut rather 
i n the c l e a r e r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the contrasts and 
connexions between the concepts used by actors and 
by observers, between emic concepts and e t i c concepts, 
as they are sometimes c a l l e d . " 
(Barnes^l970^ P . 15 ) 
I n not making c l e a r t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , the network analysts have 
thus been ignoring one of anthropology's major contributions 
to s o c i a l a n a l y s i s . Although i t would seem that the close 
examination of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p s which i s the 
essence of network a n a l y s i s must i n e v i t a b l y require an attempt 
to understand those r e l a t i o n s h i p s as the actor does - i n f a c t , 
other r e l a t e d anthropological methods have made more use of 
emic a n a l y s i s . 
Analyses such as B a i l e y s (1969, 1971) and Swartz's ( I 9 6 8 ) 
of l o c a l l e v e l p o l i t i c s and processes r e l y , through t h e i r 
u t i l i s a t i o n of ideas of transaction and exchange^ on an under-
standing of the goals and values of the p a r t i c u l a r society being 
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examined. Only when these are comprehended can normative 
and pragmatic r u l e s , estimates of resources and so on be 
extrapolated. 
Some methods which have been rel a t e d to network a n a l y s i s 
i n the past (e^^Bgader^ I964) as being b a s i c a l l y s i m i l a r i n 
o r i e n t a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e i r emphasis on the importance 
of the i n d i v i d u a l , have, i n f a c t , been used rather d i f f e r e n t l y 
from network a n a l y s i s . S i t u a t i o n a l analyses and the 
extended case method have both been developed - as has network 
a n a l y s i s , ^iexf l e s s e x c l u s i v e l y so - by the p r o l i f i c and 
impressive Manchester School. 
Van Velson's aim i s to "explain by the same process as 
I gained ray i n s i g h t " ( p . x x v i i i ^ I964). I n t h i s he resembles 
the network, analysts I have c i t e d above who see as c r u c i a l 
t h e i r ovm le a r n i n g and adaptation i n a new c u l t u r a l milieux. 
I t also echoes the desire of the New Ethnographers to be able 
to produce a set of r u l e s which would enable an outsider to 
enter such a new milieu and operate s u c c e s s f u l l y within i t . 
Again the s o c i a l dram^ i s 
"a d e s c r i p t i o n of a s e r i e s of unique events i n which 
p a r t i c u l a r persons, impelled by a l l kinds of motives 
and private purposes i n t e r a c t i n many dif f e r e n t 
ways." 
(Turner,1957^ p.330) 
The s o c i a l drama method of a n a l y s i s has gained the greatest 
acclaim of these three methods mentioned above but they a l l 
recognise the importance of the f a c t that "General forms have 
t h e i r v i t a l i t y i n p a r t i c u l a r s " - Turner's motto (1957^ p-329)• 
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They are, however, more readable than network analyses - the 
reason being that they are more i n tune with the new paradigm -
a major element of which i s the acceptance of the actor's 
understanding of the s i t u a t i o n . There i s i n fact an enormous 
divergence between these types of a n a l y s i s and the more pedantic 
network analyses. The l a t t e r attempt to be f o r m a l i s t i c and 
obviously s c i e n t i f i c while the former i n c l i n e to the form of 
a novel. The ethos i s quite d i f f e r e n t . Similar r e o r i e n t a -
t i o n s towards a focus on i n d i v i d u a l s and t h e i r understandings 
have occurred i n other s o c i a l science d i s c i p l i n e s . 
a) L i n g u i s t i c s Reorientation 
The formulation of the d i s t i n c t i o n between eraic and e t i c 
approaches i s c r e d i t e d to Pike, who derived the actual terms 
from the words "phonetic axid phonemic" i n l i n g u i s t i c s . The 
r e v o l u t i o n i n l i n g u i s t i c s thus p a r a l l e l s that i n anthropology. 
"The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the methodology outlined here 
(Prake?s 1962 paper)... goes beyond i t s contribution 
to d e s c r i p t i v e ethnography. The s t r a t e g i e s outlined 
here promise a revolution i n c u l t u r a l anthropology, 
comparable to that which took place i n recent decades 
i n l i n g u i s t i c s . L i n g u i s t i c a n a l y s i s has cast aside 
the mould of the c l a s s i c a l grammars to describe each 
language i n terms appropriate to i t s own st r u c t u r e . 
Ethnography i s struggling to break the mould of the 
c a t e g o r i c a l outline of culture which most anthropo-
l o g i s t s now take with them to the f i e l d . " ^ 
(Gladwin and Sturterant ^ l 9 6 2 ^ 
p.72) 
I n l i n g u i s t i c s the s c i e n t i f i c revolution ( l r e f e r again to 
T.S.Kuhn's work) i s traced back to Chomsky's ?7ork. Before 
1957 l i n g u i s t i c s was b e h a v i o u r i s t i c , and p o s i t i v i s t i c . 
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Chomsky 
"brought about a revolution by saying that the most 
i n t e r e s t i n g thing about language and what we should 
d i r e c t our attention to .. i s what the native 
speaker knows i n t u i t i v e l y about the structure of 
hi s language." 
(Thorne^ 1971) 
As Thorne points out t h i s i s a paradigm change i n Kuhn's 
terminology, i n that the nature of what i s accepted as 'fact' 
i s changed. Labov and other l i n g u i s t s have provided 
i n s p i r a t i o n for anthropologists, and although the formal-
i s a t i o n of l i n g u i s t i c s i s sought for but cannot be applied 
u s e f u l l y to many areas of s o c i a l l i f e , the general 
r e o r i e n t a t i o n brought about by the emic approach has pro-
foimd-ly a l t e r e d anthropology. 
"We always t a l k about str u c t u r e , but e s s e n t i a l l y when 
we're t a l k i n g about structiore what we're concerned 
with i s "meaning"." 
(Thorne) 
S i m i l a r l y i n anthropology, the meaning of actions i s to be 
sought, and i t i s t h i s which, i n some studies at l e a s t , i s 
r e c t i f y i n g the s t e r i l i t y of discussions of l i f e i n terms of 
purely e t i c concepts. 
b) P s y c h i a t r y 
A s i m i l a r movement within psychiatry has revolutionised 
that science. R.D.Laing i s the prime mover i n t h i s case. 
He has argued that the person who i s diagnosed schizophrenic 
may w e l l be a c t i n g r a t i o n a l l y i n terms of the impossible 
s i t u a t i o n i n which he i s t r y i n g to e x i s t . This view has 
created enormous controversy since i t e s s e n t i a l l y overthroX'TS 
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many of the assumptions which people are used to being able 
to make. 
"To create t h i s r e l i g i o n ( A n t i - P s y c h i a t r ^ i t was necessary 
to say that r a t i o n a l i t y , the great achievement of 
n a t u r a l and s o c i a l science (which had between them more 
or l e s s destroyed r e l i g i o n ) , wasn't such a good thing 
a f t e r a l l s that the i r r a t i o n a l , the untenable, the 
u n j u s t i f i a b l e , the completely crazy was (or could be) 
t r u l y marvellous and worthy. I n the construction of 
t h i s science-based r e l i g i o n , the i r r a t i o n a l was upgraded 
by e l e v a t i n g and celebrating human madness and 
Anti-Psychiatry became the new human science - permissive 
and indulgent towards the i r r a t i o n a l - as a substitute 
for that nasty old Psychiatry, which was of course 
thoroughly and most unpleasantly r a t i o n a l often to the 
point of dOT-mright atheism." 
(Sedgwick^1972) 
I n f a c t there i s much confusion over vrhat exactly Laing's 
p o s i t i o n i s . Others vrho have follovred h i s lead have made more 
extreme statements than Laing himself and since he has l e f t for 
Ceylon there i s no one who can c l a r i f y with any authority. 
However, the f a c t remains that Laing and Anti-Psychiatry (which 
i n f a c t owes more to D. Cooper) are seen to have made a ferocious 
attack on the e x i s t i n g s o c i a l order, and are perceived by many 
as an extremely threatening force. Sedgwick accuses Laing of 
propounding a ' r e l i g i o n ' - a word vAich seems to be used 
derogatorily to imply that such b e l i e f s are i r r a t i o n a l l y held. 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g that the s c i e n t i f i c method was c a l l e d a 
r e l i g i o n by J a r v i e i n h i s discussion of the revolution i n 
anthropology. The i n v a l i d a t i o n of a way of thought i n t h i s way 
i s not nearly so f r u i t f u l as an attempt to understand i t i n i t s 
o>m terms. 
Leach has interpreted Laing and Cooper as saying 
"Quite openly that they are more concerned with the 
110 
revolutionary transformation of the world than with 
h e a l i n g the mentally s i c k " . (2971) 
Books such as 'Death of the Family' do attack enormous areas of 
our present s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e , but a panic reaction over-
exaggerates t h e i r implications i n many ways. Leach also l i n k s 
the more extreme s e c t s of the past - for instance the F i f t h 
Monarchists - with the e x i s t e n t i a l psychologists' interpretations 
of the world. I n t h i s way he points to the transience of such 
changes of world view and e f f e c t i v e l y makes them look quite 
f o o l i s h . 
"The e f f e c t i s achieved not by argument but by 
incantation. Any f i e l d anthropologist w i l l r e a d i l y 
recognise the genre; the r e p e t i t i o n s , the non-
sequiturs, the far-fetched but highly conventionalised 
metaphors, are a l l quite t y p i c a l of the magical verbal 
accompaniment of healing r i t u a l s as reported from a l l 
over the world." 
(Leachpl971^Heview of 'Death 
of the Family' i n The L i s t e n e r ) 
The discussion of the book 'Death of the Family' i n these 
terms seems to me to be making an analogy which i s extremely 
far-fetched, but i l l u s t r a t e s againj how threatened Laing and 
Cooper can make people f e e l , so that they are forced to r e t a l i a t e 
i n the most ferocious way. 
"What needs to be ;mderstood i s that books l i k e t h i s 
are a symptom not a cause. The Times ran a s p e c i a l 
centre-page review of the book on the day before 
p u b l i c a t i o n , i t would not be described as a favour-
able review but that any book so s u p e r f i c i a l l y crazy 
should be s i n g l e d out for such treatment i s highly 
s i g n i f i c a n t . The Millenium i s not at hand, but the 
Reformation i s well underway." 
( L e a c h ^ l 9 7 l ) 
The correspondence follovring t h i s review pointed, to a number 
of misapprehensions on Leach's part. "Laing has noxfhere 
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commended any a n t i - s o c i e t y or a n t i - s t a t e " .. wrote one reader, 
who also pointed out that Bateson's theory of schizophrenia 
which Leach had summarised as being that schizophrenia " i s 
generated by family l i f e " was i n f a c t based upon R u s s e l l ' s 
theory of L o g i c a l Types, and, i n t e r e s t i n g l y , the Theory of 
Games^ of Von Neumann and Morgenstern, and was not intended 
to apply to a l l f a m i l i e s . Leach r e p l i e d to the c r i t i c i s m and 
denied that anthropologists "believe ""the d i s t i n c t i o n mad/sane 
i s purely conventional and r e l a t i v e * and I have yet to meet any 
anthropologist, with f i e l d experience, who had any doubts at 
a l l about the r e l a t i v e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of healing r i t u a l s i n 
Western and non-Western medicine". 
The furore that existential'^phenomenology has created 
w i t h i n psychiatry has had enormous repercussions elsewhere, 
i n v o l v i n g almost a l l aware s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s . I would suggest 
that i t s c e n t r a l tenet - the v a l i d i t y of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s own 
experience of the world - has been accepted to a f a r greater 
degree than one might suppose, and that t h i s i s of f a r greater 
i n t e r e s t and s i g n i f i c a n c e than the arguments as to Laing's 
exact p o s i t i o n , h i s use as a c u l t hero and so on. 
S t o r r has s a i d "ultimately vrhat I'm concerned with i s the 
patien-^s^ subjective experience of the r e l a t i o n s h i p they're 
having", when d i s c u s s i n g dynamic psychology with Remford 
Barabrough. He has also s t r e s s e d that 'you've only got a 
person when there are two people present e i t h e r i n fantasy or 
r e a l i t y , that unless you kave stomebody to r e l a t e to you don't 
e x i s t as a separate r e a l i t y ' . 
112 
T h i s type of philosophy i s accepted by many s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s 
and profoundly a l t e r s t h e i r work. I t i s i n r e l a t i o n to wide 
movements such as t h i s that the appearance of the emic approach 
i n anthropology and netvrork a n a l y s i s must be seen. 
Philosophy 
Phenomenology has provided the i n s p i r a t i o n for many of these 
r e o r i e n t a t i o n s . The founder of phenomenology was Edmund 
Husserl ( 1895 -1938 ) . He argues that Objectivism or P o s i t i v i s m 
took over European thought i n the seventeenth century - i n the 
writ i n g s of G a l i l e o . Thus 
" f o r 300 years western thought has been d i l i g e n t l y 
ignoring the e n t i r e world of sense - impressions, 
emotions and a l l the r e a l i t i e s that make up our 
everyday world". (Poole^1972 p . 82 ) 
Descartes followed up 
"the question of reducing the r e a l world to a 
mathematical picture of i t " , -.mo 
^ . (Poole,1972^p.84) 
He refused to consider perspectives and h i s own a f f e c t i v i t y , 
p r e f e r r i n g to consider only objective f a c t s . From t h i s , 
r a t i o n a l i s m and empiricism have developed. 
Husserl s t r e s s e d the existence of a myriad of d i f f e r e n t 
perspectives each pertaining to a d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l . Follow-
ing from t h i s the n e c e s s i t y of looking as f a r as possible at 
the t o t a l i t y , the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s of the world are 
apparent. 
"Let us d i r e c t our attention to the fact that i n general 
the world or r a t h e r , the objects, are not merely 
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p r e g i v e n t o us a l l i n such a way t h a t we simply have 
them as the s u b s t r a t e s o f t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s but t h a t 
we become conscious o f them ... through s u b j e c t i v e 
manners o f appearance, or manners o f givenness 
w i t h o u t n o t i c i n g i t i n p a r t i c u l a r ; i n f a c t , we are 
f o r the most p a r t not even aware o f i t at a l l . Let 
us now shape t h i s i n t o a new u n i v e r s a l d i r e c t i o n o f 
i n t e r e s t ; l e t us e s t a b l i s h a c o n s i s t e n t i m i v e r s a l 
i n t e r e s t i n the "how" o f the manners of givenness -
t h a t i s , w i t h our i n t e r e s t e x c l u s i v e l y and c o n s t a n t l y 
d i r e c t e d toward how, throughout the a l t e r a t i o n o f 
r e l a t i v e v a l i d i t i e s , s u b j e c t i v e appearances, and 
o p i n i o n s the coherent u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y w o r l d - the 
vrorld - comes i n t o b e i n g f o r us." 
(Husserl^p. 44^1970) 
H u s s e r l recognised t h a t the method o f t a c k l i n g the problem o f 
s u b j e c t i v i t y by p a y i n g a t t e n t i o n t o the t o t a l i t y was one which 
would be p r o b l e m a t i c t o embark upon, but q u i t e e s s e n t i a l i f 
we are t o g a i n any new understanding o f l i f e . The challenge 
has been taken up by l a t e r w r i t e r s however, and has gained 
i n c r e a s i n g prominence i n recent decades. 
A l f r e d Schutz has e l a b o r a t e d and c l a r i f i e d the t e n e t s o f 
phenomenology, 
"what counts i s the p o i n t o f view from which the 
s c i e n t i s t envisages the s o c i a l w o r l d .. t h i s 
c e n t r a l p o i n t o f view o f the s c i e n t i s t i s c a l l e d 
h i s " s c i e n t i f i c problem ijnder examination". 
(p.l88-)Emmet and H c l n t y r e ^ 
1971) 
The problem d e f i n e s the l i m i t s o f relevance o f the i n q u i r y , 
and a l s o p r o v i d e s a scheme o f r e f e r e n c e f o r the c o n s t r u c t i o n 
o f r e l e v a n t i d e a l t y p e s . The p r i n c i p l e o f relevance p o i n t s 
out t h a t no "type" can e x i s t independently o f a reference 
scheme. A s h i f t i n the problem thus i n v o l v e s a s h i f t i n 
p o i n t o f view and i n the r e l e v a n t elements under examination. 
Misunderstandings abound because t h i s u l t i m a t e r e l a t i v i t y i s 
overlooked by s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s . 
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"The s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t must t h e r e f o r e ask, or he must 
at l e a s t always be i n a p o s i t i o n t o ask, what happens 
i n the mind o f an i n d i v i d u a l a c t o r whose act has l e d 
t o the phenomenon i n q u e s t i o n . We can formulate 
the p o s t u l a t e o f the s u b j e c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n more 
c o r r e c t l y as f o l l o w s : The s c i e n t i s t has t o ask what 
type o f i n d i v i d u a l mind can be c o n s t r u c t e d and what 
t y p i c a l thoughts must be a t t r i b u t e d t o i t t o e x p l a i n 
the act i n q u e s t i o n as the r e s u l t o f i t s a c t i v i t y 
w i t h i n an understandable r e l a t i o n . 
"This p o s t u l a t e f i n d s i t s complement i n another which 
I propose t o c a l l , b o r r o w i n g a term from Max Weber, 
the p o s t u l a t e o f adequacy. I t may be formulated 
as f o l l o w s : Each term used i n a s c i e n t i f i c system 
r e f e r r i n g t o human a c t i o n must be so c o n s t r u c t e d 
t h a t a human act performed w i t h i n the l i f e - w o r l d 
by an i n d i v i d u a l a c t o r i n the way i n d i c a t e d by the 
t y p i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n would be reasonable and under-
standable f o r the a c t o r h i m s e l f , as w e l l as f o r h i s 
f e l l o w men." 
(p.1 1 1 ^ 1971) 
As a r e s u l t o f Schutz'spostulates and the key concept o f 
r a t i o n a l i t y t h e r e i s o n l y one reasonable course l e f t open 
t o the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t -
"Everyone t o became a s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t must make up 
h i s mind t o put somebody else i n s t e a d o f h i m s e l f 
as the c e n t r e o f t h i s observed w o r l d , namely, the 
observed person." 
( p . 106^ 1971) 
To understand the a c t o r ' s view i s thus the aim o f s o c i a l 
s c i e n c e . I n t h i s , Schutz and phenomenology p o s s i b l y go 
f u r t h e r than most emic o r i e n t e d a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s . 
d) S o c i a l Psychology 
G.H.Mead, who i s regarded by many as one o f the most 
i n f l u e n t i a l s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g i s t s , again s t r e s s e d the i n t e r -
s u b j e c t i v i t y r e q u i r e d t o enable the a c t i o n s o f s e v e r a l 
i n d i v i d u a l s t o be c o o r d i n a t e d . The theme i s s i m i l a r t o 
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t h a t o f Schutz i n t h a t the existence o f aa many viewpoints as 
t h e r e are i n d i v i d u a l s i s accepted as ax i o m a t i c . Symbolic 
i n t e r a c t i o n i s m - the school which d e r i v e s i t s i n s p i r a t i o n from 
Mead - has e l a b o r a t e d the concept i n terms o f the c r e a t i o n or 
g e n e r a t i o n o f s o c i a l forms. At present i t i s s u f f i c i e n t t o 
p o i n t t o the f a c t t h a t here again the aim o f understanding as 
i f one i s the observed i s a basic element. 
e) S o c i o l o g y 
E r v i n g Goffman, whose work has i n f l u e n c e d s o c i o l o g y i n 
p a r t i c u l a r , has examined s o c i a l l i f e at the l e v e l o f the i n d i v -
i d u a l and micEoprocesses ( a l e v e l which network a n a l y s i s assumes 
als o t o be o f relevance f o r the understanding o f human l i f e ) . 
Goffman's assumptions - as set out i n h i s book ' S t r a t e g i c 
I n t e r a c t i o n ' (1971^ ^p . 4 - 8 ) - are remarkably s i m i l a r t o those 
o f Mead and h i s emulators. There i s the same expressed i n t e r e s t 
i n t h e importance o f language and symbols communicated between 
i n t e r a c t i n g i n d i v i d u a l s . The i n d i v i d u a l i s recognised t o be 
i n c o n t r o l o f h i s "impression management" and t o be able t o 
manipulate the signs and symbols t o c e r t a i n ends. I n t h i s r e s -
pect he i s a d i f f e r e n t concept e n t i r e l y from the ratomorphic man 
o f Skinner and the b e h a v i o u r i s t s . (Again t h i s i s a c r u c i a l 
element t o vrhich I s h a l l r e t u r n ) . Goffman's \inderstanding 
o f s o c i a l l i f e depends enormously upon an i n t e r n a l imderstanding 
o f s i t u a t i o n s , s i n ce the i n d i v i d u a l i s able t o p r o j e c t an 
imp r e s s i o n vrhich he h i m s e l f knows t o be f a l s e , and t o p l a y at 
r o l e s which he i s "a t t a c h e d " t o but does not "embrace". The 
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e x i s t e n c e o f a ' s e l f behind the r o l e i s taken f o r granted. 
"The i n d i v i d u a l i s denying not the r o l e but the 
v i r t u a l s e l f t h a t i s i m p l i e d i n the r o l e f o r 
a l l a c c e p t i n g performers." 
(p.61^1969) 
T h i s leads t o the ex i s t e n c e o f " r o l e d i s t a n c e " . The 
i m p l i c a t i o n o f Goffman's analyses i s t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l can 
preserve h i s own s e l f image by m a n i p u l a t i n g the s i t u a t i o n s i n 
which he f i n d s h i m s e l f , A basic premise o f Mead's and 
Goffraan's i s t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l can n e g o t i a t e w i t h i n t e r -
a c t i n g o t h e r s i n a s i t u a t i o n t o impose a p a r t i c u l a r d e f i n i t i o n 
on the s i t u a t i o n . Once t h i s i s done behaviour i s judged 
a p p r o p r i a t e i n t h e terms o f t h a t d e f i n i t i o n . The a c t o r ' s 
d e f i n i t i o n i s v e r y much a c o n t r o l l i n g f o r c e and one which has 
t o be understood, since a c t i o n s are not evaluated i n terms o f 
f u n c t i o n but i n terms o f what i s h e l d t o be acceptable. 
The interdependence o f the a c t o r s i s o f c r u c i a l importance. 
A l l these elements o f i n t e r a c t i o n are s t r e s s e d by network-
a n a l y s i s . 
Another stream o f thought which i s i n vogue at present i n 
s o c i o l o g y i s ethnomethodology. G a r f i n k e l has been i n f l u e n c e d 
t o a g r e a t e x t e n t by Schutz's phenomenology. L i k e Luckmann & 
Berger he i s i n t e r e s t e d i n the shared t a c i t r u l e s t h a t enable 
s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n t o occur. Luckmann & Berger c a l l t h i s 
recipe-knowledge, w h i l e Schutz names i t cookery book knowledge. 
These h o l d the s o c i a l w o r l d t o g e t h e r -
"a dense c o l l e c t i v e s t r u c t u r e o f t a c i t understandings 
(What men know ejid know ot h e r s know) concerning the 
most mundane and " t r i v i a l " m a t t e r s , understandings 
t o which no s p e c i a l importance, l e t alone sacred 
s i g n i f i c a n c e , i s n o r m a l l y a t t r i b u t e d , i f , indeed, 
they are n o t i c e d a t a l l . " (Gouldner^ p . 3 9 1 ; 1971) 
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I n o r d e r t o e l u c i d a t e such understandings, G a r f i n k e l a t t a c k s 
our commonsense understanding o f r e a l i t y . For in s t a n c e h i s 
students are t o l d t o f e i g n ignorance o f o r d i n a r y phrases. 
" G a r f i n k e l seeks t o understand s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s from 
the " i n s i d e " as i t were, as i t appears t o the men 
who l i v e i t ; he seeks t o communicate t h e i r sense o f 
t h i n g s , w i t h an almost Nietzschean h o s t i l i t y t o 
c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n and a b s t r a c t i o n and p a r t i c u l a r l y 
by a v o i d i n g the c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s c o n v e n t i o n a l t o 
normal sociology."^uldnery,1971,^ p.594/) 
T h i s resembles c l o s e l y Husserl's phenomenological "suspension" 
o f b e l i e f i n r e a l i t y . To me t h i s seems t o be the l o g i c a l 
outcome o f phenomenological s t u d i e s and o f the emic approach 
w i t h i n anthropology. I t r e f l e c t s back t o the p e r c e p t i o n o f 
anthropology as t r a n s l a t i n g between c u l t u r e s . U l t i m a t e l y 
however, the r e s u l t must be a r e t u r n t o almost n o v e l i s t i c type 
w r i t i n g - which t h e s o c i a l drama method and so on already p r e -
shadow. 
Another r e c e n t a d d i t i o n t o t h i s type o f approach i s t h a t 
o f "everyday s o c i o l o g y " as presented by Jack B. Douglas. He 
argues t h a t u l t i m a t e l y a l l our knowledge o f s o c i a l l i f e i s 
i n e v i t a b l y based upon commonsense understandings. 
"... t h e r e i s no way o f g e t t i n g a t the s o c i a l meanings 
from which one e i t h e r i m p l i c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y i n f e r s 
t h e l a r g e r p a t t e r n s , except through some form o f 
commxmication w i t h the members o f t h a t s o c i a l or 
group, and t o be v a l i d and r e l i a b l e , any such 
communication w i t h the members presupposes an 
un d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e i r language, t h e i r own under-
standings o f what the people doing the observations 
are up t o , and so on almost e n d l e s s l y . " 
I do not wish t o go f u r t h e r i n t o d i s t i n c t i o n s between^for 
instance^ l i n g u i s t i c phenomenological s o c i o l o g i s t s , s i t u a t i o n a l 
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phenomenological s o c i o l o g i s t s and so f o r t h . The main p o i n t i s 
t h a t a l l these approaches r e q u i r e an acceptance o f the importance 
o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s otm view o f a s i t u a t i o n as a basic element 
i n t h e un d e r s t a n d i n g o f any s i t u a t i o n . 
I n f a c t exchange t h e o r y i m p l i e s such a view i n t h a t , as I 
have p o i n t e d o u t , p a y o f f s are d e f i n e d by the a c t o r . S i m i l a r l y , 
i t i s basic t o the d e c i s i o n model which i s o f i n c r e a s i n g 
importance i n s o c i a l science. Keesing (p.2^1968) describes 
a d e c i s i o n model as 
"an ethnographic d e s c r i p t i o n which i s e c t o r - o r i e n t e d 
and based on the c a t e g o r i e s o f the c u l t u r e under 
study i . e . one t h a t i s emic." 
"The step o f t a k i n g the commentaries o f s o c i a l a c t o r s 
s e r i o u s l y - as genuine but r e v i s a b l e , reports o f the 
genesis o f s o c i a l behaviour corresponds e x a c t l y t o 
the step made by chemists i n the mid n i n e t e e n t h 
c e n t u r y , when they b o l d l y espoused the seemingly 
b i z a r r e t h e o r y t h a t chemical r e a c t i o n s vrere produced 
by an exchange and rearrangement o f f i x e d chemical 
atoms. A f t e r 50 years o f s c o r n f u l d i s m i s s a l D a l t o n 
was suddenly discovered t o be the " f a t h e r o f modern 
ch e m i s t r y " . The t r u e nature o f chemical change i s 
the rearrangement o f atoms; and t h e t r u e nature o f 
human s o c i a l a c t i o n i s the conscious s e l f - m o n i t o r i n g 
o f behaviour, a c c o r d i n g t o p l a n s , r i t e s and conventions." 
(Harre ' ^1971^p .582) 
From t h i s emic approach many c o r r o l a r i e s o f enormous 
importance f o l l o w . T h i s i s the basic and fundamental element 
o f the new paradigm and I hope I have shoi-m t h a t i t i s a wide-
spread and accepted mode o f thought, but one which has not 
always been f u l l y developed i n network analyses. 
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R e a p p r a i s a l of Concepts i n the Context o f the New Paradigm 
As t h i s r e o r i e n t a t i o n i n the d i r e c t i o n o f a c t o r - o r i e n t e d 
approaches has taken p l a c e , many concepts have had t o be 
r e a p p r a i s e d . Some have been r e d e f i n e d , others r e j e c t e d , 
w h i l e o t h e r s have come t o be more prominent i n the context 
o f the new paradigm. 
a) Role and Choice 
I n the 1950's and 60's r o l e was a c e n t r a l concept i n 
s o c i o l o g y i n B r i t a i n and America (Banton and others have 
discussed the t e r m i n o l o g i e s and s l i g h t l y d i f f e r i n g concepts 
o f r o l e used by d i f f e r e n t >7riters so I s h a l l not discuss t h a t 
h e r e ) . The emphasis was upon the i n d i v i d u a l as a s o c i a l i s e d 
b e i n g who f i t t e d i n t o v a r i o u s r o l e s which e x i s t e d w i t h i n the 
s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e . 
"Subgroups, l i k e the widest group the s o c i e t y at 
l a r g e , are made up o f people i n determinate 
s t a b l e r e l a t i o n s h i p s . " 
(Nadel^p . 13^1957) 
"We a r r i v e at the s t r u c t u r e o f a s o c i e t y through 
a b s t r a c t i n g from the concrete p o p u l a t i o n and i t s 
behaviour the p a t t e r n or network ( o r 'system') 
o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s o b t a i n i n g "between ac t o r s i n 
t h e i r c a p a c i t y t o p l a y r o l e s r e l a t i v e t o one 
another." ( T a l c o t t Parsons^1949^P«43.Sssays 
i n ^ c i a l Theory)" ^^^^^^^ ^ ^^^^ p ^  
L i n t o n d e f i n e d r o l e as a dynamic concept 
"A s t a t u s , as d i s t i n c t from the i n d i v i d u a l , who may 
occupy i t , i s s i mply a c o l l e c t i o n o f r i g h t s and 
d u t i e s ... A r o l e r e p r e s e n t s the dynamic aspect o f 
a s t a t u s ... when (an i n d i v i d u a l ) puts the r i g h t s 
and d u t i e s i n t o e f f e c t , he i s p e r f o r m i n g a r o l e " . 
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I n t h i s way r o l e p l a y i n g i s observable i n behaviour. 
I n anthropology Tfadel examined the conce'pt i n great d e t a i l . 
"Role p r o v i d e s a concept i n t e r m e d i a r y between ' s o c i e t y ' 
and ' i n d i v i d u a l ' . I t operates i n t h a t s t r a t e g i c 
area where i n d i v i d u a l behaviour becomes s o c i a l 
conduct, and where i n e q u a l i t i e s and i n c l i n a t i o n s 
d i s t r i b u t e d over a p o p u l a t i o n are t r a n s l a t e d i n t o 
d i f f e r e n t i a l a t t r i b u t e s r e q u i r e d by, or e x e m p l i f y i n g 
the o b t a i n i n g s o c i a l norms." 
(>Ip.del^l957^p .20) 
By 1965 Mair wcoie 
"most B r i t i s h s o c i a l a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s now use as key 
terms i n t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n o f s o c i a l behaviour the 
concepts s t a t u s and r o l e . " 
U 9 o 5 I p . 2 2 j 
The relevance o f the i n d i v i d u a l as opposed to t h a t o f 
i n s t i t u t i o n s was thus f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d . Role was e l a b o r a t e d 
upon by Herton i n p a r t i c u l a r , but i t s more recent exponents have 
adopted the i d e a t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l can choose the d e f i n i t i o n 
o f t h e s i t u a t i o n i n vrhich he f i n d s h i m s e l f - one o f the important 
elements b e i n g the choice o f r o l e - and t h a t through n e g o t i a t i o n s 
over t h e ' c o r r e c t ' d e f i n i t i o n o f a s i t u a t i o n , common understandings 
develop. These understandings are the b a s i s o f symbolic 
systems, and, u l t i m a t e l y , c u l t u r e . 
Goffman's analyses use r o l e - but h i s r o l e p l a y e r s are able 
t o choose whether or not t o embrace t h e i r r o l e - they can, i f 
they w i s h , remain at a d i s t a n c e from i t . The process o f 
a r r i v i n g at a shared d e f i n i t i o n o f the s i t u a t i o n becomes the 
focus o f i n t e r e s t , i n v o l v i n g skewed com.munication and other 
devices which the a c t o r ccn use. 
" I n p u r s u i t o f t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , p a r t i e s of a l l k i n d s 
must deal w i t h and through i n d i v i d u a l s ... I n these 
d e a l i n g s , p a r t i e s - or r a t h e r persons who manage 
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them - must o r i e n t t o the c a p a c i t i e s which these 
i n d i v i d u a l s are seen t o have and t o the c o n d i t i o n s 
which bear upon t h e i r e x e r c i s e , such as i n a t e 
human p r o p e n s i t i e s , c u l t u r e bound b e l i e f s , s o c i a l 
norms, the market value o f l a b o u r , and so f o r t h . 
To o r i e n t t o these c a p a c i t i e s i s t o come t o con-
c l u s i o n s , v r e l l founded or n o t , concerning them; 
and t o come t o these conclusions i s t o have assump-
t i o n s about the fundamental nature o f the s o r t s o f 
persons d e a l t w i t h . 
These assumptions about human n a t u r e , however, are 
not easy t o uncover because they can be as deeply 
taken f o r g r a n t e d by the student as by those he 
s t u d i e s . And so an appeal i s made t o e x t r a o r d i n a r y 
s i t u a t i o n s wherein the student can stumble i n t o 
awareness. * 
I n t h i s paper I want t o explore one general human 
c a p a c i t y i n terms o f the conceptions we have o f i t s 
p h y s i c a l and s o c i a l l i m i t s . The i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
c a p a c i t y t o a c q u i r e , rsveal and conceal i n f o r m a t i o n . " 
(Goffman,pp.3 & 4^1970) 
The r e c o g n i t i o n o f the c e n t r a l importance o f i n f o r m a t i o n , ajid 
f o l l o w i n g t h i s of man's a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l i n f o r m a t i o n , a l t e r s 
t o t a l l y the concept o f r o l e . The n o t i o n o f r o l e i s thus s t i l l 
used i n s o c i o l o g y but hr.s undergone profound changes. 
"The i d e a o f r o l e t a k i n g s h i f t s emphasis away from the 
simple process o f e n a c t i n g a p r o s c r i b e d r o l e t o 
d e v i s i n g a performance on the b a s i s o f impu t e d ot h e r 
r o l e s " . 
(Turner, i n Rose Lid.,1962 
^ . 2 3 ) ^ ^ 
These changes r e l a t e t o o t h e r assumptions o f the new paradigm, 
I have quoted at l e n g t h here t o p o i n t t o the s i m i l a r i t i e s 
between t h i s £.nd ethnomethodology. The search f o r the un-
spoken background assumptions o f a c u l t u r e i s a major f o c u s ^ 
i n these s t u d i e s . ^anthropology has huge p o t e n t i a l here i n 
t h a t i n the p e r s o n a l c r i s i s o f c a r r y i n g out f i e l d work a l l the 
assumptions o f the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t are questioned and he should 
reach d o ™ t o g a i n an understanding o ' the more t a c i t l e v e l s o f 
meaning - as Goffman says - stumble i n t o awareness. I n t h i s 
way a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l f i e l d i r o r k seems l i k e l y t o gain i n importance 
v r i t h i n t h i s nevf paradigm. 
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vrhich concentrate a t t e n t i o n on the i n d i v i d u a l , but go beyond the 
o r i g i n a l s h i f t toward the i n d i v i d u a l which brought r o l e a n a l y s i s 
t o such prominence. 
The r e c o g n i t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l a b i l i t y t o e x e r c i s e 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and, choose between a l t e r n a t i v e a c t i o n s p r o v i d e s 
the b a s i c premise o f exchange t h e o r y . One o f the areas i n 
which he can choose i s h i s r o l e . 
"A man must choose the proper r o l e i d e n t i t y as f r e q u e n t l y 
as the s o c i a l c o n t e x t changes." 
( P l o t n i c o v ^ l 9 6 7 ^ p.7) 
E a r t h ' s d e s c r i p t i o n o f the u t i l i t i e s model o f s o c i e t y demon-
s t r a t e s t h i s new freedom a t t r i b u t e d t o man -
"The most simple and general model a v a i l a b l e t o us i s one 
o f an aggregate o f people e x e r c i s i n g choice w h i l e 
i n f l u e n c e d by c e r t a i n c o n s t r a i n t s and c u l t u r e s . " 
( B a r t h ^ l 9 6 6 ^ p . l ) 
Network a n a l y s i s i s o f t e n concerned t o e x p l a i n why people 
choose between v a r i o u s a l t e r n a t i v e courses o f a c t i o n . 
"b) I n t e r a c t i o n 
ac 
I'.Iany d i s c i p l i n e s now not o n l y emphasise the relevance o f 
t o r - o r i e n t e d study but also g i v e i n t e r a c t i o n between i n d i v -
i d u a l s a d e f i n i t i v e r o l e i n the c r e a t i o n o f socia -1 systems. 
Easton, a p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t , has d e f i n e d a p o l i t i c a l 
system as 
"those i n t e r a c t i o n s through which values are 
a u t h o r i t a t i v e l y a l l o c a t e d f o r a s o c i e t y . " ^ ^ ^ ^ g ^ 
Luckman and Berger say 
" s o c i a l order e x i s t s o n l y as a product o f human a c t i v i t y , 
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No oth e r on'tolbgical s t a t u s may be ascribed t o i t 
vrithout h o p e l e s s l y o b f u s c a t i n g i t s e m p i r i c a l 
m a n i f e s t a t i o n s . " 
(p.70^1967) 
Buckley and oth e r s have i n s i s t e d t h a t i n t e r a c t i o n i s the basic 
element o f s o c i a l l i f e . 
"Though i t i s p a r t o f c o n v e n t i o n a l wisdom t o s t a r t w i t h 
the i n d i v i d u a l and h i s " a c t " , an i n t e r a c t i o n a l f i e l d 
i s the r e a l s t a r t i n g p o i n t . " 
(p.100^1967) 
^ " i t i s on t h i s l e v e l o f the purposes andcdecisions o f 
complexes o f i n t e r r e l a t e d and i n t e r a c t i n g i n d i v i d u a l s 
and groups - t h a t c u r r e n t research and the o r y i s 
dev e l o p i n g the imp o r t a n t modern t h e o r i e s o f t e n s i o n , 
' r o l e - strain'jgxchange or b a r g a i n i n g and the l i k e , 
( a l t h o u g h i t i s not thereby necessary t o reduce 
a n a l y s i s t o a framework o f r a d i c a l methodological 
i n d i v i d u a l i s m as some have argued)." 
(p.76^ Buckley^1967) 
The focus o f i n t e r e s t i s q u i t e d e f i n i t e l y now i n t e r a c t i o n 
r a t h e r than i n d i v i d u a l s and a c t i o n s . The network concept i s 
r e a l l y one method which i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o t h i s s u b t l e but 
c r u c i a l s h i f t i n i n t e r e s t . 
" i t i s n o t norms and i n d i v i d u a l s s o c i a l i z e d t o them, 
vrhich are the s t a r t i n g p o i n t o f a f r u i t f u l t h e o r y 
o f s o c i a l systems, but i n s t e a d , c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n s 
and r a t i o n a l a c t o r s , each w i t h i n t e r e s t s and power 
r e l a t i v e t o those a c t i o n s . " 
(j.3 .Coleman^ p . l 6 7 ^ 19^4) 
Generation o f S o c i a l Forms and Transactions 
Generative models are developed p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the work o f 
F r e d e r i k B a r t h . " 
Ideas o f g e n e r a t i o n o f s o c i a l forms caja be t r a c e d back i n t t e 
works o f Boas and Simmel p a r t i c u l a r l y " i f anthropology d e s i r e s 
t o e s t a b l i s h the laws governing the grovrth o f c u l t u r e i t must 
not c o n f i n e i t s e l f t o comparing the r e s u l t s o f growth alone, but 
wherever f e a s i b l e i t must compare the processes o f gro;rth." 
(Boas^ l 9 4 0 ^ p.280) 
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I n Models o f S o c i a l O r g a n i s a t i o n (1966) he p o i n t s out t h a t 
o n l y i n t r a n s a c t i o n s i s i t p o s s i b l e f o r values t o be observed 
" T r a n s a c t i o n a l behaviour takes place v r i t h r eference t o 
a s e t o f values which serve as g e n e r a l i s e d i n c e n t i v e s 
and c o n s t r a i n t s on choice , i t also takes place w i t h 
r e f e r e n c e t o a p r e - e s t a b l i s h e d m a t r i x o f s t a t u s e s , 
seen as a d i s t r i b u t i o n o f values o r p o s i t i o n s i n the 
form o f minimal c l u s t e r s o f j u r a l l y b i n d i n g r i g h t s . 
From t h i s p o i n t , through the f o r m a t i o n o f s t a t u s 
s e t s and the i m p l i c a t i o n s and r e s t r i c t i o n s o f t r a n s -
a c t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s and impression management v r i t h i n 
these s e t s I propose t o generate gross forms o f s o c i a l 
behaviour which correspond t o e m p i r i c a l l y observable 
(1966^ P . 5 ) 
E a r t h uses a model o f u t i l i t i e s t o p r o v i d e the framework 
o f h i s e x p o s i t i o n . 
"This g e n e r a l vie^Tpoint s h i f t s our a t t e n t i o n from 
i n n o v a t i o n t o i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n as the c r u c i a l 
element o f change. And i f -jou have a system o f 
a l l o c a t i o n s g o i n g - as you always must have where 
you speak o f change - i t w i l l be the r a t e s and ki n d s 
o f p a y o f f s o f a l t e r n a t i v e a l l o c a t i o n s w i t h i n t h a t 
system t h a t determine whether they w i l l be adopted, 
t h a t i s i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d . The main c o n s t r a i n t s 
t f i l l thus be found i n the system, n ot i n the range 
o f ideas f o r i n n o v a t i o n , and these c o n s t r a i n t s are 
e f f e c t i v e i n the phage o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n . 
Host o f the s a l i e n t ' c o n s t r a i n t s i n the course o f 
change w i l l be s o c i a l and i n t e r a c t i o n a l , not simply 
c o g n i t i v e . " 
(1968 ^ p.668) 
Generative aspects o f s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n are c e n t r a l 
t o o t h e r exchange t h e o r i e s . Romans has s a i d t h a t 
"Probably t h e r e i s no i n s t i t u t i o n which was not i n 
i t s germ elementary s o c i a l behaviour." 
B l a u has devoted most o f h i s book "E-xchange and Power i n 
S o c i a l L i f e " (1964) t o a d i s c u s s i o n o f the ways i n vrhich 
l e a d e r s and o p p o s i t i o n groups emerge and ga i n power and 
a u t h o r i t y i n terms o f the bas i c elements o f exchange and 
t r a n s a c t i o n . Systems t h e o r y , as i t has been e l a b o r a t e d 
by Buckley, also p r o v i d e s a s i m i l a r a n a l y s i s o f the c r e a t i o n 
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o f s o c i a l forms. 
Luckmann and Berger have i f r i t t e n a s t i m u l a t i n g study^ 
"The S o c i a l C o n s t r u c t i o n o f R e a l i t y " (1967). The major 
t h e s i s o f t h i s work i s t h a t s o c i a l forms are i i f a c t 
generated on two d i s t i n c t l e v e l s . At the l e v e l o f p r a c -
t i c a l i t i e s people i n t e r a c t i n terms of norms, values and 
i n s t i t u t i o n s which thus r e c e i v e expression through such 
i n t e r a c t i o n . The process i s one f i r s t l y o f h a b i t u a l i z a t i o n . 
"ilny. a c t i o n t h a t i s repeated f r e q u e n t l y becomes cast 
i n t o a p a t t e r n which can then be reproduced w i t h an 
economy o f e f f o r t and which, ipso f a c t o , i s 
apprehended by i t s performer as t h a t p a t t e r n . 
H a b i t u a l i z a t i o n f u r t h e r i m p l i e s t h a t the a c t i o n i n 
qu e s t i o n may be performed again i n the f u t u r e i n 
the same manner and vr i t h the same economical e f f o r t . . . . 
H a b i t u a l i z a t i o n c a r r i e s i f i t h i t the important 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l g a i n t h a t choices are narrowed." 
( p . 71^1967) 
The second step i s i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n which 
"occurs whenever t h e r e i s a r e c i p r o c a l t y p i f i c a t i o n 
o f h a b i t u a l i z e d a c t i o n s by types o f a c t o r s . " 
I n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n i s t h e r e f o r e a process which 
o r i g i n a t e s i n s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n . 
On another l e v e l - t h a t o f ideas - i n s t i t u t i o n s e x i s t i n 
our p e r c e p t i o n s and t y p i f i c a t i o n s . S o c i a l s t r u c t u r e becomes, 
as Luckmejin and Berger have s a i d , the sum t o t a l o f these 
t y p i f i c a t i o n s . 
The b e l i e f t h a t c u l t u r e i s a system o f t y p i f i c a t i o n s vrhich 
are generated i n s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n i s becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y 
i m p o r t a n t i n s o c i a l science. 
" I t v r i l l h elp us t o understand r e l i g i o u s behaviour i f 
we can t r e a t n a t u r a l forms, l i k e speech forms, as 
t r e j i s m i t t e r s o f c u l t u r e , which are generated i n s o c i e t y , 
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and which by t h e i r s a n c t i o n s and emphasis, 
e x e r c i s e a c o n s t r a i n i n g e f f e c t on s o c i a l 
behaviour." 
(Slary Bouglas, ^ 1970^ p. 21) 
Such a world-view or ph i l o s o p h y provides i n t e r e s t i n g 
i n s i g h t s i n t o s o c i a l l i f e , p a r t i c u l a r l y the mechanisms o f s o c i a l 
change. I n the conte x t o f the s t r u c t u r a l ^ f u n c t i o n a l paradigm's 
supposed i n a b i l i t y t o cope -i-rith s o c i a l change, g e n e r a t i v e 
t h e o r i e s have become p a r t i c u l a r l y s t i m u l a t i n g t o a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s . 
As a r e s u l t o f t h i s focus o f i n t e r e s t s t u d i e s o f m i c r o p o l i t i c s 
and o t h e r aspects of s o c i a l l i f e t h a t might have once been 
r e g s j d e d as t r i v i a l (as B a i l e y remarked i n h i s 1970 L e c t u r e s ) 
are commonplace at p r e s e n t . Turner sees a concern w i t h process 
as causing a d i s t i n c t change i n B r i t i s h anthropology. lie says 
t h a t "Schism and C o n t i n u i t y " (1957) 
"emerges c l e a r l y as a t r a n s i t i o n a l book between the 
p r e v a l e n t s t r u c t u r a l f u n c t i o n a l i s m o f B r i t i s h 
a n thropology i n the 1940's... and the processual 
a n a l y s i s o f the 1960's." 
For Turner, a t l e a s t , the d i f f e r e n c e between the o l d and new 
paradigms l i e s i n the emphasis upon process and gen e r a t i o n placed 
by the new paradigm. 
d) Meaning and Communication ;aak. C u l t u r e 
G a r f i n k e l ' s concern i n ethnomethodology i s the l o c a t i o n o f 
a " s e c u l a r i s e d " c o l l e c t i v e conscience vrhich r e v e a l s i t s e l f i n 
i n t e r a c t i o n . I n much r e c e n t s o c i a l science the meaning gi v e n 
by i n d i v i d u a l s t o t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n s i s regarded as a l l important, 
The i n t e r e s t i n t h e a c t o r ' s viei=rpoint, and the genera t i o n o f 
s o c i a l forms, w i t h a consequent emphasis on t r a n s i e n c e , c o i n c i d e 
here. 
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Buckley r e l a t e s meaning and i n t e r a c t i o n i n the f o l l o v / i n g vray -
meaning i s 
"generated d u r i n g the t o t a l t r a n s a c t i o n and ceases t o 
e x i s t when t h e t r a n s a c t i o n i s t e r m i n a t e d . " 
(p.64^1967) 
Communication and i n f o r m a t i o n t h e o r i e s thus become o f enormous 
r e l e v a n c e . 
Blau -
" a l l s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s and t r a n s a c t i o n s i n v o l v e 
communication." (1964^p. 7) 
S h i b u t a j i i -
" c u l t u r e i s a product o f communication." 
(p.162 ^ 1962) 
C u l t u r a l areas come t o be d e f i n e d i n terms o f communication 
and t h e problem o f d e f i n i n g u n i t s o f study f o r s o c i a l science 
i s answered i n a t o t a l l y new way i n the nevr paradigm i n terms 
o f i n t e r a c t i o n and communication. 
"... s o c i e t y e x i s t s i n and through communication, 
common p e r s p e c t i v e s - common c u l t u r e s - emerge 
through p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n common communication 
channels; c u l t u r e areas are coterminous vith 
communication channels since communication n e t -
works are no longer coterminous v r i t h t e r r i t o r i a l 
b oundaries, c u l t u r e areas overlap and have l o s t 
t h e i r t e r r i t o r i a l bases." 
^ . 1 6 4 - 5 ^ S h i b u t a n i . i n 
Manis and L l e l t z e r ) 
U l t i m a t e l y , f o r L.ary Douglas, c u l t u r e and s o c i e t y are 
i n t e r a c t i o n 
" S o c i e t y or c u l t u r e are both a b s t r a c t i o n s , c a t e g o r i e s 
a p p l i e d t o the process vfhich i n the l a s t r e s o r t 
c o n s i s t s o f i n d i v i d u a l s d e a l i n g w i t h other i n d i v i d u a l s . " ' 
(iCcJry Douglas^ 1970^ p . l 5 7 ) 
I n these terms 
"To t a l k about the p r i o r i t y o f " s o c i e t y " t o the i n d i v -
i d u a l i s t o i n d u l g e i n nonsensical mets-physics. But 
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t o say t h a t some p r e - e x i s t e n t a s s o c i a t i o n o f human 
beings i s p r i o r t o every p a r t i c u l a r human being 
who i s born i n t o the w o r l d i s t o mention a common-
pl a c e . " 
(Dewey^in tl a n i s and Me l t z e r ed .^96l^|P .149-50). 
The e x i s t e n c e o f c u l t u r e , which enables people t o p r e d i c t the 
l i k e l y outcomes o f t h e i r behaviour i s the o n l y sense i n which 
" s o c i e t y i s more than a c o l l e c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s . 
I t i s a c o l l e c t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h a c u l t u r e , 
which has been l e a r n e d by symbolic communication 
from o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l s back through t i m e , so t h a t 
t h e members can gauge t h e i r behaviour t o each 
oth e r and t o the s o c i e t y as a whole,..Using the 
p e r s p e c t i v e o f symbolic i n t e r a c t i o n i s m , s o c i a l 
a c t i o n i s lodged i n a c t i n g i n d i v i d u a l s , who f i t 
t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e l i n e s o f a c t i o n t o one another 
through a process o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ? group 
a c t i o n i s the c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n o f such i n d i v i d u a l s . " 
(Blumei-^ i n Rose Ld^l962^ p.186) 
The l o g i c a l c o n c l u s i o n o f such a view i s t h a t 
"A complete viev? o f s o c i e t y vrould a l so be a complete view 
o f a l l the i n d i v i d u a l s , and v i c e versa. There would be 
no d i f f e r e n c e between them." 
(Cooley, i n l l a n i s and ICeltzer 
e ( l . ^ . 1 5 4 - 5 , 1967) 
The importance o f i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n s and the r e s u l t a n t 
i n t e r a c t i o n p a t t e r n s i s accepted by many d i s c i p l i n e s o t h e r 
t h a n anthropology. I t i s i n f a c t a p a r t o f our c u r r e n t back-
ground assumptions or c u l t u r e , t o accept t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l 
i s n o t merely a c i p h e r w i t h l i t t l e or no c o n t r o l over h i s en-
vironment. T h i s n o t i o n d i r e c t s a t t e n t i o n t o many nevr areas 
o f i n t e r e s t , some o f which I s h a l l mention^and also r e q u i r e s 
a new concept o f man t o rep l a c e the passive being o f s t r u c t u r a l ^ ' 
f u n c t i o n a l i s m , and the r a t h e r f o o l i s h c o n t r o l l a b l e c r e a t u r e 
which the b e h a v i o u r i s t s p r e s e n t . As the c r i t i c a l f a c u l t i e s 
o f the i n d i v i d u a l a c t o r are recognised and accorded the 
importance they deserve, the analyst h i m s e l f becomes o f 
i n c r e a s i n g importance. 
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Jack B. Douglas has pointed out that u l t i m a t e l y a l l knowledge 
of the world i s based upon some person's commonsense understanding 
of everyjday l i f e . I n t h i s respect the individual's understanding 
i s of overwhelming importance, and accordingly becomes central 
to any so c i a l analysis. The observer's e x i s t e n t i a l p o s i t i o n 
also becomes c r u c i a l to the analysis - as tlaquet and others 
have pointed out. 
The recognition of t h i s involvement of the observer with 
the observed brings social science back to the problem of 
a 
solipoism. 
" I n his [Husserl's] remark about "free v a r i a t i o n s " .. 
we envisage a sudden hope that a means of t r a n s f e r r i n g 
i n conceptual space (such that I might see my 'here' 
(h i e ) from the p o s i t i o n of the others 'there' ( i l l i c ) 
and vice versa) i s being opened up f o r us. But 
Husserl takes away with his l e f t hand what he of f e r s 
with his r i g h t . lie can indeed, by "free v a r i a t i o n " 
of hie and i l l i c i n conceptual space, come to r e a l i s e 
that the angle of incidence upon the world i s 
inf o r m a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t each time we carry out the 
"free v a r i a t i o n s " , but he points out t h a t , even then, 
I s h a l l only see from the other man's point of view 
what I would have seen from the same place. I s h a l l 
never know what he saw, f o r he i s an enigma, and 
unknowable c o n s t i t u t i n g s u b j e c t i v i t y whose perspectives 
on the world I have no means of knoi-ring, however long 
I t r y . " 
(Poole^p.136^1972) 
e) I n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y 
A closely r e l a t e d assumption to the acceptance of the v a l i d i t y 
of each person's perspective i s the es s e n t i a l l y subjective nature 
of a l l s o c i a l information. I n f a c t , the recognition of t h i s i s 
l o g i c a l l y p r i o r to assuming the v a l i d i t y of taking the a c t i i i g 
u n i t s point of view i n an attempt to understand social l i f e . As 
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such i t i s an important element i n the approaches I have already 
o u t l i n e d . 
Denzin has located the essential s i m i l a r i t y of symbolic 
inter a c t i o n i s m and ethnomethodology i n these terms -
"A commitment to t h i s (the attempt to describe the 
perspective of those being studied) p r i n c i p l e 
permits the researcher to escape the f a l l a c y of 
objectivism which i s the s u b s t i t u t i o n of the 
s c i e n t i s t s perspective f o r those studied." 
(p.926 ^ 1971) 
I n a s i m i l a r vein Blumer has v/ritten 
"To t r y to catch the i n t e r p r e t a t i v e process by 
remaining aloof as a so-called 'objective' 
observer and to refuse to take the r o l e of the 
acting u n i t i s to r i s k the worst kind of 
subjectivism - the objective observer i s l i k e l y 
to f i l l i n the process of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n with 
h i s own surmises i n place of catching the process 
as i t occurs i n the experience of the observer." 
(Blumer^p.l88^Eose ed.) 
The crux of analyses carried out by adherents to these 
new,currents i n sociology i s the emphasis upon i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
and meaning -
"no s i g n i f i c a n t s c i e n t i f i c d escription, analysis 
or explanation i s possible without some funda-
mental consideration of these social meanings." 
(Douglas/1972^ v.ix) 
Again the a b i l i t y of man to control his social environment 
i s apparent. 
..•."nothing can be attempted than to establish the 
beginning and the d i r e c t i o n of an i n f i n i t e l y long 
road. The pretension of any systematic and 
d e f i n i t i v e completeness ^rould be, at le a s t , a 
s e l f - i l l u s i o n . Perfection can here be obtained 
by the i n d i v i d u a l student only i n the subjective 
sense that he communicates a l l that he has been 
able t o see." 
(Georg Simmel) 
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"Regarding s u b j e c t i v i t y , I may say tha-t a l l knovrledge 
i s subjective i n one sense, i n the sense, namely that 
i t i s mental, not the external t h i n g , but a construct 
of the mind.... I am a behaviourist as f a r as I th i n k 
I can be without being a f a n a t i c . But we must not 
fo r g e t , as behaviourists sometimes appear to do, that 
the symbol i s nothing i n i t s e l f , but only a convenient 
means of developing, imparting and recording a meaning, 
and that meanings are a product of the mental-social 
complex and kno™ only to us through consciousness. 
Reliance upon symbols, therefore, i n no way releases 
us from the d i f f i c u l t y a r i s i n g from the immeasurable 
nature of our elementary social perceptions. '[•fe can 
record behaviour and handle the record by s t a t i s t i c s , 
but I see no way of avoiding the ultimate question, 
what does i t mean? 
(Coole^pp.74-5^Kanis & 
Meltaer Ed.) 
I t i s t h i s fundamental question that has been overlooked 
i n much soc i a l science which bases i t s concept of o b j e c t i v i t y 
upon that supposedly e x i s t i n g i n 'hard' science - that the 
observer i s outside the area observed, influences i t i n no 
way, and that the study could be r e p l i c a t e d vfith the same 
r e s u l t s by any competent s c i e n t i s t . This concept i s already 
under f i r e i n the 'hard' science vrhere i t i s recognized t h a t , 
f o r instance, i t i s impossible to know both the p o s i t i o n and 
the impetus of a p a r t i c l e . I t i s patently i r r e l e v a n t i n the 
so c i a l sciences. Poole has said that he thinks i t i s impos-
s i b l e to have an objective r e l a t i o n s h i p to anything at a l l 
(p. 95^1972) and has i l l u s t r a t e d his argument with sections 
of Chomsky's book on Vietnam and American involvement. 
" I t i s perhaps not su r p r i s i n g that Chomsky should end 
up with a p o s i t i o n not very f a r from Husserl's 
remark that "One must f i n a l l y achieve the insight 
that no objective science, no matter how exact, 
explains or ever can explain anything i n a serious 
sense." Chomsky himself i-Trites i n a si m i l a r 
s p i r i t : "The soc i a l and behavioural studies should 
be seriously studied not only f o r t h e i r i n t r i n s i c 
i n t e r e s t , but so that the student can be made aware 
of exactly how l i t t l e they have to ssy about the 
problems of man and society that r e a l l y mat^l^^^ ^  IO5-6) 
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The modality o f f a c t s and t h e i r v a r i a t i o n according to 
the perspective taken i s becoming a commonplace. The problem 
then becomes^ what i s the use o f attempting to express oneself 
to others, and^if there i s any point to i"t , 4 how i s i t to be 
done? 
"The fundamental goal of " o b j e c t i v i t y " of knowledge i s 
to make knowledge more use f u l . And the fundamental 
c r i t e r i o n , both commonsensical and s c i e n t i f i c , by 
which t h i s usefulness o f knowledge i s judged... i s 
the s h a r e a b i l i t y of knowledge"..."The greater share-
a b i l i t y of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge i s achieved p r i m a r i l y 
by progressively f r e e i n g the knowledge of concrete 
phenomena from the s i t u a t i o n i n which they are laiow-n,... 
t h i s f r e e i n g i s done not by making the knowledge 
o b j e c t l i k e or t h i n g l i k e but by so exaraiiiig the s i t u a t i o n 
i n which we do the knowing that we are able to ( p a r t i a l l y ) 
specify the ways i n which another observer would go 
about constructing the same kind of s i t u a t i o n . " 
(Douglas^ 19?]^ pp.27 £: 28) 
The way to ma.ke knowledge more shareable i s to attempt to 
explain one's own standpoint. 
"Very fevr l i t e r s are subje c t i v e l y dishonest. The r e a l 
question i s thus not honesty, or dishonesty, but what 
i s the code of honesty of t h i s s p e c i f i c OTiter i . e . 
h i s bias?" 
(Kyrdal^l965^ p. 14) 
"The objective s c i e n t i s t i s not he who r e l i e s on pure 
method i n h i s research, but he who points to the 
possibly biassing influences of theory and value at 
every step i n his research operations." 
(Rose^ i n Gross ed) 
The recognition of the importance of s u b j e c t i v i t y i s thus, 
not a matter f o r despair, but can be turned to advantage, 
rather than ignored i n the hope thai;, i t v d l l go away. One 
so l u t i o n i s to examine one's Q\m values and background assump-
t i o n s , and t o attempt to empathise with the observed people 
enough to understand t h e i r perspective and substitute i t f o r 
one's own. 
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There are, however, other ways i n which social studies 
can be pursued without being continuallj'- short c i r c u i t e d 
by t h e i r own s u b j e c t i v i t y , Schutz has said that man w i l l 
have to rel a t e to p r a c t i c a l i t i e s ^ u l t i m a t e l y , and that t h i s 
w i l l provide a reference point around which knowledge w i l l be 
oriented. Chomsk^ '-'s concern with moral problems i s i n the 
same vein 
" I f American i n t e l l e c t u a l s w i l l be preoccupied with 
such questions as these, they can have invaluable 
c i v i l i s i n g influence on society and on the schools. 
I f , as i s more l i k e l y , they regard them vrith disdain 
as mere sentimental nonsense, then our children •'.rill 
have to look elsewhere f o r enlightenment." 
(1970^ p.254) 
Harris has reached the same conclusion. 
"Thus, the question \Tith which we began, "How can I 
knovr that I am r i g h t ? " i s more e a s i l y reformulated 
as "What purposes s h a l l I pursue?" The reformulation 
indicates the f a u l t i n the argument about the 
r e l a t i v i t y of a l l judgements. A l l judgements are 
r e l a t i v e , and there i s no a l t e r n a t i v e to t h e i r being 
so, f o r what i s wrong i s the simple notion of a 
judgement absolutely true at a l l times and places. 
lie do have r u l e s , but they are rather rules of 
thumb, gxiide l i n e s , than absolute obligations 
wherever we are." 
(p.225^ 1971) 
Already i n anthropology there i s an increasing i n t e r e s t 
i n applied anthropology - Llanners and Kaplaji have suggested 
(1971) that t h i s i s a major r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the d i s c i p l i n e , 
I vrould agree, and suggest that one of the problems i n network 
analyses has been the lack of a problem whose in v e s t i g a t i o n i s 
the aim of the study. 
A f u r t h e r disadvantage of many studies l i e s i n t h e i r 
unwillingness to u t i l i s e to the f u l l the fieldworker's 
subjective experience. 
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f ) The Observer's H x i s t e n t i a l P o s i t i o n 
Anthropological and sociol o g i c a l studies have varied 
enormously i n the amount of a t t e n t i o n given to the fieldvrorker. 
Vi. F. Ifhyte i n 'Street Corner Society' (1943) provides an 
analysis i n which the observer i s presented as a c r u c i a l 
element of the description of events. I n the Appendix to 
l a t e r editions he explains hovr he became interested i n p a r t i c u l a r 
t o p i c s , and also how he was able to f o l l o w up areas of i n t e r e s t . 
I n t h i s way he enables the reader to understand his p o s i t i o n azd 
t h i s makes his analysis very i n t e r e s t i n g . 
The increased i n t e r e s t i n books such as those of Carlos 
Ca|staneda (1970) i n which the analyst presents his ovm exper-
iences as the raw material of his studj'-, i s evidence of the fact 
that the problems of the observer's bias and i n t e r a c t i o n with 
the observed i s re c e i v i n g increasing a t t e n t i o n . 
Elizabeth Bott was very aware of the importance of the 
interviewer's r e l a t i o n s h i p with the couples being intervievred. 
"Thus when Bott noted doim a f t e r a f i r s t interview 
'They remind me of people at the University of 
Chicago', the aim i n supervision was to f i n d out 
what they had done that had produced t h i s f e e l i n g . 
I n t h i s case they had talked easily and b r i g h t l y 
about t h e i r emotional 'problems' i n an i n t e l l e c t u a l 
way. This did not mean that Bott's judgement of 
them was co r r e c t , her feelings was one datum among 
many. No attempt vras made to r i d the fieldworker 
of her a t t i t u d e s towards the U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago. 
That was f o r her to worry about i f she vranted t o . 
The point was to use her feelings as a source of 
information. iind no attempt vras made to r i d her 
of her feelings tovfards the couple 5 that too was 
her concern. But i t vras hoped that i f the f i e l d -
irorkers understood what they f e l t they could avoid 
some of the p i t f a l l s t hat can arise from acting on 
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feelings without laioi-dng what one i s doing." 
(Bott;197; p.43-4) 
I n recognising t h i s i n t e r a c t i o n of fieldworker and the 
people observed the problem of s u b j e c t i v i t y i s sound i n the 
Way i n which I suggested e a r l i e r . As Bott says, i t i s 
impossible to pretend that the fieldworkers were objective 
i n t h a t they were not emotionally involved i n the s i t u a t i o n , 
but i t i s possible to use and understand these emotions. 
A l l men are endovred i f i t h a b i l i t i e s to respond emotionally 
to one another. The recognition of t h i s shared facet of 
both observer and observed leads to a r e d e f i n i t i o n of man. 
Models of Man 
"The question remains whether human society or social 
action can be successfully ajialysed by schemes which 
refuse to recognise human beings as they are, namely 
as persons constructing i n d i v i d u a l and c o l l e c t i v e 
action through an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n s 
which confront them.'' 
(Blumer^in Hose Zd.^ p.l92) 
The development of a more complex model of man than that 
implied by excha,nge theory has been continuing f o r some time, 
To r e t u r n to Goffman's work again - i t i s based upon two 
p r i n c i p l e s . 
" 1 . People have the power of monitoring t h e i r p e r f o r -
mances, not only as to the end to be achieved but also 
to the s t y l e i n which those perform-xnces are carried 
out, and thus the adoptions of s t y l e are conscious ... 
I t follows tha~ i f a person can be induced to stand 
back from h i s actions - then he i s i n a p o s i t i o n to 
discern the reasons, plans and rules or conventions, 
the deliberate f o l l o w i n g of which constitutes s o c i a l 
action. This i s to t r e a t l i f e something l i k e a play • 
what I would c a l l the "di-amaturgical stand p o i n t " . 
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"2. Kuch s o c i a l behaviour i s not spontaneous reaction to 
external events ( " c o n t r o l l i n g variables") but i s highly 
formal. liven those interactions which, at f i r s t s i g h t , 
might seem spontaneous, t u r n out to have a formal 
structure when examined from the dramaturgical stand 
po i n t . " 
(Herre^p.582^1971) 
These p r i n c i p l e s draw a t t e n t i o n to the f a c t that man i s 
i n c o n t r o l of h i s actions and thus can influence his l i f e ' s 
course. (The analogy with the r e o r i e n t a t i o n of l i n g u i s t i c s am 
the s h i f t to a concern with syntax and semantics i s again 
relevant here). Harre has suggested that a new view of man 
has already gained t a c i t acceptance as a par't of the reaction 
against s c i e n t i f i c positions which I have already alluded t o . 
"What i s c a l l e d the 'ethogenic' way seeks to replace 
the p o s i t i v i s t point of view with a more r e a l i s t i c 
and authentic model from the established sciences, 
paying due regard to theory, and emphasising 
expla.nation. I t seeks to replace the simpler 
models of people with the revolutionary concept 
of the anthropomorphic model of man, i n which 
s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s are recommended to t r e a t people 
f o r s c i e n t i f i c purposes as i f they were human beings. 
The ethnogenic way can, therefore, be characterised 
by tiro slogans - 'Take caxe of the explanations and 
the predictions T r i l l look a f t e r themselves' and 
'Assume that people are human beings'." 
(p.582 ^  1971) 
Harre traces t h i s new anthropomorphic model i n the vrritings 
of Straifson and Hampshire, The same concept seems to me to be 
present i n Luckman and Berger's model of social construction of 
r e a l i t y , i n symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology. 
"The human being i s not swept along as a neutral and 
i n d i f f e r e n t Xinit by the opere,tion of a system. As 
an organism capable of s e l f - i n t e r a c t i o n he forges his 
actions out of a process of d e f i n i t i o n i n v o l v i n g choice, 
appraisal, and decision. C u l t u r a l norms, status 
positions and r o l e relationships are only frameworks 
inside of which that process of formative transaction 
goes on." (Bluraer,cited i n Buckley 
^ 1967) 
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Our conception of sociology .. 
"does imply that sociology takes i t s place i n the 
compfiny of the sciences that deal with man as man, 
that i s i n that s p e c i f i c sense a humanistic 
d i s c i p l i n e . " 
(Luckman and Berger^ p.211^ I967) 
I n ethnoisethodology, and phenomenological or e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
sociologies the observer i s assumed to be r e l y i n g upon his oi-m 
understanding of a s i t u a t i o n , which he attempts to make a v a i l -
able to others. I n t h i s way the i n t e l l i g e n c e of the observer 
i s not taken to be of a d i f f e r e n t order from that of those he 
observes. The f a c t that the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t i s human also 
necessitates that he also be described by the model of man 
adopted. Modern so c i a l s c i e n t i s t s are claiming f o r themselves 
and the people they observe considerably more f a c u l t i e s than 
did the behaviourists or s t r u c t u r a l / f u n c t i o n a l i s t s . 
This view of man does not eliminate the problems and 
s u b t l e t i e s of man as a s e l f - c o n t r o l l e d , t h i n k i n g being, as 
does the view of man proposed by Exchange or ethology - vrhen 
human beingaare viewed as i n the g r i p of a culture programmed 
by t h e i r i n s t i n c t s . I t allows man more freedom and subtlety. 
I t thus i n s t a n t l y brings the social s c i e n t i s t back to problems 
of solipcisra and s u b j e c t i v i t y . I t also focuses i n t e r e s t upon 
communication, symbols, s o c i a l i z a t i o n and the generation of 
s o c i a l forms. The whole series of ideas which I have d i s -
cussed are inextrice-bly intertwined i n such a model of man 
and to attempt to accept and u t i l i s e one element vrhile ignoring 
other parts of the nevr paradigm i s doomed to f a i l u r e . I n 
s^ithropologj'- i n t e r e s t s i n cognitive anthropology and ethno-
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science are vaxt of a movement which recognises man's i n t e l l i -
gence and his power. 
Barth has rec e n t l y i r r i t t e n that 
"Human acts are predominantly shaped by cognition and 
purpose, asserted through awareness and voluntary 
behaviour i . e . through decision and choice." 
(p.209^1972) 
This represents a substantial move av/ay from his more u t i l i t a r i a n 
t h e o r e t i c a l stance of the past. Netvrork analysis does not seem 
to have been r e l a t e d f u l l y yet to the t o t a l i t y of these new 
sciences and i n t h i s respect i t f a i l s . 
B o i s s e ^ a i n has said that 
"Uetvrark analysis i s thus f i r s t of a l l an attempt to 
reintroduce the concept of man as an i n t e r a c t i n g 
s o c i a l being capable of manipulating others as well 
as being manipulated hy them." 
To t h i s extent man's power has been recognised i n netvrork 
studies. However, the problems of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and per-
ception do not as yet seem to have been approached. These are 
ce n t r a l to the new paradigm and i t i s because they have been 
ignored that netvrork analysis has f a l l e n rather f l a t , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y since i t s t i l l clings to the idea of the ratomorphic 
man. 
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h) R e a l i t y and Social Structure 
"Sociologists are increasingly becoming traders i n 
d e f i n i t i o n s : they hawk t h e i r d e f i n i t i o n s of 
r e a l i t y around to whoever w i l l buy them." 
(S. Cohen, p.24^ 1971) 
The ethnogenic view of man c r e d i t s him with the negotiation 
of d e f i n i t i o n s of s i t u a t i o n s i n i n t e r a c t i o n , and beyond that 
i f i t h the generation of s o c i a l forms. Coupled vrith the 
acceptance of the ultimate s u b j e c t i v i t y of perception, as i t 
r e l a t e s to needs and experience - t h i s means that concepts of 
r e a l i t y have been redefined. 
The b l u r r i n g o f the d i s t i n c t i o n between normal and patholo-
g i c a l which occurs i n Laing's existential-phenomonological 
psychology i s an aspect of t h i s which has gained i-ride acceptance, 
I n a mxTover sphere, the recognition that a r a p i d l y changing -
f o r instance urbanizing - society i s not necessarily one which 
i s d i s i n t e g r a t i n g , i s a r e s u l t of the view that r e a l i t y i s a 
r e l a t i v e concept, and that viewed from the ind i v i d u a l ' s point 
of view such a society i s functioning adequately. As Swartz 
ha.s said - no one state can be said to be more normal than any 
other. This fundamentally undermines any attempt at sampling • 
since any situation or i n d i v i d u a l i s unique and cannot be sub-
s t i t u t e d f o r any other. 
A re-examination of concepts such as deviance has had to 
f o l l o w . L a b e l l i n g theory and other new theories of deviance 
are concerned with the meaning of behaviour. As Llatza has 
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said, the aim i s to 'appreciate' the deviant's ovm story. A 
consequent i n t e r e s t i n the process of becoming deviant follows. 
"Deviant values are not altogether discontinuous vrith 
more accepted ones: the deviant might only be taking 
conventional values to extremes or acting out - as 
David Matza has argued - private values which are sub-
terranean to society. The deviant might j u s t i f y his 
behaviour by appealing to vn-dely acceptable social 
motives. ' I did i t f o r fun' or 'everyone else i s 
doing i t ' . " 
(S.Cohen^ 1971^ p.2l) 
As the i n d i v i d u a l i s seen to have more control over his 
• r e a l i t y ' J problems such as the boundaries between groups become 
pronounced. Current theories of e t h n i c i t y recognise that 
ethnic status can be d e l i b e r a t e l y changed i n many cases by 
i n d i v i d u a l s who see advantage accruing to them by such a 
realignment. Areas of social l i f e which once seemed immutable 
become matters of choice and manipulation. 
The ultimate s u b j e c t i v i t y of any view of r e a l i t y has been a 
problem vrhich has puzzled many authors. 
H a r r i s , f o r instance, has said that much of his book 
" B e l i e f s i n Society" i s concerned to express 
"doubts as to whether we can separate two compartments, 
• r e a l i t y ' and "ideology". For our r e a l i t y i s the 
next man's ideology and vice versa." 
(p.10^ 1971) 
Luckman and Berger have i-rritten extensively on the notion 
of r e a l i t y , which they define as 
"a q u a l i t y appertaining to phenomena that we recognise 
as having a being independent of our ovm v o l i t i o n , 
(we cannot wish them away)." 
(p.13^1967) 
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I f one takes the view propounded by Luckman and Berger that 
s o c i a l structure and social r e a l i t y are a compound of the 
i n d i v i d u a l perceptions of a s i t u a t i o r i ^ to investigate these 
perceptions would seem to be the only l o g i c a l way to attempt 
ail analysis or description or explanation. 
"The social r e a l i t y of everyday l i f e i s thus apprehended 
i n a continuum of tj.'pifications, which are 
progressively anonymous as they are removed from the 
'here and now' of the face to face s i t u a t i o n . At one 
pole of the continuum are those others vrith vrhom I 
frequently and i n t e n s i v e l y i n t e r a c t i n face to face 
s i t u a t i o n s - my inner c i r c l e as i t were. At the other 
pole are h i g h l y anonymous abstractions which by t h e i r 
very nature can never be available i n face to face 
i n t e r a c t i o n . " 
"Social s t r u c t i i r e i s the sum t o t a l of these t y p i f i c a t i o n s 
and of the recurrent patterns of i n t e r a c t i o n established 
by means of them. As such s o c i a l structure i s an 
essential element of the r e a l i t y of everyday l i f e . " 
(Luckman and Berger, p.478^ 1967) 
Social structure i s thus seen to consist here of ideas -
t y p i f i c a t i o n s - and actual behaviour. The former aspect has 
been neglected by network analysts who are concerned vdth 
morphology (e,g,Barnes) to the huge detriment of the concept. 
Taking such a vievrpoint as that outlined above, the social 
anthropologist then has to involve himself i n the task of 
abstracting from the "relevance structures" (Luckman and Berger, 
page 59) of the i n d i v i d u a l s with whom he in t e r a c t s i n the 
a l i e n c u l t u r e , the " s o c i a l stock of knowledge" which vill reveal 
to him the symbolic environment i n which members of the society 
e x i s t . 
"What i s personally r e a l to men i s r e a l , frequently 
though not always, p r i m a r i l y not because i t i s 
unique to them - i n the sense of idios y n c r a t i c t o . 
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or uniquely d i f f e r e n t f o r , them - but rather i s 
s o c i a l l y and c o l l e c t i v e l y t r u e . Since the sense 
of the r e a l i t y of things often depends upon mutual 
agreement or consensual v a l i d a t i o n , c o l l e c t i v e l y 
held notions of r e a l i t y are among the most f i r m l y 
constituted components of the in d i v i d u a l ' s personal 
r e a l i t y . Yet the personally r e a l does not e n t i r e l y 
consist of or derive from c o l l e c t i v e d e f i n i t i o n s of 
soci a l r e a l i t y . I t may also emerge from recurrent 
personal experience, vrhether unique to the person or 
shared vrith a few others." 
(Gouldner^p,45,1969) 
I n f a c t , there are two ways i n which r e a l i t y depends f o r 
i t s form upon man. His perception of i t depends upon many 
f a c t o r s , some personal and i d i o s y n c r a t i c . Beyond t h i s , 
however, his i n t e r a c t i o n , based upon perceptions, does ac t u a l l y 
create the so c i a l r e a l i t y of the world. 
P h i l i p Mayer's network analysis of Sast London demonstrated 
t h i s c l e a r l y . He concludes that network form i s a r e s u l t of 
deliberate choices made i-rithin a p a r t i c u l a r moral framework. 
I n i t s t u r n the type of netvrork a man exists t j l t h i n influences 
his world view and reinforces him i n his choices. I n t e r a c t i o n 
i s only pleasant w i t h people who share enough b e l i e f s and 
opinions to provide t h i s reinforcement. 
S i m i l a r l y , Bott's idea of class as a reference group i s 
based upon the ce n t r a l tenet that the ' r e a l i t y ' which exists 
f o r any i n d i v i d u a l i s mediated f o r him by the social environ-
ment of his network. 
I n contrast, Gluclanan says 
"We do not merely analyze the set of ideas of the 
people involved i n an i n s t i t u t i o n . These i n d i -
genous ideas a.s formulations about what social 
r e a l i t y i s belieUed to be by i t s p a r t i c i p a n t s , 
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are some of the factors vrhich are taken account of i n 
our analysis. The actors' ideas, l i k e t h e i r behaviour, 
are part of and influenced 'hy the t o t a l r e a l i t y i n 
which they l i v e . This r e a l i t y . . . i s something external 
and constraining. I t i s hard and cannot be changed 
merely by changing the set of ideas." 
(Gluckman^ 1968^ p.232) 
I n f a c t , the small part of r e a l i t y which i s not determined 
by the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n man puts upon i t , i s by d e f i n i t i o n , of 
l i t t l e i n t e r e s t to soc i a l science. Gluckman i s presenting a 
view o f r e a l i t y which i s a l i e n t o that of the new paradigm. 
I n the ne^r pa-radigm r e a l i t y becomes 
"the r e s u l t a n t of the behaviour of many actors separately 
shaping t h e i r o\m acts according to t h e i r subjective 
view of the opportunities offered by t h e i r world and 
t h e i r society." 
(Barth^ l966) 
The complexities of the i n t e r p l a y of these factors i n the 
creation of r e a l i t y i s immense. 
. . . " I want to say that I am a f r a i d I do not exactly know 
what r e a l i t y i s , and my only comfort i n t h i s unplea-
sant s i t u a t i o n i s that I share my ignorance with the 
greatest philosophers of a l l time. 
... I t i s a mi sunders taiiding of the essential character 
of science t o t h i n k that i t deals vrith r e a l i t y i f vre 
consider as the pattern of r e a l i t y the world of d a i l y 
l i f e . The world of both the natural and the social 
s c i e n t i s t i s neither more nor less r e a l than the world 
of thought i n general can be. I t i s not the world 
w i t h i n which we act and i-rithin which we are born and 
die. But i t i s the r e a l home of those important 
events and achievements which humanity at a l l times 
c a l l s c u l t u r e . " 
(Schutz.in Emmet & Ilc l n t y r e 
1 9 7 1 ^ p.113) 
I n spite of these problems of the d e f i n i t i o n and lo c a t i o n 
o f r e a l i t y 
"We a t t a i n a peculiar form of c u l t u r a l achievement i n 
keeping our pictures of o b j e c t i v i t y roughly s i m i l a r . 
Aberration i s , beyond a certain p o i n t , v i s i b l y such. 
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Yet before that b a r r i e r between the acceptable and the 
simply eccentric i s crossed, there i s a vast hinterland 
of imprecision." 
(poole^p.llO^ 1972) 
We manage to maintain roughly s i m i l a r concepts of r e a l i t y 
by i n t e r a c t i n g and checking our versions of r e a l i t y w ith those 
held by other people. Communication i s of the essence. 
The l i n e between normal and pathological r e a l i t i e s seem.s 
to have become blu r r e d , l i k e that between normal and pathological 
s o c i a l systems, as the relevance of the individual's perceptions 
has been recognised, with a resultant tolerance of views vrhich 
do not resemble our oxm. Madness has, i n the case of 
schizophrenia, become a problem to define precisely. 
Madness 
I have pointed out the concepts which have been redefined 
i n the new paradigm of anthropology. I n psychiatry networks 
have also become relevant as madness has been reappraised. 
The emphasis upon the social network as a communication 
system ( l a i d notably by B o t t , Kayer, Epstein, Katz and other 
s o c i a l anthropologists) has prompted psychotherapists to con-
sider i t s possible e f f e c t s upon in d i v i d u a l s who are defined by 
society as deviant i n some way. The importance of associates 
and friends upon the indi v i d u a l ' s behaviour and the b e l i e f s he 
holds i n such spheres as drug taking has been analysed (as has 
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the e f f e c t o f "being s o c i a l i s e d i n t o a p a r t i c u l a r r e l i g i o u s 
g r o u p ) . L a i n g has had tremendous i n f l u e n c e i n the sphere 
o f t r e a tment o f mental i l l n e s s . 
A.W.Clark has v n r i t t e n , f o r i n s t a n c e . . . 
'"(fhile the l o c u s o f the p h y s h o l o g i c a l c o n f l i c t i s 
w i t h i n the person, i t s source i s i n the netvrork 
o f s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n which the person i s 
embedded." 
The i n c o n s i s t e n t demands made upon the i n d i v i d u a l by the 
d i f f e r e n t areas o f t h e s o c i a l netvrork may lead not o n l y t o 
r o l e c o n f l i c t but e v e n t u a l l y t o behaviour which i s so abnormal 
and incomprehensible t o o t h e r s a§ t o be designated mad. The 
f a m i l y as a c l o s e l y i n t e r r a c t i n g u n i t i s seen t o be p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n s i d i o u s s i n ce here 
" f a m i l y members sj'-steraatically i n v a l i d a t e the t h i n k i n g , 
r e a l i t y t e s t i n g and s e l f - c o n c e p t o f people who become 
p s y c h i a t r i c p a t i e n t s . " 
( C l a r k ^ l 9 6 9 / p . 9 2 ) 
I n a s i m i l a r v e i n Hammer has v / r i t t e n ( 1 9 6 3 ) . . . 
"At the c u l t u r a l l e v e l , an i n d i v i d u a l i s 'mentally i l l ' 
when h i s behaviour ceases t o have the k i n d o f 
p r e d i c t a b i l i t y which i s necessary f o r i n c o r p o r a t i o n 
i n t o the s t r u c t u r e o f s o c i a l u n i t s i n which he holds 
p o s i t i o n s . A l l s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n r e s t s t o some 
degree upon the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f the p a r t i c i p a n t s 
i n terms o f t h e i r p o s i t i o n s i n a s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e . " 
For anthropologj'-, madness d e f i n e d i n t h i s vray should help 
Hammer ( 1 9 6 3 ) s t u d i e d 8 8 Negro and Jewish Ke-.r York p a t i e n t s 
and found .that t h e i r r e f e r r a l r e l a t e d t o ; 
(a) d i s t a n c e o f r e l a t i o n s h i p - directedness and 
number o f f i e l d s i n v o l v e d . 
( b ) degree o f network interconnectedness. 
( c ) n a r r o m e s s o f the d e f i n i t i o n o f behaviour 
r e l e v a n t t o t h e i n t e r a c t i o n . 
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t o r e v e a l the l i m i t s o f v a r i a t i o n o f behaviour t o l e r a t e d by 
a p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r e and should t h e r e f o r e be a r e v e a l i n g t o p i c 
o f s t u d y . 
W i t h i n the c u l t u r e group the i n d i v i d u a l ' s a c t u a l s o c i a l 
network i s o f c r u c i a l importance i n t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t o 
accommodate d i f f e r e n t degrees o f aberrant behaviour w i t h i n 
networks o f v a r y i n g f l e x i b i l i t y . 
The l o g i c a l outcome o f Laing's approach t o madness i s the 
i d e a o f network t h e r a p y which has been e l a b o r a t e d on and 
experimented v r i t h , by Speck p a r t i c u l a r l y , w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o 
s c h i z o p h r e n i a . 
"¥e b e l i e v e t h a t s i g n i f i c a n t pathology i s present i n the 
k i n s h i p system o f the s chizophrenic^ i n t h e i r f r i e n d s 
and i n t h e i r neighbours. We b e l i e v e t h a t 'madness' 
i s b a s i c a l l y a f a i l u r e i n communication and t h a t 'mad' 
modes o f communication are maintained i n the e n t i r e 
system around the l a b e l l e d 'schizophrenic person' and 
h i s f a m i l y . We begin w i t h the hypothesis t h a t the 
s o c i a l network of the s c hisophrenic f a m i l y i s the main 
mediator between madness i n the c u l t u r e and madness i n 
the n u c l e a r la.belled f a m i l y . Our goals are t o increase 
the communication i - d t h i n the s o c i a l network and i n 
p a r t i c u l a r between i n d i v i d u a l members o f the s c h i z o -
p h r e n i c f a m i l y and t h e i r k i n , f r i e n d s and neighbours." 
(Page 1 8 3 , 1 9 6 9 ) 
T h i s p a r t i c u l a r approach d i r e c t l y owes i t s i n s p i r a t i o n t o 
E.Bott vTho i s a t r a i n e d psychoenalyst as w e l l as a s o c i a l 
a n t h r o p o l o g i s t , and s i m i l a r i t i e s between t h i s approach and t h a t 
o f anthropology have been p o i n t e d out by Wheakland. 
..."That i s as a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s have l o n g explained strange 
n a t i v e b e l i e f s and a c t i o n s by r e l a t i n g these t o t h e i r 
s o c i o c u l t u r a l c o n t e x t s , so p s y c h i a t r i s t s i n c r e a s i n g l y 
are r e v i e w i n g much 'mental i l l n e s s ' not as merely 
i n d i v i d u a l p a t h o l o g y , but r a t h e r as behaviour t h a t i s 
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understandablj.y r e l a t e d t o c h a r a c t e r i s t i c p a t t e r n s 
o f i n t e r a c t i o n i n the i n d i v i d u a l ' s s o c i a l system -
e s p e c i a l l y t h e f a m i l y . " 
(Wheakland; 1 9 6 9 ^ p . 5 8 2 ) 
Such an approach hps developed throu.?h the use of group psycho-
t h e r a p y which i s becoming a more common treatment method. 
" A t t e n t i o n i n t h e past has been focused on i l l n e s s 
as a f u n c t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n a l i t y , b ut 
a l l i l l n e s s (mental and ' p h y s i c a l ' ) and every 
d i s t i i r b a n c e i n v o l v e s s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . " 
(Foulkes and Antony, p . 2 8 8 ) 
There are v a r i o u s types o f group therapy, a l l o f which base 
t h e i r t r e a t m ent upon the i d e a t h a t t h e r e i s an enormous 
v a r i a t i o n i n the meaning which can be g i v e n t o a l l but the 
'hard core' o f common ground i n communication w i t h i n a s o c i a l 
group - such as the naming o f a c h a i r as a c h a i r r a t h e r than a 
horse, (Poulkes and Antony, page 2 5 2 ) . Beyond t h i s hard core 
" t h e r e are as many p a r t - t r u t h s as t h e r e are observers." 
(Foulkes and Antony, page 2 5 5 ) • Each v i e w p o i n t i s as v a l i d 
as each o t h e r i n the group t h e r a p y s i t u a . t i o n - an i d e a which 
immediately reminds one o f t h e a n t h r o p o l o g i s t ' s aim o f r e s p e c t i n g 
each s o c i e t y w i t h i t s p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r e however e x o t i c i t may 
appear. The aim i s t o understand the p a r t i c u l a r viei-?point o f 
the i n d i v i d u a l , and t o do t h i s the l e v e l o f "Complete 
communication" has t o be reached. 
"Communication i s e v e r y t h i n g happening i n t h i s 
p a r t i c u l a r group s i t u a t i o n which can be n o t i c e d , 
i t i s e v e r y t h i n g sent out and r e c e i v e d w i t h 
response, e i t h e r c o n s c i o u s l y or unconsciously." 
(Foulkes and Antony, pa.q'e 2 5 9 , 
1 9 6 7 ) 
etvrork therapy s p e c i f i c a l l y i n v o l v e s the s o c i a l network 
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i n terms of-persons s i g n i f i c a n t t o the s c hizophrenic f a m i l y - i n 
these group d i s c u s s i o n s the aim i s t o s t r e n g t h e n bonds and loosen 
binds i n a n a l y t i c terms. 
I wanted t o discuss t h i s p a r t i c u l a r , somewhat p e r i p h e r a l 
concept o f network t h e r a p y , i n order t o emphasise t h a t the d e f i n -
i t i o n o f a s i t u a t i o n and the behaviour o f the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n 
i n t e r a c t i o n r e l a t e s enormously t o t h e . p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n i n 
which they f i n d themselves i n terras o f the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e . A 
l i m i t i n g case - madness - seems t o me t o p r o v i d e enormous scope 
f o r c r o s s - c u l t u r a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n and comparison. Also I hope 
I have shovm t h a t p s y c h o l o g i s t s are i n c r e a s i n g l y c o n s i d e r i n g 
a wider s o c i a l environment and t h a t , as Lewin suggested i n F i e l d 
Theory, the i n d i v i d u a l and the s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n are v e ry c l o s e l y 
i n t e r r e l a t e d and d e l i c a t e l y balanced. To consider i n d e t a i l 
the i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e a c t i o n t o a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n through 
network a n a l y s i s can be o f g r e a t value t o s o c i a l anthropology 
i n t h a t t h e s u b t l e d i s t i n c t i o n s o f the s i t u a t i o n put forvrard by 
d i f f e r e n t a c t o r s may w e l l expose complex d i s p a r i t i e s i n t h e i r 
s o c i a l p o s i t i o n s , r a t h e r than p u r e l y p s y c h o l o g i c a l and i n d i v i d u a l 
i d i o s y n c r a t i c f a c t o r s . 
To r e t u r n t o the i d e a o f s o c i a l network a.s used by s o c i a l 
a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s r a t h e r than a n a l y s t s , i t i s c l e a r t h a t the l e v e l 
o f the psyche can be taken as g i v e n . 
As Foulkes and Antony p o i n t e d out t h e r e i s o n l y a hard core 
o f r e a l i t y which even i n t i m a t e l y i n t e r a c t i n g members o f the same 
c u l t u r e can assume v r i l l be agreed on. Once t h i s i s e s t a b l i s h e d , 
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the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n a l a r g e s c a le s o c i e t y , i s 
l e f t I'D-th what appears t o be an incomprehensible, u n s t r u c t u r e d 
mass o f people who share very l i t t l e i n terms o f t h e i r b e l i e f 
systems and symbolic environment, and y e t the p a r t i c u l a r view 
o f a s i t u a t i o n which each i n d i v i d u a l concerned i n i t has, can 
y i e l d enormous i n f o r m a t i o n about the s o c i a l system and the ideas -
norms^ etc, - which u n d e r l y i t . The i d e a t h a t people o f a 
d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l c l a s s view the same s o c i e t y i n enormously 
d i f f e r e n t ways i s one o f the most considered aspects o f t h i s -
since i t i s so apparent and also so p o l i t i c a l l y e x p l o s i v e . The 
more s u b t l e e f f e c t s o f s o c i a l p o s i t i o n on p e r c e p t i o n are l e s s 
r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e f o r study and yet are more p o t e n t i a l l y 
r e v e a l i n g . 
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V. OBJECTIONS TO NETlffOHK ANALYSES 
1 , I n t r o d u c t i o n 
The c r i t i c i s m s I make here of netvrork analysis are not intended t o 
apply t o a l l the studies u s i n g the concept of netvrorko I t v a i l be 
app'arent which studies are a t f a u l t i n which particular areas. 
I regard network analysis as a method f o r the presentation aind 
a n a l y s i s of data. As such i t can be used i n many d i f f e r e n t contexts 
and w i t h many d i f f e r e n t orientations» My main c r i t i c i s m s stem from 
i t s use i n conjunction w i t h ideas which are not a p a r t o f the new 
paradigm i n anthropology» However, i t i s not i n e v i t a b l e t h a t the 
method should be used i n t h i s way, and so the c r i t i c i s m s I make are 
not i n any way meant as o u t r i g h t condemnations of the methodo I v;ant 
t o p o i n t out ways i n which networks have been used less s u c c e s s f u l l y 
than they might, and t o suggest the reasons f o r t h i s occurrenceo 
2 , O b j e c t i v i t y 
I have, I hope, demonstrated t h a t one of the motives which eicourage 
the use o f netvrork analysis i s the desire t o produce an iinbias|Wd 
d e s c r i p t i o n and ana l y s i s of s o c i a l l i f e . Unbiased here r e f e r s t o the 
n o t i o n of o b j e c t i v i t y which i s imputed t o be a p a r t of the 'hard' 
paradigm. The observer's r o l e i s obscured and a pretence i s kept 
up t h a t he does not enter i n t o or impinge upon the s o c i a l a c t i v i t y 
t h a t he observes i n any wayo This i s the major f a i l i n g o f such stu d i e s j 
althought i t i s compomded by the f a c t t h a t the theories w i t h which 
i t has been a l l i e d are not i n themselves s a t i s f a c t o r y o 
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The i n f l u e n c e of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s emotions and p e r s o n a l i t y upon h i s 
work has long been recognised. • 
"This f i e l d w o r k i s an extremely personal, traumatic k i n d of 
experience, and the personal involvement of the an t h r o p o l o g i s t 
i n h i s work i s r e f l e c t e d i n what he produces."(leach^1959^ p„27^ 
The s o l u t i o n t o tie problem has been less c l e a r l y seeno Leach, whose 
remark I quoted above, exhorts the an t h r o p o l o g i s t to " s t i c k to the f a c t s 
of the ca|,se, .nd exercise your imagination, but don't get so personally 
i n v o l v e d i n the s i t u a t i o n t h a t you cannot d i s t i n g u i s h betvreen the 
e m p i r i c a l f a c t s and your p r i v a t e a n a l y t i c a l concepts."(leach^1959^ p , l o J 
Such a suggestion begs a l l the r e l e v a n t questions, Maquet has v / r i t t e n 
an extremely l u c i d a r t i c l e devoted t o t h i s t o p i c and has put for\-;ard 
ideas which a l l o w the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t t o overcome the problem of h i s 
s u b j e c t i v i t y . He draws on Mannheiiris concept of 'perspectives' upon 
s o c i a l phenomena (which r e l a t e s t o Husserl's phenomenology - see below). 
" I t i s the f a c t t h a t the an t h r o p o l o g i s t perceives the s o c i a l 
phenomena he studies not from nowhere but from a c e r t a i n p o i n t 
o f view, which i s h i s e x i s t e n t i a l positiono To define adequately 
an a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l study, i t i s not enough to i n d i c a t e i t s object 
e.go 'the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e of the Mundang' one should add 'as 
seen hj an a n t h r o p o l o g i s t belonging t o the socioeconomic middle 
stratum of the white c o l o n i a l m i n o r i t y , " 
As Maquet p o i n t s out, 
"This a d d i t i o n i s not j u s t one mote welcome instance of p r e c i s i o n , 
comparable, f o r example t o d e t a i l s on the i n t e r v i e w i n g techniques 
used. I n the most acute manner i t r a i s e s the question of the 
s c i e i t t i f i c nature of anthropology. I f the anthropologist's perspec-
t i v e has t o be mentioned, i t means t h a t the observer's s u b j e c t i v i t y 
i s taken i n t o account. And i s not s u b j e c t i v i t y j u s t v/hat science 
eliminates? To be s c i e n t i f i c , should not an as s e r t i o n be v e r i f i a b l e 
by any s c i e n t i s t ? And how can an anth r o p o l o g i s t v e r i f y v/hat another 
has w r i t t e n about a c e r t a i n s o c i e t y i f the d e s c r i p t i o n or analysis 
i s determined not only by the object ( t h e society studied) but by 
the subject ( t h e a n t h r o p o l o g i s t ) as w e l l ? " 
This problem has been r a i s e d i n i t s most acute form by the e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y 
d i f f e r e n t d e s c r i p t i o n s of Tepoztlan, produced by Re d f i e l d and Lewis (see 
Pel t0; 1970,|j>. 5 1 - 5 5 ) . 
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Maquet recognises what Pelto chooses to ignore - namely 'subjec-
t i v i t y i n observation,'/ The 'evident theorj-- impregnation of ethnogra- • 
phic data' i s as J a r v i e p o i n t s out, rairely confronted. 
" , , 0 i f p o l i t i c a l p r e d i l i c t i o n s , a e s t h e t i c learnings and 
value biases were to determine the t r u t h or f a l s i t y of anthro-
p o l o g i c a l explanations - or what c o n s t i t u t e s 'good' or 'bad' anthro-
pology - the p o t e n t i a l of a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l knowledge f o r c o n t r i b u -
t i n g t o e i t h e r explanation or a p p l i c a t i o n vrould be s e r i o u s l y imder-
minedo" (Manners and Kaplan, 1 9 7 1 ? P < . 5 l ) 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the i n e v i t a b l e s u b j e c t i v i t y of the anthropologist's 
p e r c e p t i o n of the world means t h a t h i s judgements must be based upon 
e x a c t l y those concepts which Manners ySc Kaplan abhoro The question of 
whether t h i s need i n v a l i d a t e such work i s not so simply ansv/ered hov/ever. 
I n f a c t , I vrould agree w i t h Pocock t h a t unless the subjective nature 
of a l l a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l work i s recognised, i t i s invalidatedo 
"Without some idea t h a t s o c i e t y determines thought and a c t i o n , 
the o b j e c t o f study ceases t o e x i s t . But i f t h i s n o t i o n i s 
coupled w i t h the idea of o b j e c t i v i t y borrowed from n a t u r a l 
science, sociology destroys i t s e l f f o r f i n a l l y the observations 
of the s o c i o l o g i s t himself are influenced not only by h i s n a t i o n a l 
s o c i e t y , but even by h i s class and i n t e l l e c t u a l milieu".(Pocock, 
1 9 6 1 , p o l l 5 ^ 
Manners and Kaplan appro|,ch a s o l u t i o n t o the problem when they remark 
t h a t ; 
" o o , the mistake made by o o , , c r i t i c s i s t h a t they have t r i e d 
t o l o c a t e o b j e c t i v i t y v;here i t never e x i s t e d - namely i n the minds 
of i n d i v i d u a l a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s , VJe agree t h a t a l l a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s , 
l i k e a l l people, are biassed. I f anthropology i s to claim any 
o b j e c t i v i t y whatsoever, then, t h a t o b j e c t i v i t y can only emerge from 
the c o l l e c t i v e work o f a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s - i n v o l v i n g the i n t e r p l a y 
o f many d i f f e r e n t biases over time,"(^Ilanners and Kaplan, 1 9 7 1 » P<>29) 
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Maquet reaches approximately the same conclusion; 
"Several p e r s p e c t i v a l views of the same s o c i a l phenomenon help 
to describe more p r e c i s e l y each view p o i n t and consequently t o 
determine hov/ each of them a f f e c t s the r e s u l t i n g knov/ledge 1,, 
More i s to be expected from the c o n f r o n t a t i o n of a m u l t i p l i c i t y 
o f perspectives than from the quest f o r the 'best one' i t 
i s from the comparison of d i f f e r e n t , e x i s t e n t i a l l y conditioned 
views, and not by the f u t i l e attempt to cleanse one's view of 
any s o c i a l commitment, t h a t more complete knowledge of the object 
w i l l be o b t a i n e d . " ( 1 9 6 4 , p , 5 4 ) 
The major p o t e n t i a l of network analysis l i e s i n a p o s s i b i l i t y of pre-
s e n t i n g the unique perspective of each ac t o r on h i s ovm e x i s t e n t i a l 
p o s i t i o n and r e a l i t y . To an extent exchange theory implies t h i s s o r t 
of approach, but by r e f u s i n g t o accept t h a t the observer's p o s i t i o n 
i s also c r u c i a l and requires e l a b o r a t i o n , the s u b t l e t y and p o t e n t i a l i -
t i e s have been missed i n a l l the studies I have considered, w i t h the 
exception of B o t t , Whitten and Parkin's work. 
Van Velsen has remarked t h a t " f o r the s o c i o l o g i s t i n t e r e s t e d i n s o c i a l 
processes there are no r i g h t or wrong views, only d i f f e r i n g viei-ra repre-
s e n t i n g d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t groups, s t a t u s , p e r s o n a l i t y and so f o r t h . " 
I t i s i n the task of o b t a i n i n g these d i f f e r e n t views t h a t netv/ork analysis 
can be of use. 
There i s another way i n which the observer's s u b j e c t i v i t y can be coun-
t e r a c t e d t o some ext e n t . 
"Values do enter a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l research a t many J o i n t s , whether 
or not t h i s i s recognised. They enter i n t o the s e l e c t i o n of problems, 
the choice of v a r i a b l e s , and thus the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of data. I 
suggest t h a t an a n t h r o p o l o g i s t who i s e x p l i c i t about h i s ovm values 
i s l i k e l y to frame h i s problems more sharply and t o see more c l e a r l y 
the l i n e s between values and data more than one who has not examined 
h i s d a t a , " ( G o u g h ^ l 9 6 8 ^ p . l 4 o ^ 
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This s e l f examination r e l a t e s back t o Maquet's desire t o have the 
e x i s t e n t i a l p o s i t i o n of the obsei^er s p e c i f i e d i n each study on the 
assumption t h a t the reader w i l l then be av/are of the tjrpe of bias 
present. I t also r e l a t e s t o the Reflexive Sociology which i s argued 
f o r by Gouldner, How e f f e c t i v e i t can be i s arguable. I t i s r a t h e r 
l i k e the graph of an i n f i n i t e regression which approaches but never 
touches i t s axis - i . e , zero, or the problem of the hare and the 
t o r t o i s e . 
As l o n g as a n o t i o n of o b j e c t i v i t y i s adhered t o , which i s supposedly 
d e r i v e d from the 'hard' sciences, no method w i l l provide s a t i s f a c t o r y 
analyses. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , network analysis seems t o have been l i n k e d 
e x t e n s i v e l y w i t h such a concept, 
a) BTipiricism 
Such an idea of o b j e c t i v i t y as has j u s t been o u t l i n e d i s p a r t of an 
extreme d o c t r i n e of empiricism. Experience i s opposed t o theory 
i n such a schema vfhich, u l t i m a t e l y , accepts orHj the r e a l i t y of 
the former and r e j e c t s the existence of any supersensoiy r e a l i t y , 
G ellner has said t h a t the commonly accepted f o r m u l a t i o n of empiricism 
i s "the d o c t r i n e t h a t w h i l s t theory i s e s s e n t i a l and desirable, i t 
ultimately depends f o r i t s v a l i d i t y on observation and experiment." 
( d i c t i o n a r y of the S o c i a l . ^ i e n c e s , I 9 6 4 , ) I n these terms netvrork 
a n a l y s i s has been used e m p i r i c a l l y i n almost a l l cases. V/riters 
have used i t t o elaborate theories such as exchange theories (Kapferer^ 
1 9 6 9 - 1 9 7 2 ) or to t e s t hypotheses - such as t h a t the form of the 
s o c i a l network and the conjugal r o l e r e l a t i o n s h i p are i n t e r l i n k e d , 
(Noble 1 9 7 0 , Turner I 9 6 7 . ) 
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Used i n 3, p e j o r a t i v e sense, empiricism denotes "a d o c t r i n e which 
asserts or recommends the absence of theorjr a l t o g e t h e r " (Gellner, i n 
Gould edo^ D i c t i o n a r y of the Social Sciences . ) 1 9 6 4 ) 
The idea of o b j e c t i v i t y tovrards which many of the netviork analysts 
afe s t r i v i n g i s a p a r t of t h i s type of empiricism. 
Anthropology as a whole has been moving away from such a n o t i o n 
of empiricism a t l e a s t since Levi-Strauss began t o exert an influence 
over the d i s c i p l i n e . According to Levi-Strauss, anthropology attempts 
t o b u i l d models? 
"The best model w i l l always be t h a t which i s t r u e , t h a t i s 
the simplest possible model, which, while being extracted 
e x c l u s i v e l y from the f a c t s under consideration, also makes 
i t p ossible t o account f o r them,"^19559 p » 5 2 6 ^ 
I n attempting, as M i t c h e l l argues we shoujd, to make netvjorks as 
close to: e m p i r i c a l r e a l i t y as pos s i b l e , the advances made i n anthro-
pology i n recent decades sire completely ignored, A narrov; empiricism 
of t h i s s o r t i s u n l i k e l y to provide stimulus to the d i s c i p l i n e s 
develoJ)mento 
Furthermore i t i s not necessary t o t r y t o be as close to r e a l i t y 
as possible t o be o b j e c t i v e . As I)u?kheim said o b j e c t i v i t y i s 
achieved by the d i s t a n c i n g of i n d i v i d u a l f a c t s (page 44, RuJ.es of 
S o c i o l o g i c a l fefethod). I n Schutz's terms t h i s i s making knov;ledge 
t r a n s s i t u a t i o n a l . Such a process i s a c t u a l l y hindered by the 
type of empiricism which has been associated w i t h some net\-/ork 
a n a l y s i s , 
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b) Terminological Refinements 
I t i s apparent (see Chapter I I I ) t h a t a standard network methodo-
logy i s the aim of many of the w r i t e r s who use the concept of 
network. The aim i s t o produce a method which could r i v a l t h a t 
of the experiment of the 'hard' sciences. The a r t i c l e s by M i t c h e l l 
(1969), ¥ol&/(1970) and Barnes (197O a) e x p l i c i t l y seek such a 
methode 
I n order f o r such a development t o occur i t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t a 
concise and p r e c i s e l y defined terminology f o r netvrorks and r e l a t e d 
concepts be formulated, Harries-Jones (1969) and Boissevain (1972) 
have both w r i t t e n a r t i c l e s i n which they urge t h a t the term 'quasi-
group' be dropped since the concept i t r e f e r s to i s , i n f a c t , 
filassificatory r a t h e r than an i n t e r a c t i v e quasi-group (Boissevain^ 
1972jP469)» Boissevain suggests t h a t the term c o a l i t i o n be u t i l i s e d 
and taken t o include the concept of the i n t e r a c t i v e quasi-group to 
which A,C, Mayer r e f e r s (I966), Mayer (1972) has r e p l i e d t h a t 
he agrees w i t h Boissevainfe r e f o r m u l a t i o n and asks him to consider 
a wider r e - e v a l u a t i o n of terminology. 
The discussion of the term 'quasi-group' has apparently eliminated 
some confusion and may v j e l l make the use of the network concept 
more f r u i t f u l . I t i s debatable, however, how true t h i s i s of other 
t e r m i n o l o g i c a l debates. 
The d i s t i n c t i o n between s t a r and zone made by Barnes. (1968), f o r 
instance, seems t o be an overabstrp,ct f o r m u l a t i o n . The e l i m i n a t i o n 
of a p a r t i c u l a r set of l i n k s p urely because they are between ego's 
f i r s t order contacts i s u n l i k e l y t o provide any u s e f u l i n s i g h t s . 
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A r b i t r a r y decisions, such as to consider f i r s t order contacts only, 
are bound to produce d i s t o r t e d i n f o r m a t i o n . Such t e r m i n o l o g i c a l 
refinements are, i n f a c t , r a r e l y i f ever applied. The f a c t t h a t 
they are suggested a t a l l i s a side e f f e c t of a search f o r a stan-
dard methodology to give network analysis and anthropology a scien-
t i f i c s t a t u s . 
I n f a c t , probably one of the strengths of the network concept a t 
present i s i t s f l e x i b i l i t y . The r e l a t i v e n o v e l t y of the concept 
enables people to use i t i n ways p a r t i c u l a r l y appropriate to each 
t o p i c they examine w i t h o u t having t o f i t t h e i r data i n t o a set 
of r i g i d l y defined terms, E l i z a b e t h B o t t ( l 9 7 l ) i s q u i t e r i g h t 
when she says t h a t we should use the concept without v/orrying Aiout 
apparent t e r m i n o l o g i c a l confusion. 
The n o t i o n of the group was never defined f i n a l l y and immutably. 
For instance, i n the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences i t i s 
-:Ki-
defined i n three d i f f e r e n t ways by three d i f f e r e n t v / r i t e r s . 
I n the Encyclopaedia o f the Social S c i e n c e s . ( I 9 6 8 ) Homans ( v o l , 6 
p , 2 5 8 ) defines the group as "a number of persons-, or members, each of 
whom while the group i s meeting, i n t e r a c t s w i t h every other, or i s 
able t o do so, or can a t l e a s t take personal cognizance of every 
othe r " , Deutsch ( p , 6 2 5 ) v/rites t h a t a group consists of two or 
more persons who l ) have one or more c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n common 2 ) 
perceive themselves as forming a d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e e n t i t y 5 ) are aware 
of the interdependence of some o f t h e i r goals or i n t e r e s t s 4 ) i n t e r a c t 
w i t h one another i n p u r s u i t of t h e i r independent goals" He adds t h a t 
5 ) they may endure over a time and the r e f o r e 6 ) develop norms and 7 ) 
sets of r o l e s and r i g h t s , S h e r i f and Sher i f ( p , 2 7 6 ) say the group 
i s "a s o c i a l u n i t c o n s i s t i n g of a number of i n d i v i d u a l s who stand i n 
stat u s and r o l e r e l a t i o n s h i p s t o one another t h a t are s t a b i l i s e d i n 
some degree a t a given time and who possess a set of values or norms 
r e g u l a t i n g t h e i r behaviour, a t l e a s t i n matters of consequence t o the 
group," 
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I n s p i t e of t h i s the group i s a concept which i s used by many 
s o c i o l o g i s t s and a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s who share a common understanding 
as t o what i t i m p l i e s a t l e a s t t o the extent of enabling them to 
use the group concept p r o d u c t i v e l y . I t i s c l e a r t h a t a s t r i c t l y 
d e f i n e d terminology i s not e s s e n t i a l . I n the analysis of f i e l d , 
data, unless i t i s hoped to standardise methods. The desire to 
do t h i s stems from an adherence to an outdated n a t u r a l science 
i d e a l , which i s one of the l e a s t a t t r a c t i v e elements of some net-
work a n a l y s i s . I n such a s e t t i n g the i n s i s t e n c e upon the primacy 
of one d e f i n i t i o n over a l l others i s an aspect of academic j o s t l i n g 
f o r p r e s t i g e , p a r t i c u l a r l y v;hen i t i s done i n a context unrelated 
to any f i e l d study. The aim does not seem to be to increase under-
standing but t o demarcate specialisms f o r p a r t i c u l a r a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s . 
5. The F a i l u r e of Q u a n t i f i c a t i o n i n Network Analysis 
One o f the a^'eas i n which netvrork analysis was claimed t o be p a r t i c u l a x l y 
f r u i t f u l was t h a t of the c o l l e c t i o n of systematised data which vrould be 
amenable to mathematical a n a l y s i s . I t i s a sign of the methods f a i l u r e 
to l i v e up t o i t s o r i g i n a l promise t h a t t h i s has not yet occurred. Of the 
studies I have considered i n d e t a i l , only eleven have involved the presen-
t a t i o n of q u a n t i t a t i v e data (Boissevain, M,G, Smith, Oeser, ( G u l l i v e r ) , 
(VJheeldon), Harries Jones, Pons, Kapferer, Lamphere, Foster, Turner, 
H a l l p i k e and Noble), For the most p a r t t h i s has involved merely the 
counting of heads. The exceptions being Boissevain's, Oeser's, Kapferer's 
Turner's and M,G, Smith's vrorks, ( H a l l p i k e ' s more so p h i s t i c a t e d analysis 
i s based upon game theory and takes i-£s u n i t s of analysis as an urban area 
r a t h e r than an i n d i v i d u a l . I t thus poses d i f f e r e n t problems), Boissevain's 
work (;^ 97;2) i s more s p e c i f i c a l l y o r i e n t e d around network analysis than 
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any o f the others. He concludes t h a t s o c i a l environment influences 
the gregariousness of any i n d i v i d u a l . To reach t h i s conclusion he 
analyses i n considerable d e t a i l the networks of two informants i n 
Malta - one urban and one r m ^ l i n o r i g i n . 
I f e e l that^as P. Mayer remarked i n h i s review of Kapferer's a r t i c l e 
i n the M i t c h e l l Symposium , " I n t e r e H t i n g though tie m a t e r i a l seems t o be, 
i t i s not r e a l l y vei*y r e v e a l i n g t o be sho\m i n terms of a si n g l e dispute 
t h a t i t i s advantageous f o r the disputant t o have f i r m l i n k s wit i many 
people, p r e f e r a b l y i n f l u e n t i a l ones." (Mayer, 1970, Po72l) 
Mayer, however, concludes t h a t the s o l u t i o n t o the problem i s t h a t " i n 
p r i n c i p l e very many networks ought to be analysed and r e l a t e d , vrith a 
view t o i s o l a t i n g t y p i c a l features or v a r i a t i o n s and discovering t h e i r 
i m p l i c a t i o n s before one attempts to expl a i n s o c i a l processes i n net\-jork 
terras," (1970, p ,27l) . I n t h i s he echoes the e x h o r t a t i o n of M t c h e l l and 
Garbett f o r the c o l l e c t i o n of more systematic data, and i n t e r c a l i b r a t i o n 
(GUtkind), The f a u l t i s seen to l i e a t the l e v e l of inadequate infoma-
t i o n . I n f a c t , the f a i l u r e o f q u a j i t i f i c a t i o n i n network analysis has 
f a r deeper r o o t s , 
"Nearly every s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e s i s proposes a new method v/hich, 
however, i t s author i s c a r e f u l not t o apply, so t h a t sociologj'- i s 
the science w i t h the greatest number o f methods amd l e a s t r e s u l t s , " 
(Poincare^ 
The p r o l i f e r a t i o n of network terminology has been commented upon. At the 
l e v e l o f method and q u a l i f i c a t i o n the same confusion p e r s i s t s . Barnes, 
Wolfe, M i t c h e l l and Garbett have between them proposed f i v e d e t a i l e d 
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methods of u s i n g networks t o c o l l e c t q u a n t i t a t i v e datao A modified 
v e r s i o n of M i t c h e l l ' s proposal has been applied perhaps twice i n Kapferer's 
^orko 
The network analysts themselves p o i n t t o some of the i m p r a c t i c a l i t i e s , 
G u l l i v e r w r i t e s t h a t Barnes; 
"proposed means toraeasure degrees of den s i t y but I do not see 
how these would be applied t o Ndendenli m a t e r i a l ( o r f o r t h a t 
matter t o other concrete cases from r e a l l i f e ) ' ' , ( 1 9 7 1 , p , 2 4 6 ^ 
The d e n s i t y measures are too crude t o be of any use, and any r e f i n i n g 
of the concept would make i t r e l e v a n t only f o r the problem a t hand, 
andi remove i t s j u s t i f i c a t i o n - the p r o v i s i o n of comparative data. Also 
any such refinement - which i s e s s e n t i a l i f r e l a t i o n s h i p s are t o be 
char a c t e r i s e d meaningfully i n the concepts of strandedness, contents 
and so on, i n s t a n t l y r e q u i r e s s u b j e c t i v e categorisations by the observer. 
"The perception of the strands i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p , however, 
depends upon the a n a l y t i c purpose of the observer,"/^Mitchell, 
1 9 6 9 ^ p , 2 5 j ^ 
Thus, the only m e r i t o f q u a n t i f i c a t i o n - a c e r t a i n type of o b j e c t i v i t y 
which would a l l o w d i r e c t comparisons t o be made - i s removed, 
A concentration upon morphology and s t r u c t u r e which i s e s s e n t i a l i f 
q u a n t i f i a b l e data i s t o be used also makes f o r tedious reading, a s the 
w r i t e r s are aware, and, i n f a c t , teaches us l i t t l e of the s o c i a l processes 
i n v o l v e d , 
"This long e x p o s i t i o n of the formal p r o p e r t i e s o f netvrorks of 
s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s has not taken us very f a r along the road t o the 
study of p o l i t i c a l process," (Barnes, 1 9 6 8 ^ p . l 2 2 ^ 
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"Standards of l i t e r a r y elegsjice and eminent reauiability .. o 
must often be eschewed i n the interests of a more developed 
and i n c i s i v e sociological analysis'^ ^ u l l i v e r ^ 1971si Po82^ 
"Heavy demands are indeed made by the reader by this kind of 
an a l y s i s , and I would merely comment that there i s no reason why 
science should be easy reading," (Gluckman, l%f^ 
"ooo devoted most of the summer of 1968 to the mind deadening 
task of organising and c o l l e c t i n g the network data.., "/^Boissevaini 
1972, Vo2j 
The boBdom induced i n investigator and reader a l i k e by network analyses 
of the type which i n s i s t on quantifying data i s a r e s u l t of the fac t 
that only the most-trivial and readily apparent conclusions can be dravm 
from a remarkably large amount of d e t a i l i n this v/ay. 
The non-quantitative mathematical methods hailed by Mitchell do not 
seem to have materialised, and we are l e f t with unsophisticated head 
counting. Even at t h i s l e v e l the observer and his bias intrudes at 
every l e v e l , and i t i s the r e f u s a l to recognise this that results i n 
the ommission of a l l meaningful areas of s o c i a l intercourse from such 
data. As Blau has said, there ex i s t s no measure of change content, and 
t h i s i s a substantive not a methodological f a c t , 
"The i n t e r e s t here (Bamesyl954) i s i n the morphological features 
of the network i t s e l f and t h e i r implications for s o c i a l behaviour 
rather than i n the flow of communications through the netvrork," 
( j ^ i t c h e l l , 1969, p,5o} 
Such an in t e r e s t can only be j u s t i f i e d by a concern to quantify and 
compare i n hopes of e l i c i t i n g s o c i a l processes which are not readily 
apparent to the observer. However, the ignoring of communication means 
that the meaning of the interaction within the network i s dispensed vdth= 
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The end r e s u l t of a l l t h i s i s that as Boissevain says, "never has so 
much been written about so l i t t l e o " (1968^ Po554) 
The reason for so much being v/ritten^ i s ^ surely, that netv/orks are 
currently fashionable and, for many s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s , seem to represent 
a panacea0 The idea that data are somehow better for being mathemati-
c a l l y processable i s c l e a r l y s t i l l with us - though for the most part 
not e x p l i c i t l y so - and many people believe that i f they can only under-
stand and apply the complex methodology of networks, they v / i l l be repre-
sented with such datao Such a b e l i e f p e r s i s t s because the domajji assum-
ptions of sodetyo The most important of these are the telief i n predic-
tion and control by external agencies through objective analysis of 
data on p a r t i c u l a r aspects of humsm li f e o 
These assumptions are changing rapidly hov;ever, and as they do the 
emphasis upon obj e c t i v i t y , s c i e n t i f i c method ajad quantification i s unlikely 
to remain with uso 
The basic f a i l u r e o f quantification i s s t i l l due to the inescapable fa c t 
that " a l l of us know that the essential things i n our own relat i o n to 
other men are not subject to numerical measuremento" ^ Cooley^in Manis and 
Meltzer, I969, vASj 
a) Density Measures 
Barnes has said that "although mathematics supplies concepts that 
are admirably clear and precise, the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t finds he has 
to deal with the same kind of teminological jungle as generally 
prevails i n other areas of s o c i a l science where there are fewer 
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pretensions to methodological rigour. In this instance, at le a s t 
the j u i ^ l e i s purely terminological and not conceptual o,."(l970, 
p,2l6) 
I hope to show that the jungle may be purely terminological at 
the l e v e l of mathematical concept but that i t most certainly i s 
conceptual when i t comes to the applying of the mathematical 
concepts to s o c i a l systems. The problem of quantification of s o c i a l 
networks i s not methodological, but substantiveo 
By i l l u s t r a t i n g i n some d e t a i l the problems of a r r i v i n g at a 
numerical value of density, I s h a l l point out my objections to 
the quantification of network studies. I f I v;as to discixss othmc 
more obscure measures such as span as well, I vrould be r e i t e r a t i n g 
my objections, since they a l l stem from the problem of defining 
the s o c i a l concepts - such as relationship - which are being 
measured. This process i s so subjective that to attempt to compare 
the r e s u l t s of different workers i n different situations would be 
completely impossibleo A further objection to quantification i s 
that the aim seems not so much to be that of making knowledge available 
to others, but of increasing i t s e x c l u s i v i t y . There i s an. a i r of 
mystification i n a l l these calculations, v.rhich i s unnecessarjr 
(except that i f t h i s vrere not so th e i r ultimate irelefance would be 
more e a s i l y seen), 
Barnes has presented the different terms - such as connectedness, 
loose and close k n i t , large smd small mesh - vfhich have been applied 
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to networks and which are b a s i c a l l y concerned with -the density 
of the.networks (197O,pp,224-228). Density i s %he number of 
lines- present i n the viclr^j of^given point as a fraction of the 
maximum possible number '^p.225, 197o), 
Barnes f i r s t suggested the r i s e of such a measure i n 1969, He 
suggests applying the measure to stars and zones - ego-centric 
abstracts from the network. As an example of the mystification 
I mentioned above I would c i t e the f a c t that he novihere presents 
the means of calculating t h i s measure. From his statement (p»63) 
that i n a zone containing Alpha and s i x people potential number 
of l i n k s i s 21, i t i s possible for the reader who knows some maths 
to conclude that the formula i s = potential nol of l i n k s 
where n i s the t o t a l number of people i n the zone. He then presents 
a table (p,65) i n which he gives various measures for three hypothe-
t i c a l networks. 
Density Per Cent 
Society 1st Order Zone 2nd Order Zone 
1, "Everyone knows everybody" 100 100 
2, "Eo homosexuality" 18 55 
5o "Proselytizing" 18 2 
He explains b r i e f l y what each society i s l i k e (p,62-3)» lo i s 
quite clear, 2, i s a society i n which each person knox-js only members 
of the opposite sex, 5° i s a society i n which each person converts 
ten others - the network always ramifies. 
He presents no diagrams and i n order to wrk out exactly v;hat i s 
meant i n the case of aacLety 2, i t i s necessary to work back from the 
densities given. He says (p,65) there are ten men and ten women 
First order zone 
Second order zone 
Fig. 2 Barnes' 
society no.2 
'No homosexuality' 
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i n the society, (There are ten i)eople ad^cent to each Alpha 
i n the other soc i e t i e s - c l e a r l y this i s irrelevant i n the case 
of a society of type 1, whose density w i l l always be 100^^ In 
the primary zone of society 2, i t becomes apparent that Alpha 
knows ten people of the opposite sex, none of whom know each 
other. 
The potential linkage i s 11,10 
— =55 
The actual number of l i n k s i s 10 
Therefore, the density i s 1 0 ^ ^ 222 = isas (recurring) 
(a simple percentage calculation i s used here) 
I n the second order zone, each person of opposite sex to Alpha 
t 
knows another ten people of Alpha's sex who do not know each other. 
•|he potential linkage i s 21,20 _ 
The actual linkage i s 110 
Therefore, the density i s 1 1 2 ^ = ^ = 52.6 (correct to 1 decimal 
•^^  place) 
Society 5, 
The f i r s t order zone contains Alpha and his 10 contacts 
The potential linkage i s 11.10 _ 
2 ~ 
The actual linkage i s 10 
The density i s 1 0 ^ ^ ^^^^^ (recurring) 
55 
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Second Order Zone 
Alpha and his ten contacts, t h e i r ten contacts 
Potential linkage i s 111,110 
2 
Adnal linkage i s 110 
Density i s 2.100 200 t / a, . ^ ^ • . n \ 
- YTT ~ ' (.correct to one decimal place) 
I have elaborated on these calculations because i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
to understand how Barnes haS arrived at his figures i n the text 
He has ignored the elementary rule of mathematics which i s to 
demonstrate every step by which one reaches an answer. The r e s u l t 
i s that he i s not explaining anything but rather producing a set 
of authoritative working figures and of thin a i r . He does not even 
bother to explain that he has corrected his figures, (Also when he 
says that the measure of f i r s t order density does not discriminate 
between societies 2, and 5f he~. seems to be unaware of the f a c t 
that the f i r s t order zone i s i d e n t i c a l i n these tv/o societies,) 
It'- seems that Barnes i s not trying to teach other analysts how to 
use the formulae for density measurement at a l l , or he would 
write out his calculations properly. There seems, i n f a c t , to 
be l i t t l e ar no value i n the whole exercise as i t i s presented here, 
Barnes assigns measures of density to cliques and clusters, Densi-by 
i s the most important single measure used i n netv/ork analysis, 
Bruce Kapferer has attempted to apply this measure to empirical 
studies and i t becomes apparent immediately that the major problem, 
once one has extricated the E l a t i v e l y simple formulae from Barnes' 
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obscurantism l i e s i n defining l i n k s for inclusion in such k 
formula^ 
calculations, (Kapferer uses a s l i g h t l y different/from that of 
Barnes, density measure which excludes the primary star r e l a t i o n -
ships), I have taken my discussion from Kapferer's (1972) book 
since although^the calculations are i d e n t i c a l v.dth those i n the 
(1969) a r t i c l e , I f e e l that i t i s f a i r e r to c r i t i c i s e the f u l l e r 
text, 
Kapferer i s attempting to elucida.te the v/ay i n which support i s 
mobilised by workers i n a factory dispute. To this end he presents 
various network measures j, of which I s h a l l examine one - density. 
The formula given i s ; / 211a, \ , 
where Na = the number of ac-tual l i n k s , and N the t o t a l number of 
persons i n the network (p,172) 
"By density I simply' refer to the extent to vfhich the 
individuals to whom Ego i s linked are linked to each 
other," (1972, p.172) 
I suggest that t h i s i s not 'simply' defined at a l l , I n examining 
the idea of l i n k i n Kapferer's work we are l e f t \^ith the notion 
of something d i s t i n c t l y hazy, 
"By interaction I r e f e r to continuous uninterrupted s o c i a l 
a c t i v i t y involving the participation of at l e a s t tvro persons," 
(1972, p,l63) 
The components of interaction are sociational or instrumental 
transactions, 
" I have attempted to overcome such difficultmes ( i n the 
categorization of transactions) by categorising a trans-
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action as sociational or instrumental on the basis of what I 
considered to be i t s dominant element, according to my general 
knowled'ge of the nature of the relationships betv/een the i n d i v i -
duals engaged i n the interaction," (1972, P0I64) 
Kapferer i s thus already introducing an element of personal judge-
ment which would make his study unreplicable. He continues to 
explain that he i s concerned only with voluntary interaction (pl67) 
and not those interactions d i r e c t l y concerned with the production 
process. In t h i s he i s following Blau's limitations on the r e l e -
vance of exchange theory. 
Later he eliminates transations that are not regular, 
"By regular I r e f e r to nepeated transactional a c t i v i t y . That 
i s transactional a c t i v i t y which I recorded between individuals 
which occurred more than once sind from my data appeared as a 
r e l a t i v e l y frequent aspect of the i r interaction,"(p,168^ 
(in' doing this he i s concerning himself with 'normal' average behaviour 
only and omitting any aberration. He returns to the s t r u c t u r a l / 
functional outlook on s o c i a l l i f e , a view vihich i s confirmed v/here 
he writes, "those relationships which are u n i l a t e r a l and imbalanced 
are r e l a t i v e l y stable because of t h e i r u n i l a t e r a l i t y and imbalance" ^ 
p. 205) 
From these definitions the existence or not of a ' personal i n t e r -
actional relationship' between any pair of people seems to be 
extremely elusive, and i s based upon Kapferer's discriminatory 
powers. I t i s assumed that this i s v a l i d , v;hen in a cross-cultural 
study t h i s i s precisely what must not be taken for granted. 
The whole basia of the measurements i s so shaky - for instances 
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"The factory premises were small enough for me to observe 
most of the interactions between the workers, though I 
by no means claim that a l l were recorded,"(p,163^ 
that they are of very l i t t l e value 
Ultimately, the observer's judgement i s of such enormous jjnpor-
tance at every stage of the s-fcudy that we are presented with a 
quantification of h i s ideas rather than anything derived f^om the 
society under examination. Induction dominates deduction to such 
an extent that quantification i s merely a gloss, vjhich obscures 
the overwhelming importsince of the anthropologist's judgement, 
4, • The Limitations of Exchange Theory 
I have already demonstrated that exchange theoiy i s the t a c i t theory 
behind the majority of network analyses, and as such i f i t f a i l s , so 
do the studies concerned. 
Exchange theory c l e a r l y derives much of i t s inspriation from the 
behaviourist psychologists Watson/Dinner, They have produced an 
elaborate theory of s o c i a l behaviour based upon the notion of the 
neurological stimulus-response arc. Although i t has been argued 
that such ideas are out of date, Koestler has quoted V, Bertallanfy 
(196"^ w^ho says that American p o s i t i v i s t philosophy and psychology; 
"have achieved the rare feat of being both extremely boring 
and frivolous i n the i r unconcern with human issues," 
He continues; 
" I don't care a jot whether Professor A, B or C have modified 
Watson, Hull and Freud here and there and have replaced t h e i r 
blunt statements by more qualified and sophisticated circumlocu-
tions, I do care a l o t that t h e s s p i r i t i s s t i l l a l l -pervading 
i n our society; reducing man to the lov/er aspects of his animal 
nature, or a marionette of p o l i t i c a l power, systematically 
s t u l t i f y i n g him by a perverse system of eduction, i n short, 
dehumanising him even farther by means of a sophisticated 
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psychological technology. 
I t i s the expressed or i m p l i c i t contention that there i s no 
e s s e n t i a l difference between r a t and maji v;hich makes American 
psychology so profoundly disturbing, VJhen the i n t e l l e c t u a l 
e l i t e , the thinkers and leaders, see nothing but an overgrown 
r a t , then i t i s time to be alarmed," 
Many network studies achieve the remarkable feat of being both boring 
and f r i v o l o u s , and i t seems that the cause i s th e i r reliance upon the 
empty theories of exchange. 
Skinner indeed s t i l l exerts an enormous influence i n psychology which, 
i n turn, effects many other areas of s o c i a l science. He argues that 
culture can be successfully designed so that the reinforcem-ent of 
c u l t u r a l l y desirable behaviour i s successfiil In this v/ay dissent 
w i l l be eliminated (Listener, September 1971)• As an empiricist he 
contends that only observable a c t i v i t i e s , and thus measurable units 
of behaviour are of relevance, - mental events are excluded from 
consideration. In t h i s he follows VJatsons-
"IThe time has come when psychology must discard a l l reference to 
conciousness ,,, i t s sole task i s the prediction and control of 
behaviour; and introspection can form no part of iits method," 
(1938) 
The model of the natural sciences i s to be s t t i c t l y adhered to -
although i t i s the mechanistic model of the nineteenth century. 
Eysenck i s a prominent behaviourial psychologist v;ho folloi-ra these ideas. 
S i m i l a r l y , the vogue for kinesics at present i s a part of the same view 
of man - a ratomorphic one, as Koestler has called ito The aim of such 
work i s to control human beings and persuade them to conform to a p a r i t -
cular code of behaviour which i s imposed, hopefully not by despots as 
Skinner says, but from a hierarchy of some sort. Such ideas are c l e a r l y 
useful for p o l i t i c a l manipulation - JJysenck's ideas on the prediction of 
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criminal behaviour i n certain of the population, for instance, have 
apparently been taken seriously by the American government, (Poole, 
1971, VoSo) 
"Oux problem, then, i s behavioixrism, which would permit not even 
description i n 'subjective' tenns, A few sociologists and anthro-
pologists have f u l l y accepted the tenets of behaviourismi many 
more make concessions to i t . I f the use of the teim 'conditioning' 
i s any evidence, almost the whole of modem anthropology has gone 
behaviouristi' ^Nadel^ 1951^ P°57^ 
Behavio-urism i s s t i l l of enormous importance i n s o c i a l sciences 
"Yet the e a r l i e r claims of behavioiirism to be all-embracing are 
only s l i g h t l y toned dovm; for these basic mechanisms, i t i s held, 
w i l l prove applicable to the f i e l d s of s o c i a l psychologjr, moral 
behaviour, psychoanalysis, the theory of empirical knowledge, also 
to insight, thought and reasoning - i n 'short, wherever i n human 
or animal behaviour habits play a sig n i f i c a n t role',"CWadel, 1957? 
P.59) ^ 
Nadel has demonstrated c l e a r l y the inadquacie^of behaviourist psychology 
which he f i n a l l y dismisses i n these terms; 
"Let me, i n conclusion quote this 'confession of f a i t h ' of an 
outstanding psychologists ' I believe that everything importsnt 
i n psychology (except perhaps such mattersaas the building of 
of a super-ego, that i s everything save such matters as involve 
socie-fcy and words) can be investigated i n essence through the 
continued experimental and theoretical analysis of the determiners 
of r a t behaviour at a choice point i n a maze', (Tolman^l938) As 
an anthropologist, who treats of society, I r e s t content^'Q.957» P« 64) 
The new form i n which behaviourism appears i s ex^^nge theory, Blau 
and Homans have applied such ideas to produce a theory of society, 
Hbman's discussion i s p a r t i c u l a r l y m a t e r i a l i s t i c , and supportive of the 
L 
status quo. Beau's concepts are more inclusive - he attempts to consider 
power, affection and other non-tangibles as essential parts of his analysis 
( i n t r i n s i c rewards to s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n ) . Ultimately one i s l e f t v;ith 
the f e e l i n g that one has been told i n enormous d e t a i l things which one 
kn^w anyway, and i n a p a r t i c u l a r l y tedious v;ay. 
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The notion of exchange becomes marginal to an understanding of s o c i a l 
l i f e , however, once i t i s recognised that values such as altiruism 
influence behaviour. I n that case transactions become of relevance 
only i n so f a r as they can bring to our attention scales of scalue, as 
Barth points out. Even at this l e v e l , hov/ever, exchange theorjr i s 
merely a revamped u t i l i t a r i a n i s m and a l l the objections to that theory 
must apply to i t . I t does not supersede older anthropological notions 
of r e c i p r o c i t y i n any way. 
I t s only contribution i s that i t points to the importance of the actor's 
d e f i n i t i o n of values and so on and the importance of interaction and 
r e l a t i v i t y . Thus, i t s general l e v e l of analysis and to some extent, 
i t s focus of i n t e r e s t are relevant, but overall i t s effect i s more 
negative than positive. The alienated view of s o c i a l interaction v;hich 
i t suggests fosters the production of the more tedious and pedantic 
network analyses even when the constriction of tie natural science 
paradigm i s escaped, A t o t a l l y different view of man i s required, and 
indeed e x i s t s , but has not yet been used by network analysts. U n t i l 
t h i s occurs, the network concept v ; i l l not provide much inspriation to 
s o c i a l anthropologists, 
5, Conclusions 
My major contention has been i l l u s t r a t e d i n the previous sections -
i t i s that network analysis has suffered enormously from i t s al l i a n c e 
with an outdated paradigm, A further major disadvantage i n most 
completed studies is/the assumptions underlying such a method have 
not been ecamined. I f this were done i t s anomaiius links with aspects 
of the s t r u c t u r a l / f u n c t i o n a l i s t paradigm vrould be broken. 
173. 
This basic oversight has led to the immense confusion over the exact 
role that network analysis has to play i n s o c i a l anthropology, Mitchell 
has stressed that i t i s to be seen as an element which can contribute 
to a s t r u c t u r a l analysis, and that by concentrating an analysis of the 
same behaviour but at different l e v e l s of abstraction the r e s u l t can 
be either a discussion of networks or in s t i t u t i o n s (1969), The probfem 
of l e v e l s of abstraction has exercised many l a t e r network analysts. In 
a recent a r t i c l e Mitchell (1972) has ^ •noitten that the concept of role 
can be related to that of netwotk since roles emerge at the l e v e l of 
p a r t i a l network abstraction. Beyond this one can separate out i n s t i t u -
tions - "a set of norms and values which relate to a phenomenologically 
d i s t i n c t aspect of s o c i a l relationships," He concludes that "netirorks 
of relationships are the sta r t i n g point i n the analysis of group behaviour 
and that they e x i s t las a n a l y t i c a l constructs which the observer erects 
partly by taking the participants perceptions into account and by f i t t i n g 
together observations not available to the participants themselves," 
This admixture of emic and e t i c , objective and subjective^is what makes 
network analysis so unsatisfactor;'-. Although I r e a l i s e that ultimately 
v/e are a l l subjective, the major point of using network analysis seems 
to me to be the clear presentation of the processes and \mderstandings 
involved i n interaction, Mitchell considers i n depth the problem of 
meaning i n his l a t e r a r t i c l e (1972) He locates meaning at the leve l 
of expectations - but says that the analyst must move beyond the percep-
tions of the actors0 To the extent that i n order to understand what 
i s to him a new situation he has to be aware of understandings which 
aj?e for the actor unconscious, unless - as i n the methods of ethnometho-
dology they are suddenly questioned, t h i s i s true, (The logic of studying 
a c r i s i s s ituation - which i s becoming increasingly important - i s based 
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upon the same assumptions). Beyond that the idea of moving beyond 
the actor's understanding i s based upon an application of a 'haj:d' 
science paradigm to the s o c i a l sciences, 
Boissevain i n his I968 a r t i c l e was concerned to emphasise that the 
ego-centred approach must supersede that of struc-tural functionalism, 
Garbett has said he can find no way of reconciling the two. The reason 
i s , as Banck has remarked, that one cannot, hj definition be interested 
} 
i n groups as well as networks. I t i s a strategic choice. Groups 
impinge inasmuch as th i s may influence behaviour, but ultimately one's 
focus i s the individual and he provides the reference point. The l e v e l 
of abstraction depends upon -foe problem to be tackled, but once i t i s 
set t l e d upon, i t i s not possible to move outside i t l In fact, the 
network approach should allow the anthropologist to chart his ovm s o c i a l i -
zation into a new cul-ture, and thus the ways i n which he learns about, 
and perceives insti-tutions w i l l enter the studyj but they are learnt 
about from individuals interaction and i t i s this element v/hich i s c r u c i a l 
and which i s dismissed by suddenly sh i f t i n g Levels of abstraction. This 
renders u n i n t e l l i g i b l e most network studies, 
A closely related problem i s a c r i t i c i s m which has been levelled at 
ne-twork analysis i n the past. B a s i c a l l y , i t i s that a field-worker has 
to know the society before he st a r t s irork, 
"Just how the fieldvrorker can discover vrho his informants are to be, 
or which of the situations are to be analysed, without prior knov/-
ledge, i s not e n t i r e l y c l e a r . I t seems that some sort of i n t u i t i v e 
or empathetic knowledge of the context i n which situations a-re 
analysed and ego-oriented, networks are defined i s a prerequisite," 
(Kushner, I969, p,96^ 
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"The fieldwork upon which the analysis i s based i s , of course, 
much deeper and more extensive than mere presence when the 
incidents constituting the situation took place» I t involves 
a detailed knowledge of the ecological and i n s t i t u t i o n a l back-
ground of the participants as well as f a m i l i a r i t y v/ith ths 
"history" of the particpants »c« but the explanation of the 
s p e c i f i c behaviour i n the situation mecessitated his (Bosv/ell) 
tracing out and recordin^j. the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the relevant 
networks of the actors„"^Mitchell, 19699pP=52-3) 
The editing out of the ways i n which the anthropologist learns the back-
ground information as u n f i t for s c i e n t i s t s ^ consumption, i s pointlessr 
and makes the network studies vague and tedious. I f the analyst i s 
placed at the centre of the netvrork and explains how he learns this 
information about a new culture the data i s imderstandable a n ^ f r e a l 
interesto I n effect an anthropologist i s faced ready-made vjith a 
happening - such as the ethnomethodologists attempt to create - or 
c r i s i s as he enters the society. How w i l l he be treated? Hov; w i l l 
he learn to function i n t h i s strange culture? From the answers to 
such questions as these the reader can be given r e a l insight into the 
working of a culture he knov;s nothing about - i t can be translated into 
h i s termso 
\i/hitten i s the only network analyst I have seen to use this method, 
and even he does not present his f i n a l analysis i n these terms. He t e l l s 
how Gloria, h i s f i r s t informant i n Nova Scotia, v/as i n f a c t not accepted 
by the l o c a l inhabitantH', Clearly this i s of i n t e r e s t and relevance 
since her information w i l l be b i a s e d and related to her position i n the 
communityo 
Incidenta l l y , Toffler quotes studies v;hich have found the same phenomenon 
occurring when new families move into new areas. They aj:^ taken up by the 
l o c a l 'integrator', and when they r e a l i s e that she i s not integrated into 
the community herself, they drop her, Toffler remarks that fortunately 
by the time t h i s happens there are usually new a r r i v a l s I 
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Network analysis suffers again here by refusing to accept the esse n t i a l l y 
haphazard nature of anthropological research which i s inevitable, since 
A/ 
each situation, individual and so on i s unique. I t is^substantive rather 
than methodological problemo This f a i l u r e to accept and exploit to the 
f u l l the advantages of netv/ork analysis can be overcome, and i s the 
major problem i n the methods usedo 
To an extent the other problems which I should l i k e to mention follovr 
from thiSo 
"Moreover and d i s t r e s s i n g l y from any point of view, there seems 
to have been an increasing use of 'netvrork' i n a vague, j a r g o n i s t i c 
sense. Students, and others have tended to use i t as a loose 
substitute for the sometimes suspect terms 'structure' and 'system' 
without giving i t substance or significance; indeed as a substitute 
for genuine analy s i s . There i s danger, therefore, that the term, 
may degenerate into another meaningless c l i c h e , " K J u l l i v e r , 1971? 
p , 545-6) 
The studies i n which t h i s seems to have happened are, i n fact, those 
which I suspect Gu l l i v e r vrould see as l e a s t vague. Network has been 
used i n a constructive way by v/riters such as Bott, P, Mayer, SoC, Mayer, 
and Whitten without having to be r i g i d l y described v/ithin the dictates 
of 'hard' science paradigm. The f l e x i b i l i t y of the concept i s ^ a f t e r 
a l l , what distinguishes i t from ideas of system aid structure- I f this 
i s removed, jargon i s a l l that i s l e f t . 
The problems of tedious presentation which I have mentioned also derive 
from t h i s type of approach, 
"There seem to be tendencies today to assume that networks 
can be analysed and c l a s s i f i e d vfithout refer'ence to the cultural 
significance attached to people's own e x p l i c i t or i m p l i c i t notions 
of t h e i r s o c i a l c a p i t a l " , (v/hitten, 1970, p,272^ 
Meaning i s removed as being too 'subjective' a concept. 
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Overall, these disadvantages can be overcome, and then network analysis 
w i l l come into i t s o\m - as an important methodologjr v;ithin the new 
paradigm which I s h a l l outline, VJhat i s required i s not an attempt 
tltTreconciliation between the old and the new, but an enthusiastic 
exploitation of the new to the f u l l , bearing i n mind that that approach 
w i l l eventually be superceded i n i t s turn. As Kuhn has said, those 
who cannot adapt to new paradigms simply get l e f t behind. This has 
happened already to netvrork analysis, unnecessarily so. We must avoid 
becoming semi-scholars, 
"My characters are Hemi-scholars i n that they have each taken 
possession of a certain group of f a c t s , they have a theory and 
they command a s c i e n t i f i c method, or a number of such methods, 
but that they apply these beyond normal l i m i t s " Ho one 
has dreamed to treating them as though they were mad. 
The reason i s that men of science have neglected to c l a s s i f y a s 
a madness that deviation of the mind which consists i n applj'^ing 
a method without moderation, without any intervention on the part 
of what i s called mental control. The absence of this faculty 
of checking each assertion and each step forward i s what differen-
t i a t e s the semi-scholar from the true scholar. 
The l a t t e r sees a method as no more than an imperfect tool, t h o u ^ 
a perfectible one. The semi-scholar attributes to i t the absolute 
and definite value of a magical key. Consequently, he applies i t 
unhesitatingly to the entire range of facts f a l l i n g into v/ithin 
h i s f i e l d of v i s i o n , and without c l a s s i f y i n g these facts according 
to t h e i r order of importance,"(Van Gennep^l9679pp» xxi - x x i i } 
I n order to avoid t h i s , i t i s e s s e n t i a l that the network method be 
u t i l i s e d within the frajnework of the new paradigmj I have outlined. 
I t i s apparent that the objections to the method stem, ultimately, from 
a f a i l u r e to adopt this paradigm. 
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VI SOCIAL THEORIES AED SOCIAL FORMS 
Since perception i s altered by experience, i t follovra that experience 
of shared s o c i a l forms i s l i k e l y to r e s u l t i n similar perceptions. As 
a l l the netvrork analysts I have cited come from Western Europe or 
North America i t i s reasonable to assume that they sh?re common experi-
ences v/hich influence them i n their choice of netvrork analysis as a 
methodo 
"Social theory, then, changes i n at leas t tvro vrays and for tvro 
reasons. F i r s t i t changes through 'internal' technical develop-
ment and elaboration, i n conformity with such d i s t i n c t i v e rules 
of relevance and decision-making as i t may have. Second, so c i a l 
theory may also change as ^  consequence of change i n the i n f r a -
structure i n which i t i s anchored; that i s , as a consequence of 
changes i n the s o c i a l and cul t u r a l structure as these ajre mediated 
by changing sentiments, domain assumptions, and personal r e a l i t y 
of the theorist and those around him," (Gouldner, 1971, p..397^ 
The acceptance of a part i c u l a r s o c i a l theory at a certain time also 
r e s t s upon a s i m i l a r i t y of perceptions shared by the innovator and his 
colleagues. The context of j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s as important as the context 
of discovery. Theories can get out of phase, as i t v/ere, and not be 
accepted for some time ( i f ever)„ Husserl, for instance, seems to be 
more i n tune with our ovm background assumptions and infrastr-acture 
than he wa.s i-zith those of his ovm contemporarieso Kuhn has rena^rked 
that i t frequently happens that new ideas may be introduced into a d i s c i -
pline by a r e l a t i v e outsider. This i s understandable since he has not 
yet been immersed i n the domain assumptions of the d i s c i p l i n e a-nd can 
see t o t a l l y new problems and solutions, (Leach was such a person i n 
anthropology which he entered from engineering). 
However, the complexities inherent i n the f a c t that "the s o c i a l system 
i s not something given i n experience, but i s rather an i n t e l l e c t u a l 
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construct or model", (Beattie i n Manners and Kaplan 1968,pl2l) and 
i s created by actors' and tbsezvers' perceptions means that r e a l i t y 
and s o c i a l theoiry are l i k e l y to be similar i n many ways. 
The s o c i a l sj^stem v/hich led to the r i s e of f-unctionalism has been 
described by Gouldner (l97l) and others, Maquet has related coloni-
alism and a conservative f u n c t i o n a l i s t anthropology. 
"Although many exceptions could certainly be pointed out, 
i t seems not unfair to say that during the colonial period, most 
anthropological studies v;ere - unwillingly and unconsciously 
i n many cases - conservative? f i r s t i n that Africans vjere 
described as so different from ' c i v i l i s e d ' peoples and so 
'savage' j u s t at the time that Europe needed to j u s t i f y 
colonial expansions; and second, i n that l a t e r on, the value 
of the t r a d i t i o n a l cultures was magnified when i t v/as useful for 
the colonial pov/ers to a l l y themselves v/ith the more traditionaJ 
forces against the progressive Africans, He do not believe that 
these p a r a l l e l s are mere ccdicidences,"^Maquet, 1 9 6 4 i i P o 5 0 ) 
As Gouldner says; 
"every theory i s thus a t a c i t theoiry of p o l i t i c s " , 
as well as a personal theory. 
"inevitably expressing, coping and infused with the personal 
experience of the individuals who author i t . Every s o c i a l 
theory has both p o l i t i c a l and personal relevance, which, 
according to the technical canons of s o c i a l theory, i t i s not 
supposed to have, Conseqiiently, both the man and his p o l i t i c s 
are commonly screened out i n what i s deemed the proper presen-
tation of presumably 'automomous' s o c i a l theory"(l9719 ? < ' 4 0 ^ 
I t i s i n f a c t easier to disentangle the relationship betv;een s o c i a l 
theory and s o c i a l structure at a temporal distance, but there seem to 
be some cl e a r relationships at present. 
Taking urban, V/estem society as the milieu of the majority of network 
analysts we can understand how th e i r particular insights are related 
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to the society they inhabit, by considering some popular conceptions 
of the nature of modem society, 
'Modular Man' 
Louis Wirth noted the fragmented nature of urban relationships, 
" C h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y urbanites meet one another i n highly segmental 
roles ,,," he v/rote, " t h e i r dependence upon others i s confined to a 
highly f r a c t i o n a l i s e d aspect of the other's round of a c t i v i t y , " Rather 
than becoming deeply involved v/ith the t o t a l personality of every indivi-
dual we meet, he explained, we necessarily maintain v:e are interested 
only i n the e f f i c i e n c y of the shoe salesman i n meeting our needs 5 we 
couldn't care less that h i s v/ife i s an alcoholic, 
li/hat t h i s means i s that v;e form limited involvement relationships vdth 
most of the people around us. Consciously or not, we defin.e OUT r e l a -
tionships with most people i n functional terms so long as v/e do not 
become involved with the shoe salesman's problems at home, or his 
more general hopes, dreams and f r ^ j ^ r a t i o n s , he i s , for us, f u l l y 
interchangeable with any other salesman of equal competence. In effect, 
we have applied the modular principle to human relationships, VJe have 
created the disposable person - Modular Man, 
"Rather than entangling ourselves with the whole man, v;e plug into 
a module of his personality. Each personality can be imagined as 
a unique configuration of thousands of such modules,"(Toffler, 
1970,'pPo87-8) 
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I t would seem that we are already used to coping vxith ideas of p a r t i a l 
networks and multiplex or uniplex relationships i n our ovm society. 
I t i s not surprising that ideas such as role and netvjork have 
come to prominence i n t i i s s o c i a l situation. The s o c i a l structure vxe 
have created i n interaction provides the model for such soci a l theories. 
The concept of role i s a,lready being displaced both i n theorjr ajid ou_r 
own society. I n theory i t i s nov; seen as a formalised aspect of j j i t e r -
r elationships or i s not mettioned at a l l . The idea of 'role-taking' 
i s predominant. I n society s i m i l a r l y , the role of, for instance, a 
woman i s now greatly questioned. I t has become possible for people to 
act out rol e s without being committed to them, and to r e j e c t many of 
the t r a d i t i o n a l trappings of a part i c u l a r roleo 
I t seems we are continually forced to te s t our own assumptions, and 
that as we do so, we question those of other societies and cultures. 
Many a r t forms now challenge our 'recipe-knowledge' of r e a l i t y , 
"2- Change and Choice 
The increased transience and impermanence of a l l aspects of l i f e , vrhich 
network analysis i s p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned to discuss, has emphasised 
r e l a t i v i t y , ^mckminster F u l l e r has said that "those who have l i v e d i n 
New York since the beginning of the century have l i t e r a l l y experienced 
l i v i n g v;ith Einsteinian R e l a t i v i t y , " This has made i t essential that 
experience i s judged only i n i t s ovm terms. The alternative i s to i n v a l i -
date the .experience of most people arovmd oneself. 
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"Change, roaring through society, widens the ga.p between what 
we believe, and what r e a l l y i s , bet>;een the existing images and 
the r e a l i t y they are supposed to r e f l e c t , V/hen this gap i s only 
moderate we can cope more or l e s s r a t i o n a l l y i ^ i t h change, we can 
react sanely to new conditions, we have a grip on r e i - l i t y , \Ihen 
t h i s gap grows too wide, hovrever, we find ourselves increasingly 
unable to cope, we respond inappropriately, we become ineffectual 
withdraw, or simply panic. At the f i n a l extreme we suffer psychosis -
or even death, "(^Toffler, 1971? {^.159-6o) 
The present concern i n the s o c i a l sciences v;ith the nature of r e a l i t y , 
and the sudden r e a l i s a t i o n that r e a l i t y i s created t h r o u ^ interaction 
can thus be explained, ¥e experience t h i s ourselves. I t i s no longer 
possible to assume that the signs and sjrmbols v;hich were accepted y e s t e r -
day have the same meaning today. I t i s observable that they are frequently 
renegotiated and established. The vexed question of men's hair length i s 
a case i n point. I t i s no longer possible to assume that long hair i s 
associated with a p a r t i c u l a r l i f e - s t y l e . Short h a i r i s equally fashionable 
and f a r more indicators have to be used before i t i s possible to type a 
person, A more f l e x i b l e system of s i g n a l l i n g exists and i s not so 
amenable to quick judgements by outsiders. I t i s possible to mix elements 
from different l i f e - s t y l e s , and the whole idea of being able to make assump-
tions on the basis of appearance has become a matter for negotiation 
between actors, 
¥e also create and control our own images, which we wish to project. The 
important elements i n societjr have become life-styles(v/-hich f i t in. with 
an ideology of equal opportunitjr), In a r e a l way, these are created by 
individuals rather than being the impositions of a hard extsmal realiti"-, 
as c l a s s was. 
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"Thus today i t i s not so much one's class base as- one's t i e s 
with a sub-cult that determine the individual's style of l i f e . 
The working class hippie and the hippie who dropped out of Eton 
share a common l i f e s t y l e but no common class,"(Toffler, 1970s p27l} 
The knowledge of what xjonstitutes a part of a particular l i f e style 
i s picked up by i n t u i t i o n . I t i s impossible to describe many l i f e -
s t y l e s since they change so quickly that by the time i t i s v/ritten do'.-m 
the whole description i s i r r e l e v a n t . This i s the problem v/ith books 
about skinheads, suedeheads, rockers, etc, etc^A^hich have proliferated 
recently. 
The fears of the past - that vre were racing tovrards cultural homogeneity 
are proving unfounded. The abundance of sub-cults vrhich f l o u r i s h a l l 
over the Western world disproves this f i n a l l y , 
T o f f l e r has argued that choosing a sub-cult gives respite from the 
problems oj' over-choice which v/e a l l face. Again, the fact that v/e 
do have to cope v;ith more choice today than was the case i n the past 
i s r e f l e c t e d i n the importance given to the individual's manipulation 
of situations which i s an ess e n t i a l part of the nev; paradigm. 
"What they Qub-cults]} offer i s not simply a skin shov;, or a 
new soap, or detergent, they offer not a product but a super-
product. I t i s true they hold out the promise of human vrarmth, 
companionship, respect, a sense of community, But so do the 
advertisers of deodorant, and beer. The 'miracle ingredient' the 
exclusive component, the one thing the sub-cults offer that other 
hawkers cannot, i s a respite from the s t r a i n of over-choice. They 
offer not a single product or idea, but a way of organising a l l 
products ^nd ideas, not a, single commodity but a, v;hole s t y l e , a, 
set of guidelines that help the individual reduce the 
.increasing compexity of choice to manageable proportions," 
(1970, P o 2 7 5 ^ 
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The i n t e r e s t i n languages, such as Welsh and I r i s h , which have been 
declining i n importance but are now undergoing a resurgence i s an 
aspect of t h i s . Black Power and other movements provide further 
examples, 
I n anthropology, there has recently been an increasing interest i n 
e t h n i c i t y . The emphasis has been p a r t i c u l a r l y upon hov; a particiilar 
ethnic status can be linked with a p a r t i c u l a r ecological or p o l i t i c a l 
niche, Th^s again i s to be explained i n terms of the experience of 
anthropologists i n t h e i r ovm society, as well as that which they are 
studying. 
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n with a p a r t i c u l a r l i f e s t y l e i s now the "super-decision^* 
which each person has to take. The decision i s made i n teims of the 
r e l a t i v e advantages which accrue to the individual from membership of 
p a r t i c u l a r groups. The process of decision making and choice i s , there-
fore, of p a r t i c u l a r relevance to us nov;. Areas of study - such as 
operational research - have grown up s p e c i f i c a l l y devoted to s o c i a l 
choice, 
"The more s o c i a l l y accepted l i f e - s t y l e models put forth by the 
society, the closer that society approaches a condition i n 
which, i n f a c t , each man does his ovm unique, thing,"(Toffler, 
1970, p,282) 
In order to cope with this d i v e r s i t y i t i s essential that society becomes 
more tolerant, and aware. There i s an increasing interest i n anthro-
pology - for instance, 'O'-and 'A'-level courses for schools are being 
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devised, as the need to understand cultures or sub-cultures different 
from our own becomes more pressing. 
Alienation produced a pa r t i c u l a r tj^pe of s o c i a l sciences 
",,, sociology emerged as a 'natural' science when certain domain 
a-ssumptions and sentiments became prevalent; when men f e l t alienated 
from a society that they thought they had made but could not control, 
Wieveas European men had once expressed their estrangement from, 
themselves i n terms of tra d i t i o n a l r e l i g i o n and metaphysica, they 
now began to do so through academic s o c i a l science, and scientism 
became, i n t h i s way, a modem substitute for a decaying, traditional 
r e l i g i o n . 
The concepts of societj'- and culture, vfhich are at the very founda-
tion of the academic s o c i a l sciences, are i n part based upon a 
reaction to an h i s t o r i c a l defeat; Man's f a i l u r e to possess the 
s o c i a l wor^^d that he created. To that extent, the academic social 
sciences are the s o c i a l sciences of an alienated age ajid alienated 
man. Prom t h i s standpoint the p o s s i b i l i t y of 'objectivity', bp: 
the s o c i a l sciences has a rather different meaning from that conven-
t i o n a l l y assigned. The 'objectivity' of the s o c i a l sciences i s 
not the expression of a detached and dispassionate vievj of the 
s o c i a l world; i t i s rather, an ambivalent effort to accommodate 
to alienation and to express mutual resentment djf i t , " (^Gouldner, 
1971, P o 5 3 o ) 
"The ' r e a l i t y ' offered i s said to be an unseen but underlj^ing 
condition, the 'r e a l ' basis of surface chatter. The 'reality'"' i s 
a substitute for c e r t a i n i t i e s eroded bj'' time and circum-^tsnce. The 
fading of a common framevrork of assumptions about hoviio should l i v e 
and what we should pursue has been described by maxry commerftators 
on the appearance of modem in d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y , " ^ r r i s ^ l 9 7 1 9 Po20) 
The invalidation of individuals vfho question the p o l i t i c a l order i n 
terms such an Harris describes, i s a continuing process. Under the 
new paradigm, hov/ever, realitj'" becomes at once both more and le s s 
accessible. Ultimately a l l we know i s derived from our ovm or someone 
else's perceptions - and we have, therefore, to accept at face value 
what people say they experience. Debunking theories are on the v;ay out, 
and with them behaviourism. 
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"This simplified doctrine of the conditioned r e f l e x does every-
thing i t can to annihilate i t s enemies ,,, for the theory accor-
ding to which man i s only the creation of h i s environment i s 
comfortable for eyexyone - the c i t i z e n who has been 'equalised' 
i n t h i s way i s welcome both to American capitalism which hfepes 
for a c i t i z e n without surprises ,,„ i f ,,, one observes the mental 
and emotional resistance wi^ich the behaviourists have for everything 
that i s not conditioned reflex, one finds, I think, i n the back-
ground the ideology of a l l the current p o l i t i c a l doctrines ,,, 
Any man who wishes to manage the big masses automatically adheres 
,to the equalising doctrine of the a l l powerful conditioned r e f l e x , " 
ijjorenz^ Jxme 1970^ 1'Express,^ 
3. I n s t i t u t i o n a l Collapse and Innovation 
As idepS of objectivity, and v;hole value systems are questioned, there 
are reactions throughout society. 
"In such conditions (when old assumptions become not merely invalid 
but meaningless) of malaise, then, morality, r e l i g i o n and philosophy 
become matters of doubt. P o l i t i c s r e f l e c t s the confusion of men's 
directiono Sense and nonsense become d i f f i c u l t to distinguish, the 
catalogue i s jumbled. Confusion prompts^ men to seek new guides, to 
examine the old, and i n the process of examining past b e l i e f s they 
become aware of the s o c i a l and personal roots of their b e l i e f s , the 
h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i v i t y of opinion and knov/ledge, the existence of, 
'ideologies' i n v/hat had fomerly been commonsense or ' r e a l i t y ' , 
The most closely integrated into the old ideology are the l e a s t 
s e l f aware, the l e a s t able to see the ideology as a r e l a t i v e response 
to a pa r t i c u l a r range of problems, VJeber remarks that major innova-
tions i n existing b e l i e f systems tend to ar i s e not i n the major 
centres of a c u l t u r a l system, but on i t s peripherj--, for 'the possibi-
l i t y of questioning the meaning of the world, presupposes the capacity 
to be astonished about the covirse of events'" (1952 p=206)(Harris, 
1971, p.21) 
Innovators i n s o c i a l forms are also to be seen as external to the so c i a l 
system i n some way. A r t i s t s have alvrays been recognised to be majrginal 
men. Entrepreneurs have been since studied as such, A degree of detach-
ment and lack of integration i s essential for the ofevelopraent of creativity'-. 
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The demise of the old reifica.tion of s o c i a l structure also relates 
d i r e c t l y to changes i n our ovm s o c i a l environment; 
"The h i s t o r i c a l and empirical application of the sociology of 
knowledge must take special note of the s o c i a l circumstances 
that favour d e - r e i f i c a t i o n - such as the overall collapse of 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l orders, the contact betvreen previously segregated 
.societies, and the important phenomenon of s o c i a l marginality," 
(jjuckman and Berger^ 19675Pl09^ 
I t would seem that these are the circumstances v/hich axe bringing about^ 
(and are brought about by ?) the emphasis upon the individual. 
S i m i l a r l y , G, Homan|^ says that elementary s o c i a l behaviour appea.rs 
when i n s t i t u t i o n s have broken dovm, or i n the ga-ps l e f t betvjeen i n s t i -
tutions. I t also 'clings to i n s t i t u t i o n s as to a t r e l l i s ' , 
" I n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n makes more complex the chains of transactions 
between men but i t achieves i t at the prices of simplifying one 
l i n k . Elementary s o c i a l behaviour may compensate for this simpli-
f i c a t i o n , "(196I, p,204) 
I t i s p r e c i s e l y i n situations i n which i n s t i t u t i o n s have supposedly 
collapsed or i n those areas of s o c i a l l i f e that remain outside p a r t i -
cular i n s t i t u t i o r ^ , that netvrork analysis has demarcated i t s s p e c i f i c 
spheres of i n t e r e s t and competency, 
Mary Douglas has related socia.1 and s^inbolic orders, and i n her terras 
we seem to be going through a stage of effervescence, (l970^p,74) 
-a* 
" R e i f i c a t i o n can be described as an extreme step i n the process of 
objectivation, vjhereb^ the objectivated vrorld loses i t s comprehensi-
b i l i t y as a hujnan enterprise and becomes fixated as a non-hum-an, 
non-h-umanisable i n e r t f a c t i v i t y , " Q/Uckman and B e r g e r ^ l 9 6 7 , p , 1 0 6 ^ 
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l o lack of a r t i c u l a t i o n i n s o c i a l 
structure, weak control on indivi-
duals by s o c i a l grid and group 
2 o L i t t l e d i s t i n c t i o f i recognised 
between interpersonal and public 
patteims of relations 
3. Society nc^differentiated from 
s e l f 
Diffuse symbols 
2 , Preference for spontaneous 
expression, no i n t e r e s t in 
r i t u a l differentiation; no 
interest i n symbolic expres-
sions of inside/outside, 
5, Control of consciousness 
not exalted. 
The evidence of t h i s ^ all around us. Hallucinogens are of enormous 
popularity and there e x i s t s a "cult of Informality" ( as Leach^l965^ 
has c a l l e d i t ) . The individual's position as the only tangible j j i a l l 
t h i s f l u x means that understanding has to be centred upon him to have 
any permanence, 
Pocock has described the cargo cult situation i n terms v±iich make 
i t appear remarkably similar to that existing for us nov/, 
"In Cassirer's terms, the balance between conservation and inno-
vation v/as destroyed i n favour of the l a t t e r . The s o c i a l forms 
of communication appear inadquate. The society i s as near atomi-
zation into i t s component individual's as i t could be. The l a s t 
resort i s a new s t r e s s upon the individual as that society concretes 
i t , an emphasis upon history, upon individual possession by s p i r i t s , 
upon the individual inspired leader,"(Pocockjl96l, p , 1 1 2 ^ 
The importance accorded to sub-cult leaders at present i s an example 
of such a need for charismatic individuals. In the pop v/orld this i s 
most obvious - the Beatles have long been superseded b; stars such as 
Marc Bolan and David Bowie who experience an j,stonishingly short period 
of enormous popularity, and are at the centre of a very definite sub-
c u l t for that period. In other parts of s o c i a l l i f e t his f r e n e t i c 
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element ^Iso appears. Gurus come and go, Previn and others i n music 
• find i t d e r i g e u r to copy the pop mode and c a l l concerts 'gigs'. Actors 
emerge as p o l i t i c i a n s , Writers such McLuhan, Marcuse, Buckley a.nd Leary 
become cu l t heroes. The whole emphasis i s upon the hero - the i n d i v i -
dual. I t matters l e s s and l e s s what he does, as long as he provides 
a figure to indentify with, 
A s i m i l a r analogy to that of the cargo c u l t has been dravm by Leach, 
who said that although the Millennium i s not at hand, the Reformation 
i s well under v/ay, 
-4-. Subjectivism 
I n so f a r as i t seems that 'objectivity' i s unlikely to continue to 
influence the s o c i a l sciences or any other area of i n t e l l e c t u a l study, 
i t would seem that we gre becoming l e s s alienated from our s o c i a l system. 
The flowering of a c t i v i s t and protest groups everywhere bears v/itness 
to the increasing b e l i e f i n the individual's efficacy i n changing his 
own l i f e and influencing areas v/hich had previously seemed out of his 
hands. This again i s expressed i n new s o c i a l theories, and must a l t e r 
the whole f a b r i c of society, lie seem to have passed through the passive 
phenomenon of the beat generation, 
"The beatnik i s neither reactionary or revolutionarj'-j he i s 
simply the anarchist i n waiting, existing societj'- i s a sham, 
a 'shuck', h i s reaction to i t i s a kind of passive resistance, • 
He 'opts out', he :^.ys i t cool, he disaffiliates,"/Pov-/ell, I9675 
p,366) 
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Powell, i n describing the s o c i a l circumstajices which gave r i s e to 
the 'beat' generation refers to Mannheim, In his terms, both ideo-
logies - r a t i o n a l i s i n g and conservative - and Utopias - revolutionarj'-
ideas - have vanished leaving a situation of anomie, 
"Mannheim c l e a r l y foresaw the consequences of such a condition -
a dehumanisation of the a r t s , an emergence of a 'ma.tter of f a c t -
ness' i n a l l spheres of c u l t u r a l l i f e , an ethic of 'genuineness' 
and 'frankness' replacing more heroic ideals. Deprived of mean-
ingful participation i n the s o c i a l system, the mind or''^elf loses 
i t s structure and direction, sinking into a kind of torpor which 
requires even more violent stimulation toaj?ouse i t . Reason i t s e l f 
i s held i n abeyance and the pursuit of long=range goals i s aban-
doned" for the pleasures - and the anguish - of the moment," 
(1967, P=366) 
The s i m i l a r i t i e s between the 1920's, 1950's and the 1970's are remar-
kable. In the 1920's "The subjective and interpersonal took precedence 
over the i n s t i t u t i o n a l ^ a modd reflected not only i n the ajrts but i n the 
great growth of psychiatry and pschoanalysis," (1967^p.56^"") 
Subj e c t i v i t y seems to be i n vogue again today, Gouldner i n s i s t s upon 
a r e f l e x i v e sociology and many other vrriters are ti'ming av.^y from the 
concept of o b j e c t i v i t y , 
T o f f l e r sees t h i s as a sign of weakness; 
"The assertion that the vrorld has 'gone crazy'; the g r a f f i t i slogans 
that ' r e a l i t y i s the crutch', the interest i n hallucinogenic drugs, 
the enthusiasm for astrology and the occult, the search for truth i n 
sensation, ecstasy and 'peak experience', the sv;ing to'.-.'ard extreme 
subjectivism, the attacks on science, the snov/balling b e l i e f that 
reason has f a i l e d man, r e f l e c t the everyday experience of masses of 
ordinary people who find the^^ can no longer cope ra t i o n a l l y vdth 
change,"(Toffler^19705 p,525) 
At present there i s a reversion to the pop music and fashions of the 
50's. I t remains to be seen i f t h i s i s a part of a s h i f t back i n 
other spheres as v e i l . 
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The swing tovrard s u b j e c t i v i s m ' v;hich T o f f l e r describes i s apjarent 
m many aspects of s o c i e t y today. 
I n the a r t s and philosophy s u b j e c t i v i t y i s a major element i n many 
movements a t present. E x i s t e n t i a l i s m u l t i m a t e l y gives pride of place 
t o s u b j e c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the world. The Theatre of the Absxird 
also denigrates s o c i e t y and presents the i n d i v i d u a l aad h i s understandings 
as the only comprehensible elements around us. The v/ork of Samuel Bec'zett 
also expresses a l i e n a t i o n from a wider s o c i e t y . 
On J u l y 7th9 One P a i r of Eyes (on BBC 2) gave Tom Stoppard a chajice to 
a i r h i s views. He i s obsessed w i t h the idea t h a t we can knov; nothing 
w i t h any c e r t a i n t y , l^ /hen he i n v e s t i g a t e d the weights and measures o f f i c e 
i t seemed t h a t he was r i g h t - i t i s not even possible t o have a length 
which i s q u i t e d e f i n i t e l j ' - a metrej there i s alvrays -uncertainity. A.J. 
Ayer was quoted as saying t h a t there i s u l t i m a t e l y the p o s s i b i l i t y t o 
be considered t h a t we can knov; n o t h i n g a t a J l . Stoppard dismissed 
t h e o r i e s of biochemical f a c t o r s as u n d e r l y i n g the c r e a t i v e process by 
For instance some recent book reviews r e i t e r a t e the f a c t t h a t p o s i t i v i s m 
^ has been r e j e c t e d and a swing towards s u b j e c t i v i t y has begun; 
" I share w i t h him (David HolbrookJ a dismay a t the i n s i d i o u s d i f f u s i o n 
of inhumane a t t i t u d e s of d e n i a l , hate and perversion at a l l l e v e l s of 
our c u l t u r e . 
Holbrook sees t h i s process as being accelerated by our r e f l e x veneration 
f o r o b j e c t i v e science and technology v.iiicjs i s then applied to inward humaji 
experience which i t i s p o s i t i v e l y iinequipped t o understand. The r e s u l t 
has been a v i o l a t i o n of i n t e g r i t y , an i n v e r s i o n of values and a v i t i a t i n g 
r e l a t i v i s m which has invaded every aspect of our cvltvxe.! beings."(jleview 
of 'Sex and Dehumanisation' and the 'Masks of Hate' Gabriel Pears on, Gug^dian, 
June 22nd-, 1972^ 
"The k i n d of psychologj'- which Mr. Hudson now advocates i s one, as he says, ijn 
which the contents of the mind matter. To put i t crudely, such a psychology 
i s c l e a r l y a n t i - b e h a v i o u r i s t s i t i s l i k e l y also to avoid t h a t attempt to 
appear s c i e n t i f i c v/hich characterised the earljr days of experimental psycho-
logy- i n Cambridge ^nd l a t e r , i n Oxford." Ma.r;r Vamock. Review of "the Cult 
of the Fact".(Liam Hudson^ The L i s t e n e r , <th July, 1972 0 
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saying t h a t the l i k e l i h o o d of such a chain of reactions - from amino-
acids t o OTiting - vras so small t h a t , i n h i s vievj, the odds were shorter 
on godo 
I n t e r e s t i n body language (vjhich i s expected to occur i f i t has not 
already, t o judge the sudden appearance of several paperbacks on 
the s i i b j e c t ) i s a p a r t of the same tren d . I t involves a r e j e c t i o n of 
language and w i t h i t reason. Today ( J u l y Sth, 1972) i n the Times appears 
the f o l l o w i n g ? 
"Great excitement a t the I n s t i t u t e of Conv.emporary Arts over a 
new programme, "The Body as a Medium of Expression" <, o c 'One 
of the suppositions t h a t we've working on i s tha,t our society 
has developed langugae too much. We vrould say tha-t language i s 
only one way of communicating; t h a t v e r b a l c u l t u r e i s p a r t of 
the o v e r - s p e c i a l i s a t i o n of i n d u s t r i a l man', says Jonothan B e n t h a l l , 
the iCA's c o n t r o l l e r and moving s p i r i t behind the e n t e r p r i s e f 
'our emphasis on language - logo c e n t r i c i t j r as Derrida c a l l e d i t -
means t h a t we have neglected, and repressed, the expressive resources 
of the body,,"-
One of the p a r t s of the e x h i b i t i o n , which includes d i s t o r t i o n s of the 
body, body p a i n t i n g , t a t o o i n g , tricholog;'-, cosmetic p l a s t i c surgery, 
padded underwear, f a l s e t e e t h and a h a l l of m i r r o r s - i s an orchestra, 
p l a y i n g s i l e n t l y to emphasise the movement of the playerso 
P a r a d o x i c a l l y , o b j e c t i v e ( i n the teims of the 'hard science' pajradigm) 
science when a p p l i e d t o s o c i a l l i f e e liminates meanings i n the same v;ay 
t h a t watching an orchestra play s i l e n t l y eliminates meaning i n the a r t s , 
I have used Roger Poole's book 'Toward Deep S u b j e c t i v i t y ' extensively 
i n my t h e s i s and t o i l l t i s t r a t e hov/ v/idespread t h i s s u b j e c t i v e trend i s 
I vrould l i k e to quote from George Steiner's reviev/ of the book i n the 
Sunday Timess 
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" I f he i s not c a r e f u l , Dr, Poole will find'•himself the obj e c t 
of a c u l t among the j'^oung and the subterranean» His awkv/ardly-
e n t i t l e d essay f a l l s squarely i n t o t"-^ e c;irrent movement of a n t i -
r a t i o n a l i s m , inter-persona^l encounters, RoDo Laing and 'Soul'„ 
"Time i s growing s h o r t " and the world v ; i l l destroy i t s e l f i f i t 
does not abandon the lunacies of so-caled l o g i c , of competitive 
power r e l a t i o n s and u n b r i d l e d science. The choice i s not h i n g 
less than t h a t between the ' l i f e - w o r l d ' of complete e t h i c a l 
values, of genuine contact between human perceptions on the one 
hand, and the d e s t r u c t i v e f o l l i e s of v;ar and technological auto-
matism on the other". 
Boissevain has suggested t h a t oiir s o c i a l t heories are based on a v i s i o n 
of what s o c i e t y should be l i k e , r a t h e r than v;hat i t i s l i k e , 
" B i a n c i p a t i o n , r e v o l u t i o n and the questioning of the r i g h t of 
those who w i e l d e stablished power to exact obedience are themes 
which are dominant i n the s o c i e t i e s i n v/hich neti-rork analysts 
l i v e and work, ¥e must make sure t h a t our t h e o r i s i n g and analysis 
are based on f a c t and not merely v/ishful t h i n k i n g , "(l972^ 
The f a c t seems t o be t h a t we see s o c i e t y as out of c o n t r o l , di-'.e to the 
f a i l i i r e o f our planning methods, and respond w i t h an inward t u r n i n g 
s u b j e c t i v i t y which has already influenced the a r t s , philosophy and s o c i a l 
theory as w e l l as the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s which we c o n t r a c t . 
"One response t o loss o f c o n t r o l , f o r example i s a r e v u l s i o n against 
i n t e l l i g e n c e . Science f i r s t gave maji a sense of masterjr over h i s 
environment, and hence over the f u t u r e . By making the futu.re seem 
malleable, i n s t e a d of i n i m i t a b l e , i t shattered the opiate r e l i g i o n s 
t h a t preached p a s s i v i t y and mysticism, Todaj, moimting evidence 
t h a t s o c i e t y i s out of c o n t r o l , leads t o d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t with science. 
I n consequence, we witness a g a r i s h r e v i v a l of mysticism^ Suddenly 
a s t r o l o g y i s the rage, Zen, yoga, seances, ajid vritchcraJt become 
popular pastimes. Cults form around the search f o r Dionysian e x p e r i -
ence, f o r non-verbal and supposedly non-linear experience, 'Je axe 
t o l d i t i s more important t o ' f e e l ' than t o 'think' as though, there 
were a c o n t r a d i c t i o n between the tvro, E x i s t e n t i a J i s t oracles j o i n 
C a tholic mystics, Jungiaji psychoanalysts, and Hindu gunis i n e x a l -
t i n g the m y s t i c a l and emotional against the s c i e n t i f i c and r a t i o n a l 
This r e v e r s i o n t o p r e - s c i e n t i f i c a t t i t u d e s i s accompanied not s-urpri-
s i n g l y by a tremendous wave o f n o s t a l g i a i n the s o c i e t y , .Antique 
F u r n i t u r e , posters from a bygone era, games based on the remembrajice 
o f l a s t year's t r i v i a , the r e v i v a l o f A r t JTou^ T'eau, the spread of 
Edwardian s t y l e s , the rediscovery of such faded pop-cult c e l e b r i -
t i e s as Humphrey Bogart or V,G, F i e l d s , a l l m i r r o r a psychological 
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l u s t f o r the simpler, less t u r b u l e n t past. Powerfu.l f a d 
m.achines s p r i n g i n t o a c t i o n to c a p i t a l i s e on t h i s hunger. 
The n o s t a l g i a , business becomes a t h r i v i n g i n t e r e s t . " 
( T o f f l e r , 1970, pp.398-9) 
The p o p u l a r i t y of '50's s t y l e music and dress a t present ( J u l y 1972) 
has l e d t o the opening up of cafes such as the Hard Rock and SmallsJ 
a resurgence of i n t e r e s t i n the music of the 50's - E l v i s , Rich Nelson 
and others - i s apparent. 
The increased i n t e r e s t i n anthropology'- i s a p a r t of a sea.rch f o r some 
a l t e r n a t i v e , more peaceful l i f e - s t y l e . I t gains popular expression 
i n the sales of 'ethnic' c l o t h i n g and so on, v;hich are incr e a s i n g 
enormously. I n London i t i s possible to buy clothes made by peasants 
from a l l over the world. I t i s also an expression of a genuine i n t e r e s t 
i n and tolerance of other people which must go w i t h some tjrpes of sub-
j e c t i v i t y . 
"The f a i l u r e of tec h n o c r a t i c planning and the consequent sense 
of l o s t c o n t r o l also feeds the philosophy of 'novi-ness'. Songs 
and advertisements a l l h a i l the appearance of the 'now generation', 
and lea,med p s y c h i a t r i s t s , d i s c o i i r s i n g on the presruned daxigers of 
repression, warn us not t o defer our g r a t i f i c a t i o n s . A c t i n g out 
and a search f o r immediate paj-'-off are encouraged, 'V/e're more 
o r i e n t e d t o the present," sa,ys a teenage g i r l to a r e p o r t e r a f t e r 
the majnmoth Vfoodstock rock f e s t i v a l . ' I t ' s l i k e do v/hat jrou waxit 
to do now ... I f you stay ajiywhere very long you get i n t o a plan-
n i n g t h i n g 0 0 0 So you j u s t move on." Spontaneity'-, the personal 
equivalent o f plajiles^ness, i s elevated i n t o a c a r d i n a l psycholo-
g i c a l v i r t u e . 
A l l t h i s has i t s po l i t i c a l analogy i n -foe emergence of a. strange 
c o a l i t i o n of r i g h t wingers and new l e f t i s t s i n support of what 
can only be termed a 'hang loose' appraoch t o the f u t u r e . Thus, 
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we hear i n seminars c a l l s f o r a n t i - p l a n n i n g or non-planning, 
aometimes eupheraised as 'organic grov/th'. Not only i s i t regr^r-
ded as -unnecessary or unv/ise t o make long-range plans f o r the f u t u r e 
of the i n s t i t u t i o n or s o c i e t y they vash to overturn, i t i s sometimes 
even regarded as poor task t o plan the nex:t hour and a h a l f of 
a meeting. Plajiiess ness i s g l o r i f i e d . " ( T o f f l e r 1970, p.399)-^ "'-
Anthropology and the other s o c i a l sciences are i n e v i t a b l y svrept along 
i n these currents vihich permeate the s o c i e t i e s of B r i t a i n ajid America. 
Conclusions 
Network a n a l y s i s i s a response t o changes, not only i n t^.e socie-
t i e s a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s seek t o analyse, or, i n the theories of s o c i a l 
anthropology, but also i n ovix ovm s o c i a l experience. Aspects of our 
l i v e s v;hich have become problematic - such as the enormous range of 
choice we are faced v/ith i n every sphere, the speed of change, and 
the r e s u l t i n g q u e s t i o r ^ n g o f viev/s of r e a l i t y - become p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n t e r e s t i n g t o us. These problem areas have become the focus of i n t e r -
est of much an t h r o p o l o g i c a l work, and network analysis provides a metho= 
d o l o g i c a l advance i n the study of these nev; problems. 
Again, anthropology i s g a i n i n g adherents as i t provides a reason f o r 
otherwise aimless t r a v e l . Travel i s valued by our society'- f o r i t s ovm 
sake, - i n t h i s we d i f f e r enormously from other societie*; - f o r 
instance, I r e l a n d , v/here a person r e a l l y f e e l s a lack cf r o o t s , and 
s u f f e r s f e e l i n g s of d e p r i v a t i o n , i f he i s not bom ajid brou>jht up 
w i t h i n one comm^^nity-. 
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V I I T E E CONTRTT^Tjino]vT Qp TviET /^.^ ORK A I ' L \ L Y S I S TO S O C I A L AI^ITHROPOLOGY 
VJhen I s t a r t e d work on t h i s t h e s i s - three years ago- I expected t o 
be able t o describe a s p e c i f i c corpus of theorj/- vfhich belonged t o 
network analysis and to judge the concept vrith t h i s broader view in. 
mind. I n f a c t , as I have stressed throughout, there i s no such corpus 
of theory, and so network a j i a l y s i s has to be considered i n f a r more 
general terms, which encompass a c r i t i q u e of the theories to which i t 
has been a l l i e d . Networks only provide a meajis of ordering ar presen-
t i n g data Hovrever, the3'" have had a considerable impact ij). recent years 
i n B r i t i s h s o c i a l anthropologjr, and i t i s necessary to evaluate t h i s , 
A B n p i r i c a l areas 
Network analysis i s seen to have c o n t r i b u t e d to p a r t i c u l a r e m p i r i c a l 
areas of study v.dthin s o c i a l anthropology, 
l o Urban 
The f i r s t area i n which V^e method has been p a r t i c u l a r l y i\se.ful 
i s t h a t of urban, complex s o c i e t i e s , I ha.ve i l l u s t r a t e d hov.f t h i s 
was one of the major f a c t o r s which encoiiraged the develop^-^ent of 
the n o t i o n . The op5.nions of some anthropologists who .have used 
networks i n an urban, context are of i n t e r e s t s 
"The s o c i a l network o r i e n t a t i o n seems to be the most 
productive v/ay of analysing urban s i t u a t i o n s since i t 
enables closer focussing on the more subtle changes i n 
personal r e l a t i o n s h i p s v;hich are perhaps the essence of 
'urbanisation' or indeed of any s o c i a l change,''(Oeser, 1969^ P o j l ^ 
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"By using the concept of s o c i a l network one can analyse 
i n f o r m a l urban s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n a vray which a.dmits 
both the various channels of rec7?uitment t o them and t h e i r 
p o t e n t i a l l y t r a n s i t o r y n a t u r e ^ o s w e l l , 1969? Po255) 
"... one of the major advantages of network analysis i s to 
a b s t r a c t urban m.aterial i n a d i f f e r e n t way, to trace the 
connection betv;een the i n d i v i d u a l and the p a r t i a l , r o t h e r 
than the t o t a l system, while s t i l l u n d e r l i n i n g the importance 
of pressures on i n d i v i d u a l s i n v o l v e d i n c o n f l i c t i n g expec-
t a t i o n s as a r e s u l t of l i v i n g i n toi-m!" (Harries-Jones, I969, Po298^ 
"The i m p l i c a t i o n ( o f networks^ i s t h a t v/hereas i n 'simple' 
s o c i e t i e s much s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n taJces place w i t h i n enduring 
s o c i a l u n i t s t h a t 3.re bounded i n space and time and tend t o 
be based on such considerations as k i n s h i p , residence or r i t u a l 
a c t i v i t i e s , the bulk of i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n 'complex' 
s o c i e t i e s , take place v / i t h i n another s o r t of s o c i a l u n i t , which 
i s transito2?y and f r e e - f l o a t i n g . I t i s through netv;orks and 
f i e l d s , then, t h a t p a t t e r n i n g and struc-ture may be discerned 
i n the otherwise confusing urban vrorld.'^ ( i ^ i s h n e r , 1969? Po95j 
2. Unstructured Si-buations 
Network studies f i r s t came to prominence i n urban s i t u a t i o n s as I 
have shovm, but i n f a c t , t h e i r use i n urban analysis v;as a small 
element i n a f a i ^ wider f i e l d i n ^ich they enabled anthropologists 
t o describe and analyse. As Aronson has s a i d , networks are a p a r t 
of the i n t e r e s t i n u r b a n i s a t i o n , but beyond t h a t they are also 
r e l a t e d t o s " 
i ) concern vnth types of behaviovir which could not be aggre-
gated i n analysis of groups and i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
i i ) a greater a t t e n t i o n to r e l a t i o n s h i p s between i n d i v i d u a l s 
and groups i n one scale u n i t of p o l i t i c a l and economic 
a c t i v i - t y , and those i n another. 
i i i ) a movement tovrards the analysis of choice making, mani-
p u l a t i o n and other elements, and av/ay from ( o r bey-ond) 
s t r u c t u r a l d e s c r i p t i o n . " (l970^p.222^ 
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The method's major c o n t r i b u t i o n seems t o ha.ve been in. enabling 
a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s to work i n area,s of s o c i a l l i f e vrhich a t f i r s t 
present an appearance of chaos„ By concentrating upon micro-
an a l y s i s they have been able t o understand the i n t e r a c t i o n s they 
observed. 
Gutkind - "a network has been suggested as p a r t i c u l a r l y suita.ble 
f o r the analysis of mixed and complex groupings"Q.965^ a)^ p,51^ 
So u t h a l l - " f o r u n s t r u c t u r e d sd.tuations" ^ 96l) 
Ja.y - f o r " s o c i a l systems comm?ising sca.ttered u n i t s which displa.y 
l i t t l e o v e r a l l c o h e s i o n , " ( j 9 6 4 ) 
A,Co Mayer - "an approach of the k i n d I have o u t l i n e d (1966) pre-
sented i t s e l f to me i n the 'complex s i t u a t i o n ' of the Devras e l e c t i o n 
T suggest t h a t the a c t i o n set and quasigroup are concepts which 
apply i n any s i t u a t i o n where no organised groups operate" 
Networks "provide means by which complex and d e t a i l e d data car. be 
presented as c l e a r l y as possible"(Gulliver^1971^Po17^ 
"Netvrork a n a l y s i s solves the problem of talJcing about groups vdthout 
s x d m e t r i c a l l y or c o n s t a n t l y f i x e d boundaries, hui -voids the problem 
of 'occasional groups' v;hich are characterised by extremely r a p i d 
changes of personnel",(Provencher^ 
I n f a c t , the l a s t t\-ro authors were working i n areas of t r a d i t i o n a l 
s o c i e t i e s , v i i i c h would p r e v i o u s l y perhaps have been anal^J-sed i n 
terms of groups. There has r e c e n t l y been a movement to apply 
networks t o such s o c i e t i e s i n the hope of understanding the society 
b e t t e r than t h r o u ^ analysis i n terms of groups, Lamphere ha,s 
suggested t h a t previous anthropologists vrho vrorked on Navajo s o c i a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n were " t r y i n g to .validate a preconceived anthropological 
concept q u i t e d i f f e r ^ e n t from the Navajo i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of s o c i a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s , " (1970, Po4l) This a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l concept i n tha.t 
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of the kin d r e d . G u l l i v e r i s also concerned t o p o i ^ t t o i t s 
inadequacy. 
A l a t e r c o n t r i b u t i o n of ne-ti-fork analysis has, t h e r e f o r e , been 
t o e x p l a i n i n d i f f e r e n t terms s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s vihich i-fere 
p r e v i o u s l y analysed as c o n t a i n i n g groups of various kinds. The 
method has d i r e c t e d a t t e n t i o n t o the process of c r e a t i n g these 
s o c i a l forms, and t h i s i s an extremely important aspect of much 
present a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l work. 
Gutkind has emphasised t h i s refocussing which occurs through the 
use of networks. 
"Netvrorks are defined i n terms of a c t i o n r a t h e r than formal 
s t r u c t u r e , of change r a t h e r than r e g i l a r i t y or s t a b i l i t y , and 
of achieved r a t h e r than ascribed s o c i a l pos i t i o n s . " ( l 9 6 5 , p i 2 4 / ^ 
I t i s rare t h a t netvrork analysis has been used t o shed l i ^ ^ t upon 
the exact process of c o n s t r u c t i o n , except i n the most gross terms 
of the ant h r o p o l o g i s t ' s perception of recruitment t o sets^but there 
i s a recognisable p o t e n t i a l i n t h i s area. 
"The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the (netvrork] approach f o r the s t t d y of 
class i n A f r i c a n u-rban s o c i e t i e s may not always have been f u l l y 
appreciated. I f the 'ne-tvjork' model i s found adequate to 
represent other\";ise amorphous urban r e l a t i o n s h i p s i t v/ould seem 
t h a t class as a s u b j e c t i v e l y - c o n s t r u c t e d model v / i t h i n the n e t -
vrork i s vforth i n v e s t i g a t i n g . V/hile the class concept could 
then be expected t o vary- from i n d i v i d u a l to i n d i v i d u a l class 
categories might v;ell a r i s e i n terms of consensus betvjeen a 
series of models being operated." (Reader^1964, p 2 i ^ 
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Barnes has s p e c i f i c a l l y placed networks c o n t r i b t i t i o n to s o c i a l 
anthropology as supplying a means t o 'analyse and describe those 
s o c i a l processes i n v o l v i n g l i n k s across, r a t h e r than within, group 
and category l i m i t s ' ( l 9 6 8 ^ p , 1 0 9 ) The studies of migrants made 
us i n g the network concept are a cle a r i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h i s area 
i s indeed one t o v/hich netvrorks can c o n t r i b u t e . 
" o o , I b e l i e v e t h a t the s o c i a l netvrork concept allov/s f o r 
the documenta-tion of hov;, i n p r a c t i c e , the i n d i v i d u a l and 
the group manipulate various r o l e s both simultaneously and 
separately. I n t h i s respect s o c i a l netvrork analj^sis points 
t o the way i n vjhich r o l e performance i s a p a r t o f the operation 
o f a system, or a s e r i e s of systems," ^ u t k i n d ^ I965, ro60^ 
I n t h i s emphasis netvfork analysis supersedes r o l e . 
I n p r o v i d i n g s means o f l i n k i n g the i n d i v i d u a l and h i s i n t e r a c t i o n s 
w i t h the overarching s t r u c t u r e s of modem s o c i e t i e s netvrork analysis 
i s extremely Jjnportanto 
"They ^ a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s ] have sou.ght therefore t o define 
u n i t s of reTea.rch and analysis t h a t l i e somev.fhere betv.i-een 
the l o c a l v i l l a g e and the n a t i o n ,state - u n i t s and e n t i t i e s 
such as networks, qua-si-groups, hinge groups and brokers. 
E n t i t i e s l i k e these, i t i s asserted, may be handled by most 
of the t r a d i t i o n a l a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l techniques, vrhile a t the 
same time they may serve t o i l l u m i n a t e the l i n k s among the 
l o c a l r e g i o n a l and n a t i o n a l l e v e l s of s o c i e t y , " ^Manners and 
Kaplan^ 1 9 7 1 9 p 5 2 O ) 
" I t i s possible to see the i n d i v i d u a l i n society as belonging 
t o many categories and p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n many groups. But t h i s 
t w o - f o l d c l a s s i f i c a t i o n le?ves us without a means of analysis 
o f very important areas of s o c i a l l i f e ,,, To deal v j i t h t h i s 
gap i n a n a l y t i c a l terminologjr, the metaphor s o c i a l netvrork 
has been introduced," ^Frankenberg, i9679 P o l 8 ^ 
Thus, i n most area, the claims of the o r i g i n a l proponents of the 
netvTOrk method t o be a.ble to consider p a r t i c u l a r problems have bean 
met". 
201 
B T h e o r e t i c a l Areas 
Bot t concludes her^Reconsiderations''(l97l) i n these terms; 
"There i s n o t h i n g r e v o l u t i o n a r y about the idea of sociaA ne±-
v/orks. I t i s the s o r t of concept t h a t can be used i n many 
conceptual frames of reference. I t has been used i n conjunction 
vdth t r a d i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r a j / f u n c t i o n a l i s t theory'-, i n the analysis: 
of s o c i e t i e s and groups as open syrstems and i n conjunction vdth 
s i t u a t i o n a l a n a l y s i s , S o c i o l o g i c a l h i s t o r y and the constru.ction 
of generative models. Vihat the concept can do i s to provide a 
s l i g h t enlargement of the conceptual r e p e r t o i r e . Perhaps vxe can 
now see things we might not have looked f o r i n 1954."(l971s P350j 
I t h i n k i t must have become apparent t h a t my major o b j e c t i o n t o the 
network studies t h a t have appeared i s t h a t they are not revolutionary-
enough. The c o n t i n u a l attempts t o 'reconcile' network analysis w i t h 
s t r u c t u r a l d e s c r i p t i o n s of s o c i e t y are, i n f a c t , removing an.y merit t h a t 
the concept may have. M i t c h e l l and others of the'I^Ianchester school' 
have been the most serious offenders i n t h i s vfay. K. Garbett expressly 
set out t o 'resolve the c o n f l i c t betvroen anthropologists focussing on 
i n s t i t u t i o n s and those focussing on ego-centred i n t e r a c t i o n ' (l970^p=227) • 
a task which he found he could not complete. This i s becaiise^ as Kuhn 
has s a i d , we must 'take i t f o r granted t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e s betv/een 
successive paxadigms are both necessary and i r r e c o n c i l a b l e p . (l962^p.l03) 
S c i e n t i s t s who are unable to accept a new paradigm are e i t h e r l e f t behind 
and produce vrork which has no lelevance or meaning v/ i t h i n the nev7 d i s c i -
p l i n e or r e j e c t the science i t s e l f . 
"To r e j e c t one paradigm without simultaneously s u b s t i t u t i n g another 
i s t o r e j e c t science i t s e l f . That act r e f l e c t s not on the paradigm 
but the man. I n e v i t a b l y he will be seen by h i s colleagues as 'the 
carpenter who blajnes h i s tools'."'^Kuhn, 1962, p.78^ 
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U n f o r t u n a t e l y , netvrork ana-lysts vrho attempt to concentrate upon the 
formal d e s c r i p t i o n and q u a n t i f i c a t i o n of the concept are already i n 
such a p o s i t i o n . 
R e c o n c i l i a t i o n betvreen two paradigms i s impossible. The whole world 
view of the s c i e n t i s t i s in v o l v e d i n the change of paradigm and a l t h o u ^ 
i t i s possible to p o i n t out s i m i l a r i t i e s t h i s n e u t r a l i s e s th^.ssets of 
both perspectives-. An emphasis upon and development of the points of 
d i f f e r e n c e i s the only f r u i t f u l course. 
"One perceptive h i s t o r i a n , viewing a c l a s s i c case of a sciences 
r e o r i e n t a t i o n by pa,radigm change, r e c e n t l y described i t as 'pickSn.g 
up the other end of the s t i c k ' , a process t h a t involves- 'handling the same 
bundle o f f a c t s ' as before, but placingthem i n a new system of 
r e l a t i o n s with one another by g i v i n g them a d i f f e r e n t framevrork' ,,, 
S c i e n t i s t s do not see something as something else; instead they 
see i t , " {Juh_n^962, p 8 5 ^ 
This i s t r u e of a l l d i s c i p l i n e s . 
"As Goethe contended, h i s t o r y i s c o n t i n u a l l y revnritten, not so 
much because of the di s c l o s u r e of new documentary evidence, but 
because the chan.ging perspectives of h i s t o r i a n s lead t o nev.r 
s e l e c t i o n s from the data," ( S h i b u t a n i ^ i n Manis &. Meltzerp.^S^J, r„l62j 
"VJhat counts i s the p o i n t of view from which the s c i e n t i s t envisages 
the s o c i a l vrorld,"' (Schxxtz^ in Hranet & Maclntyre^l971, p„108^ 
"The s e l e c t i o n and explanation o f f a c t s (By the s o c i a l sciences^ 
has h e r e t o f o r e proved p r o v i s i o n a l ; i t has to be done over a-ga.in. 
w i t h every change i n the general current of thought. But i s t h i s 
n o t t r u e of a l l science? At the moment the whole t h e o r e t i c a l trunk 
of physics has been t o r n up b") the roots and seems l i k e l j " - to be 
thjcown upon the rubbish p i l e , A l a s t i n g s t r u c t u r e of ^ mowledge i s 
hardlj'- t o be expected, excppt as regardsr the priinarj'- f a c t s and t^-^.eir 
simpler r e l a t i o n s , and t h i s much vro may expect i n s o c i a l science as 
w e l l as s p a t i a l , " ^Cooley^in l^Ianis Meltzer^967, P o 7 8 ^ 
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Such a view of science as p r o v i d i n g i n t e r i m judgements r a t h e r than 
moving systematically- tovrards some absolute t r u t h i s i t s e l f a p a r t of 
the paradigm. I t i s not a vievr shared f o r instance by Gluckman v;ho i s 
a staunch upholder of the o l d paradigm and believes i n s c i e n t i f i c pro-
gress and methods. 
I n s o c i a l anthropology the process o f rean a l y s i s o f o l d data i s v;ell 
under v/ay v ; i t h i n the new paradigm's terms, and i s p r o v i d i n g som.e i n t e r e s -
t i n g new i n s i g h t s . Seddon, f o r instance, has argued t h a t k i n s h i p and 
f r i e n d s h i p are, i n f a c t , both "idims employed by the members of a socie-fcy 
as p r i n c i p l e s of a s s o c i a t i o n or grotxping, an.d which (from the observer's 
p o i n t o f viev;) provide the i n d i v i d u a l v;ith e a s i l y manipulable netvrorks 
of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s t h a t besides t h e i r e f f e c t i v e aspects, may b r i n g 
b e n e f i t s i n terms of access t o scarce or d i s t a n t resources or of insixrance 
i n an u n c e r t a i n ' n a t u r a l ' or s o c i a l environment". 
Kinship i s defined as "a general idiom, based on a concept of b i o l o g i c a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p , which may c l o t h e , or be used t o c l o t h e , a v a r i e t y of s o c i a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s , but which almost always, bears s t r o n g p o s i t i v e a f f e c t i v e 
-.Hi 
overtones." Friendship i s a "general idiom, based on a concept 
of warm i n t e r p e r s o n a l a f f e c t i o n and t r u s t vjhich may clothe or be used 
t o c l o t h e a v a r i e t y of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . " 
Paine and others have discussed f r i e n d s h i p r e c e n % , but before the nev; 
paradigm d i r e c t e d a t t e n t i o n t o such i n f o r m a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s theyr were 
r a r e l y mentioned. I n f a c t , vrhen I was deciding what t o vre-ite my t h e s i s 
on I considered v / r i t i n g on f r i e n d s h i p and vrorked on i t f o r about three 
months. I then r e a l i s e d t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n on the subject was simply got 
present i n most monogr^s as i t has not been a par t of the f a c t u a l realm 
which the o l d a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l paradigm considered. 
204 
Sahlins has discussed descent groups i n the same terms and concluded 
t h a t " i n major t e r r i t o r i a l descent groups, there i s no p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n 
betv/een the descent ideology and group compesition," (1965) Colson has 
r u l e d t h a t "those vrho help one another i n a p a r t i c u l a r fashion are 
r e l a t i v e s , and those who do not help one another are t o be considered 
i m r e l a t e d , " I n t h i s she a l t e r s the vrhole perspective on k i n s h i p , 
Kaberry has also reconsidered the p l a s t i c i t y of Nev.r Guinea, k i n s h i p , 
M r i c has analysed Yugoslav k i n s h i p i n terms of choice and netvrork. 
This a l l represents a fimdamental r e o r i e n t a t i o n v r i t h i n anthropology'-, 
and although i t i s q u i t e possible to argue tha-t anthropologists ha.ve 
always seen k i n s h i p as an idiom of expression of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
t h i s , i n f a c t , glosses over the f a c t t h a t a r e a l change i n paradigm 
has taken place. By rem.oving the extreme elements from both the o l d 
and nevr anthropologies the t e e t h are dravm of both. I t i s f a r more 
courageous, and u l t i m a t e l y f a r more c o n s t r u c t i v e , to be able to dismiss 
the vrark of the o l d paradigm and u t i l i s e t o the f u l l the new, even "hen 
one's past vrork i s thus i n v a l i d a t e d , as George P, Murdock hc.s done i n 
h i s 1971 Huxley Memorial Lec-trure, 
•Events and the r o l e of the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t 
The major r e o r i e n t a t i o n which i s o c c u r r i n g i n the s o c i a l sciences resolves 
around a r e a p p r a i s a l of the r o l e of the observer. One aspect of t h i s i s 
an emphasis upon the u l t i m a t e s u b j e c t i v i t y of experience t o vrhich I have 
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a l l u d e d before. A second aspect of t h i s r e a p p r a i s a l i s an awareness of 
observer's i n f l u e n c e upon the s i - t T u a t i o n he i s observing and a v r i l l i n g -
ness to c a p i t a l i s e upon h i s i n t e r a c t i o n vrith those he observes. Previously-, 
the problems of communication and i n t e r a c t i o n betvieen observer and observed 
have been studiously- Ignored t o the enormous detriment of the s o c i a l 
sciences - p a r t i c u l a r l y anthropologyr as Li^m Hudson points outs 
"Problems of meaning aboimd whenever one person attempts t o 
understand another he does not know i n t i m a t e l y . .And when he 
does know him i n t i m a t e l y they s t i l l abound. For t h e i r r e l a t i o n -
ship w i l l have generated a context of s o c i a l r i t u a l s , jokes, 
t a c i t assumptions, t h a t enable them to negotiate the dangerous 
p a r t i c l e s t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p contains. Consequently-, any agree-
ment they reach may r e f l e c t no more than, the existence of a common 
m i n i - c u l t u r e betv/een them. Problems of meaning thus a f f e c t not 
j u s t Anglo-Saxon communicating v/ith Zimi, middle-clasr commiirilca-
t i n g v/ith the working class. They a r i s e v/henever two people 
attempt to communicate a,bout aspects of t h e i r l i v e s which are other 
than banal. The i n t r i g u i n g aspect of t h i s semantic ci^ uanda,7?y- i s 
not t h a t i t e x i s t s i n the human sciences, but t h a t psychologist 
s o c i o l o g i s t and a n t h r o p o l o g i s t have conspired so successfully to 
ignore i t . 
The extreme case i s t h a t of the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t . Member of an 
economic s o p h i s t i c a t e d s o c i e t y , he goes o f f i n t o bush or jungle 
to appriase a v/ay of l i f e d i s s i m i l a r t o h i s own i n alm.ost every-
p a r t i c u l a r . At best, he has a f o r e i g n e r ' s grasp of the language 
and i s u s u a l l y f o r c e d to communicate through ?nterperters or 
middle men; people marginal t o both the cul-fcures i n question. 
The f r u i t s of t h i s curious i n t e r a c t i o n are then published as objec-
t i v e evidence about the p r i m i t i v e c u l t u r e observed. Discussed 
with exemplary- candour by a t l e a s t one of the subject's foimdlng 
f a t h e r s , ¥ „ H . R . Rivers, such lacunae have since been glossed over 
by a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s preoccupied, l i k e t h e i r neighbours the psy-chn-
l o g i s t s , w i t h t h e i r ov/n emergent -orofessionalism." (i^udson, 1972, 
P 0 I 5 1 ) 
I n network analysis I have already pointed out how Elizabeth Bott (1957) 
recognised and a r t i c u l a t e d the emotional involvement of the i n t e r v i e w e r s 
with the f a m i l i e s they were study-ing. I n doing so, the understandings 
of the interviev/era: were u t i l i s e d i n the stu.dy r a t h e r than su.ppressed. 
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V/hitten (1972) explained the d i f f e r e n c e between negroes i n Nova 
Scotia and Ecuador i n terms of the way in vrhich he vras incorporated 
i n t o the s o c i a l system i n each case. He f i n d s t h a t the cultur-aJ. 
game of exchange i s qu.ite d i f f e r e n t i n the tv.'o s o c i e t i e s , although 
the netvrorks are s t n i c t u r a l l y s i m i l a r (l970a, p,40^ ) , (This f i n d i n g 
demonstrates again t h a t s t r u c t u r a l comparisons of netvrorks are l i k e l y 
t o ignore the most important aspects of s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n ) , 
V/hitten concludes s 
"Data ga,thering through modified genealogical method inevitahlj--
i n v o l v e s the investiga.tor i n a c t i v i t i e s of strategjr and pov.'er 
v r i t h i n the arena i n vn i c h he i s working. The i n v e s t i g a t o r cannot 
d i s r e g a r d h i s s t r a t e g i c sign.ificance i n a s;'-stem and i n s i s t t h a t 
he i s 'merely gat h e r i n g data'," 
Having understood h i s r o l e i n a system, there i s no rea,son v.'hy the f i e l d 
i n v e s t i g a t o r should not characterise the capaci-t;'- of the system t o e x p l o i t 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s . Only by doing a c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n are we l i k e l y t o gain 
the opportu.nity t o l a t e r t e s t our ideas, 
the ethnograhic g a t h e r i n g of data i t s e l f involves a process 
t h a t has s t r a t e g i c s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r actors i n changing s i - t i i a t i o n s . 
Since the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t i s thereby ipso f a c t o anjagent of change, 
he may use h i s r o l e and h i s e f f e c t to generalise Je^-reas of i n t e r e s t 
t h a t include the capacity of systems t o change," (IJhitten, 1970^a$ipPo401-2^ 
The importance of the investiga-tor i s coming t o be recognised b;-- rany 
s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s , 
"As regards the ' f i e l d o f the present' - i , e , the actu a l presence 
of the investigator/a?esearcher a t the pehnomenon/event being s t i i d i e d -
we should e x t r a c t vrhat advantages v.'e can from those vrell I'n.ovm 
s c i e n t i f i c inconveniences themselves as f a r as possible. F i r s t of 
a l l , t h a t i s t o say, vre must e x p l o i t - i n depth and from everj'-
a v a i l a b l e angle - the p o s s i b i l i t i e s opened up b ^  the presence of 
the i n v e s t i g a t o r i n the a c t u a l process, V/e can do t h i s by maximum 
use of on-the-spot observation, not onlj through the \ i t i l i s a t i o n 
o f a l l a v a i l a b l e r e c o r d i n g devices (tape recorders, cajne-r-as, e t c ) 
but also by i n c r e a s i n g the niimber of observation points (emphasis 
on team vrork). Avoid repression, r a t h e r e x p l o i t the i n v e s t i g a t o r ' s 
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personal s e n s i b i l i t i e s . Wh^t I have elsewhere l a b e l l e d s o c i o l o g i -
c a l Stendhalism or Balzacism-Provistism even. Another vjay i n vrhich 
the investigp.tor can make use of h i s presence i s by a c t u a l i n t e r -
v entiono" (^Morin ^ 1971» p?275^4}*^ 
I t seems to be i n e v i t a b l e t h a t the observer viill have to move outside 
h i s low p r o f i l e of the past and expose h i s ovm viev.fpoint and p o s i t i o n 
t o examinationo 
A r e l a t e d emphasis i s the i n t e r e s t i n studyin^j eventso This i s to be 
viewed as a l o g i c a l outsrov/th of concern f o r process ajid chajige,, Events 
r e v e a l adaptive medianisms and provide a V7ay of a^pproaching s o c i a l change o 
I n t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i o l o g i c a l and a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l approaches an event or 
happening i s regarded as something to be set aside i f v/e are t o a;^pre-
c i a t e the tru.e s o c i a l r e a l i t i e s , these being associated v.dth r e p e t i t i o n , 
r e g u l a r i t y and more o f t e n than n o t , ' s t r u c t u r a l ' pattern= 
"We b e l i e v e , hov/ever, t h a t an event must be t r e a t e d f i r s t ?jid f o r e -
most as i n f o r m a t i v e evidence - i^eo as a nev; element vjhich not only 
i n f i l t r a t e s the s o c i o l o g i s t ' s mental outlook but a f f e c t s h i s s o c i a l 
assumptions as v / e l l o " ^ o r i n ^ l 9 7 1 , Po207^ 
This t r e n d i s apparent i n ethnome^hodologj'- p a r t i c u l a r l y ^ and also in. 
anthropology i n s i t a a t i o n a l a j i a l y s i s , extended case a j i a l y s i s and the 
method of s o c i a l drama a l l depend f o r the very s t x i f f of t h e i r a j i a l y s i s 
upon eventso Again, network analysis has been u n i t e d w i t h t h i s emphasis -
f o r instance i n the vrork of Kapferer ^nd Boswello I t i s i n t h i s tjrne of 
-a* 
I t i s of great i n t e r e s t and significa.nce t h a t French sociologj'y vjhich has 
d i f f e r e n t i n t e l l e c t u a l r o o t s again from Br' t i s h ajid Americ?n, 9hcu"'d be 
moving i n such a s i m i l a r d i r e c t i o n o The s i m i l a r i t y between ethnomot>i.o= 
dology happenings and Morin's suggestion t h a t the s o c i o l o g i s t '.nterveneo 
This could range from a series of questions going bejrond the ovdinexy 
q u e s t i o n n a i r e , v/ith the ob j e c t of provoking s p e c i f i c s o c i a l reactions 
( n o t merely o f op i n i o n but also of behaviouj?) i n anjr given s i t u a t i o n , 
t o what might be termed 'maeiutic' i n t e r v e n t i o n o Also the reference t o 
n o v e l i s t s i s i n t e r e s t i n g o 
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a n a l y s i s t h a t networks can be p a r t i c u l a r l y feelpful i n p r o v i d i n g a 
-JKi-
c l e a r method of p r e s e n t a t i o n ajid d e s c r i p t i o n . 
The r e c o g n i t i o n of the observer's i n f l u e n c e on and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n 
the events he observes allows f o r the f u l l e x p l o i t a t i o n of h i s sen s i -
t i v i t i e s and understandings. I t r a i s e s a fimdamental probl.em^hovrever^ 
i n t h a t i t becomes apparent t h a t s o c i a l science i s no more than the imder-
standings of several people of p a r t i c u l a r problems or s o c i e t i e s . Social 
s c i e n t i s t s may claim t h a t they are able to draw on a wider knoviledge 
of s o c i a l processes than the l&im.an, but u l t i m a t e l y the d i f f e r e n c e 
between them i s one of q u a n t i t y r a t h e r thaji q u a l i t y of knowledge. 
I n f a c t J ajithropolog^'- has an enormous s t r e n g t h i n V"?,t i t has the best 
method i n terms o f the new paradigm as one o f i t s major i d e n t i f y i n g 
f e a t u r e s . 
This i s p a r t i c i p a n t observation. I n e n t e r i n g a new society the ajithjro-
p o l o g i s t i s f o r c e d i n t o the p o s i t i o n of questioning a l l h i s assumptions 
about the meanings of s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n . At the same tjjue he has t o 
crack the code of the s o c i e t y v/hich he enters. I n d o i j i g t h i s he has t o 
l e a r n the 'recipe knowledge' of t h a t p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r e . 
Simultaneously, h i s presence creates a disturbance i n the s o c i a l i i i f e 
of the people he i n t e r a c t s v/ith vxhich again can be yexy r e v e a l i n g . The 
process by vihich h i s presence becomes acceptable and the vray i n v/hich 
he enters i n t o the exchanges of the people he now l i v e s w i t h l a y ba^re 
the basic assumptions of those people. Vihitten has u . t i l i s e d t h i s n o t i o n 
w i t h enormous success. His work i s enjoyable t o read and presents r e a l 
i n s i g h t i n t o the l i f e o f the people. 
I t i s thus i r o n i c a l and t r a g i c t h a t anthropology i s adopting the discarded 
methods of sociology such as questionnaires and s t a t i s t i c s . As Jarvie 
has s a i d - a g e n e r a l i s a t i o n i s no b e t t e r than the p a r t i c u l a x i s a t i o n s upon 
which i t i s based. Planners and Kaplan have put the convergerce of anthjco-
pologjr w i t h the other s o c i a l sciences through -foe use of s o c i o l o g i c a l 
methods as the f i r s t o f t h e i r two major trends i n the f u t u r e o f anthro-
pology. This a t a-<3jae vrhen Morin can w r i t e t h a t he sees sociology'- 8,s 
'bogged doivn' by questionnaires and s t a t i s t i c s , a/id suggest instead a 
m u l t i d i s c i p l i n a r j ' - approach t o avoid the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of phenomena as 
they are studied. 
cont. 
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2 . The Consequent Role of Anthropology/ and Social Science 
Once the t h e s i s of methodological dualism i s dismissed - as i t has 
been i n the new paradigm, s o c i a l science faces the o l d charge t h a t i t 
i s d e a l i n g w i t h n o t h i n g but commonsense, and t h a t i t descends to the 
l e v e l of anecdote. This c r i t i c i s m has been l e v e l l e d a t ego-oriented 
approaches p a r t i c u l a r l y , i n c l u d i n g network a n a l y s i s . 
This ego-oriented type of a n a l y s i s ; 
" o f f e r s j.nsights and knovjledge of contenporarjr A f r i c a n urban 
s o c i a l l i f e not r e a i i y observable and obtainable through conven-
t i o n a l survey techniques. However, my teohnique i s not intended 
to serve as a s u b s t i t u t e f o r t r a d i t i o n a l analysis? I regard i t 
as a supplement t o them, one which adds sub j e c t i v e data, and the 
types of analysis used by novelists".(^lotnicov^..l967j(my emphasis) 
I n e v i t a b l y such d e s c r i p t i o n becomes anecdotal - as Morin and P l o t n i c o v 
have hinted? 
" I f the ethogenj'- o f s o c i a l behaviour i s revealed i n the accounts 
and commentaries of s o c i a l a c t o r s , how do v;e subject t h i s material 
to s c i e n t i f i c treatment? RQ\-I do we prevent a s o c i a l psycholog;'-
t h a t pursues the ethogenic May from descending i n t o anecdote? Tb.e 
achievement of e x t r a c t i n g a, science from anecdotes i s la^g9"'y 5"-
matter of having an adeqtiate conceptuta,l sjrstem f o r the anal^'-sis 
of accounts and commentaries. Understanding -• the ulti.rnp+e goal 
of a non-positive science - i s achieved p a r t l y i n the deplojTiient 
o f a good conceptual scheme," ^ a r v e ^971^p.582) 
To r e t u r n t o tfee Plotnicov's reference t o the n o v e l i s t - Poole has 
described the process of reading a n o v e l i s t or philosophers 
cont. from previous pa.ge 
Any s t r e n g t h anthropology'- has l i e s i n i t s method of p a r t i c i p a n t obser-
v a t i o n . To abandon t h i s andl'-et aga.in f o l l o w i n t o a paradi^^m t h a t i s 
already i2?relevant i n the areas i t owes i t s i n c e p t i o n t o , i s t o d u p l i -
cate the enormous e r r o r of f o l l o v f i n g the r e j e c t e d model of the n a t i i r a l 
science. 
To some extent ego-oriented approaches, i n c l u d i n g netv.'ork a n a l y s i s , 
escape from t h i s monumental e r r o r . 
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"His space, the l i m i t s of h i s v/orld, are f o r the time being, 
accepted on t r u s t , while v/e explore t h a t v/orld. Every term 
he uses, evei?y assumption he makes, r e f e r s t o the a r c h i t e c t u r e 
of h i s system, r e f e r s t o the s t r u c t u r e t h a t he i s b r i n g i n g i n t o 
being through h i s v/riting„ For the f i r s t p a r t of our reading and 
t h i n k i n g vre are completely passive, absorbingo Then vre begin 
to transform h i s terms i n t o ovjc te2?mSo A c r o s s - f e r t i l i s a t i o n of 
tvro l i v e d spaces begins t o happen, a s+rajige s p a t i a l n u t a t i o n takes 
place, a symbiosis„ I begin to i n t e r - p e n e t r a t e i n t o t h a t space, 
my spac$, my thought-world begins t o happen alongside t h a t maji's 
and I am suddently 'understan.ding' himo His space i s acceptable 
to me, i t i s f r e e i n g and not cramping (otherv.dse t h i s system v/ould never 
haveteguii,I can f e e l myself i n t o i t s space, I can r e l y on i t o Above 
a l l i t helps me t o t h i n k , I grow i n c a p a b i l i t y as I read, I can 
take hurdles I couldn't take before» !^ear decreases. 
Then f i n a l l y the terms i n which he i s expressing himself have to 
be transformed i n t o mjr terms," (l972^Pol45^ 
The n o t i o n of the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t as an elevated expert on s o c i a l sj'-stems 
i s one which i s undermined by the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t u l t i m a t e l y h i s under-
standing are those of a humaji being such as those he observes. The p a r a l -
l e l w i t h the n o v e l i s t ' s task of making experience accessible t o h i s readers 
helps t o underline t h i s , 
"This [ s u b j e c t i v i t y ] does not mean t h a t the s o c i a l sciences ha.ve 
n o t h i n g to o f f e r , mt i t does mean t h a t people cannot evade the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t j r f o r p o l i t i c a l decisions by i n v e n t i n g the omnipotent 
godhead of science, the pure ' f a c t s ' the answers of which are ' r i g h t ' , 
I'/hat the r i g h t answer i s depends upon who you are, vjhether YOV are 
r i c h or poor or something else" ( H a r r i s , 1971? Po223j 
The use of s o c i a l science t o e s t a b l i s h the ' f a c t s ' i s widesprea.d -
based upon the assujnption t h a t they can see more than the non-social 
s c i e n t i s t persono Ch.omsky sa-ysl/this i s a f a l s e assumption, 
"Anyone can be a moral i n d i v i d u a l , concerned w i t h hum.cyi r i g h t s and 
problems; but only a college professor, a t r a i n e d expert can solve 
t e c h n i c a l problems by 's o p h i s t i c a t e d ' methods. Ergo, i t i s only 
problems of the l a t t e r s o r t t h a t are important or realo Responsible 
non-ideologicaJ experts villi give advice on t a c t i c a l questions; 
i r r e s p o n s i b l e , ' i d e o l o g i c a l types' v / i l l harangue a.bout -principle 
and t r o i i b l e themselves over mora], issues and human r i g h t s , or over 
the t r a d i t i o n a l problems of man and society'-, concerning which ' s o c i a l 
and behavioural' science having nothing to o f f e r beyond t r i v i a l i t i e s . 
Obviously, these emotional and i r r a t i o n a l types are i r r a t i o n a l , since, 
being w e l l o f f , and having povjer i n t h e i r grasp, they shouldn't v.'orrjr 
about such matters. 
At times t h i s p s e u d o - s c i e n t i f i c posing reaches l e v e l s t h a t are almost 
p a t h o l o g i c a l , " { ^ 1967s p269^ 
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"There i s more t h a t can be said abou.t t h i s t o p i c , but, v.dthout 
c o n t i n u i n g , I would sijnply l i k e t o emphasise t h a t , as i s no 
doubt obvious, the c u l t of the expert i s both self-ser'/ing, f o r 
those v;ho propound i t , and f r a u d u l e n t . Obviously, one must learn, 
from s o c i a l and behavioural science whatever one caji; obviouslj'-
these f i e l d s should be pursued i n as serious a vray as i s possible. 
But i t w i l l be q u i t e u n f o r t u n a t e , and h i g j i l y dangerous, i f they 
are not accepted and judged on t h e i r m e rits and according t o t h e i r 
ac-tual not pretended, accomplish m e r i t s . 
0 0. To anyone who has any f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h the s o c i a l and behavioural 
sciences ... the claim t h a t there are c e r t a i n considerations and 
p r i n c i p l e s too deep f o r the o u t s i d e r t o con-orehend i s sim-plyr an 
a b s u r d i t y , unworthjr of comm_ent. "0.967271 j 
The n o t i o n t h a t the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t i s able to present the f a c t s 
of a si-truation has allowed s o c i a l theories t o be u.sed to i n v a l i d a t e 
p r o t e s t and t o uphold the sta-tus quoo 
.. owe must also expect t h a t p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s v j i l l use the termino-
logy o f the s o c i a l and behavioural sciences t o p r o t e c t t h e i r actions 
from c r i t i c a l a n alysis - the n o n - s p e c i a l i s t does not, a f t e r a l l , 
presume to t e l l p h y s i c i s t s and engineers hov to b i i l d an at(-^mic 
r e a c t o r . And f o r any p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n experts can be found i n 
the U n i v e r s i t i e s who w i l l solemn.lv t e s t i f y t o i t s appropriateness 
and r e a l i s m . " (Chomsky^1967^ p.252^ 
To give an examplef from my o\-m experience. The I r i s h government have 
commissioned a Research P r o j e c t on A t t i t u d e s t o the •'•rish T-a.nguage. 
Through.various machinations two M e r i c a n professors were chosen to 
head the p r o j e c t ( l say| ^machinations^ because i t appears t h a t they are 
f r i e n d s of the only r e s i d e n t American a n t h r o p o l o g i s t i n E i r e ) . THey 
came to I r e l a n d equipped, supposedlj'-, w i t h the most up-to-d"te theore-
t i c a l knowledge of s o c i o - l i n g u i s t i c s and anthropology'-, p a r t i c u l a r l y v.dth 
reference t o the use of computers. They were accompanied by another 
f r i e n d - a l i n g u i ^ . There were 15 research a s s i s t a n t s - myself bein.g 
one. The o r i g i n a l plan was r a d i c a l l y a l t e r e d a f t e r we had been t r a i n e d . 
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when the professors a r r i v e d -from America, Interviews were to be 
organised w i t h various sections of the p o p i i l a t i o n i n order to e l i c i t 
the v a r i a b l e s to be examined i n a questionnaire t o be given to 1^^^  of 
the p o p u l a t i o n . I t i s a.pparent t h a t a l l t h a t iis going to be l e a r n t 
from these i n t e r v i e w s i s what i s already knovjn by m.os-^- I r i s h people -
such as t h a t I r i s h i s p o s i t i v e l j ' - valued by some people of the middle 
cla s s , but t h a t only those v/hose jobs r e q u i r e ?:[- - those i n the C i v i l 
.Service an" teaching^make any attempt to use i t ; t h a t i n the vrest^ extremes 
of o p i n i o n e x i s t - some people seeing i t as ?. po s i t i v e hinderance to 
emigration, other f e r o c i o u s l y aware of t h e i r language and anxious to 
escape the Dublin power s t r u c t u r e and i t s i r i v e s t i g a t i o n s on t>ieir a t t i -
tudes t o the I r i s h langu.age. The major f a c t i s t h a t people v/ho h^ve 
povrer i n biisiness and so on are not on the v/hole i n t e r e s t e d i n the 
language, andj i n f a c t , model themselves t o a large extent on vrhst thejr 
see as the B r i t i s h v/ay of l i f e . C l e a r l y the s i t u a t i o n i s f a r more complex 
and I cannot put dov/n a l l t h a t I picked up coming from outside v f i t h i n 
s i x months. The government vrould be able t o ga.ther a l l t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n , 
however, d i r e c t l y from the tab-com^iittee i t appointed t o appoint the per-
sonnel of the p r o j e c t , Tb.ey a-re Irishmen and women p a j t i c u l a . r l y involved 
w i t h the I r i s h language i n various c a p a c i t i e s , Appointing .American 
s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s gives an a i r . o f i m p a r t i a l i t y , and beyond t h a t - of 
s c i e n t i f i c o b j e c t i v i t y about the vrhole t h i n g . The i m p l i c a t i o n i s 
t h a t these h i g h l y t r a i n e d outsiders w i l l be able t o get at the r e g l t n x t h . 
I n f a c t , a l l they v ; i l l present i s a c o l l e c t i o n of views a.nd s t a t i s t i c s 
no more ' o b j e c t i v e ' than those of the Taoiseach or anjr^one else i n the 
country, A f a r more u s e f u l r o l e wo^^ld be t h a t of an ombudsman who could 
provide a channel of communication between the government and the peopleo 
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To an extent the whole p r o j e c t i s a vra.y out of an impasse i n t h a t i t 
i s impossible t o s a t i s f y the extremists who oppose or sup;^ort the 
I r i s h language. The government i s able to say (as i t does f r e q u e n t l y ) 
t h a t there i s an i m p a r t i a l study under way which w i l l pressnt i t s recqm-
mendations i n so many years time. I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see what v / i l l 
ha.ppen i f recommendations are made. From a personal p o i n t of viev/ of 
the s i - t u a t i o n I would suspect t h a t n o t h i n g spectacular w i l l come of i t -
the most being the possible removal of compulsory- I r i s h i n schools, 
which has been suggested f o r some time. 
Meanthile, about tvjen-ty people are employee? to get a t the t i l t h of the 
ma.tter, i n a s c i e n t i f i c manner. I t i s only by r a i s i n g s o c i a l science 
and i t s p r a c t i t i o n e r s to a p o s i t i o n which the;-- cannot possibl;-- r ^ e r i t 
tha,t such a si-tuation can come a.bout. 
3. The Reactions of Soci a l S c i e n t i s t s to the nevf r o l e of Social Science; 
and t l i e i r expression i n network s-tudies. 
I n the l i g h t of t h i s profoiind r e a p p r a i s a l of the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s - t ^ r o l e -
a t the l e v e l of h i s i n t e r a c t i o n v;ith the people he observes, and at the 
l e v e l of h i s r o l e i n the socie-by and p o l i t i c a l system i n v.fhich he l i v e s -
there are tvjo d i s t i n c t r e a c t i o n s on the p a r t of s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s : -
1, One i s t o recongise t h a t the s o c i a l sciences cannot continiie i n 
t h e i r pretence of understanding human l i f e i n a way vjhich i s inac-
cessible t o those not -tra.ined i n academ.ic d i s c i p l i n e s , "^'^lis requires 
t h a t the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t i s prepared to reassess h i s ov.n r o l e and 
the aims of h i s d i s c i p l i n e . 
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2o The second r e a c t i o n i s t o attempt t o preserve an aura of superior 
understanding i n order t o defend the p o s i t i o n of the socia.,1 scien-
t i s t as a f o u n t of o b j e c t i v e f a c t s not a-vailable to the lajTnan, 
I n order t o do t h i s ^ m y s t i f i c a t i o n of the job of the s o c i a l scien-
t i s t through the i n t r o d u c t i o n of abstruse notions i s e s s e n t i a l . 
Network analysis has been used i n both contexts. 
Philosophies which a l l o w a p o s i t i o n of primacy f o r the i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
understanding are also g a i n i n g ground ajid give strength to the f i r s t 
r e a c t i o n t o the changed systema^ of s o c i a l science, 
"But i f the type of philosophy t h a t a man chooses depends on the 
type of man he i s , then each and everyone of us has a r i g h t to a 
philosophy of h i s own, a r i g h t t o a space ho can t h i n k i n , a r i g h t 
t o h i s ovm s u b j e c t i v e thought vrorld. 
I t i s a d a r i n g contention. The massed expertise of the profersio.nal 
w i l l of course oppose i t t o the l a s t d i t c h . To assert t h a t siibjec-
t i v e l y chosen conceptual space i s open to each and . everjr th.inking 
being i s , i n our age, tanfemount t o treason a::ainst the State, Dare 
we, nevertheless, t h i n k i t , assert i t , to be true ?«(Poole^l972, P0I423 
I t vrould seem t h a t such a philosophy i s , i n f a c t , a t the basis of the 
view of anthropology as making experience accessible t o others. Each 
man's understandi.ng of l i f e and h i s s i t u a t i o n i s u l t i m a t e l y unique and 
v a l i d . There i s c l e a r l y an enormous body of shaded kn.owledge and un.der-
standings which e x i s t as a r e s r . l t of communication and i n t e r e a c t i o n betvjeen 
human beings. But beyond t h a t there i s a realm of the purely personalc 
Ethnomethodology and other sociologies attempt to du-cidate these shared 
understandings by questioning them, as the basic assvimptions of societir 
H^s- on next page 
are questioned by other r a d i c a l s . 
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One of the now trends i n sociology which i s a p a r t of the f i r s t 
r e a c t i o n i s Gouldner's ' r e f l e x i v e sociologj'-'. I n essence the ideas 
behind t h i s have been m-ooted by d i f f e r e n t w r i t e r s over a considera.ble 
time span. For instance Gough has w i t t e n s 
" I suggest t h a t an. a n t h r o p o l o g i s t v;ho i s e x p l i c i t about h i s own 
•v^ues i s l i k e l y t o frame h i s problems m.ore sharply and to see 
more c l e a r l y the l i n e between values and data, more than one v.fho 
has not exajnined h i s values." ^968^p. 149^ 
This theme echoes t h a t of the phenomenolegists among them Alf-'^ed 
Schut7j and other recent movem.ents i n sociology, swch as sym-bclic i n t e r -
actionism.0 
I t i s worth g i v i n g G<?uldncr's conception of what a Reflexive Sociolog;'-
i n v o l v e s s -
"From the standpoint of the r e f l e x i v e sociology, however, the as-
sumption t h a t the s e l f can be sealed o f f from i n f o r m a t i o n system?, 
i s m y t h o l o g i c a l . The assumption t h a t the s e l f aXfects t h ^ i n f o r -
mation system s o l e l y i n a d i s t o r t i n g manner i s one-sidedj i t f a i l s 
t o see t h a t the s e l f may also be a source both of v a l i d i n s i g h t 
t h a t enriches study and of m o t i v a t i o r t h a t energises i t . A r e f l e x i v e 
sociology looks, t h e r e f o r e t o the deepening of the s e l f ' s capacity 
t o recognise t h a t i t views c d r t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n as h o s t i l e , t o recog-
n i s e the various dodges t h a t i t uses to deny, ignore or cam.uflage 
i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t i s h o s t i l e t o i t , and to the strengtbening of i t s 
capacity t o accept and -to use h o s t i l e i n f o r m a t i o n . 7n s h o r t , vfhat 
r e f l e x i v e sociology- seeks i s not an insu.lation but a transformation 
of the s o c i o l o g i s t ' s s e l f , and hence of h i s praxis I n th'-> world. " 
A r e f l e x i v e sociologj'- then, i s not c h a r - c t e r i s e d by what i t s-tnidies. 
" I t i s distinguis.hed n e i t h e r by the persons and t^.c problems studi-^d 
nor even by the tec^^niques and ins-t^ruments used .in stn.dy.-ing them 
I t i s c h aracterised, r a t h e r , by the r e l a t i o n s h i p i t establishes 
between being a s o c i o l o g i s t and being a, person, between the r o l e 
and the man pe r f o r m i j i g i t . A r e f l e x i v e sociology embodies a c r i -
t i q u e of segregated s c h o l a r l y r o l e s and has a v i s i o n -r^ f an a l t e r -
n a t i v e . . I t aims a t transforming the s o c i o l o g i s t s r e l a t i o n to h i s 
work." (1971J Po495) 
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The o v e r t u r n i n g of s o c i a l l y accepted ideas i s apparent i n many areas. For instance 
Neurotics Anonymous a d v e r t i s e by the slogan "Neurosis i s .Normal - hov/'s yours?" 
The acd'eptance of the v a l i d i t y of each person's experience which t h i s sim.plies 
i s a development of t?ie humanistic perspective on man presented by Bertran.d 
R u s s e l l . I t r e q u i r e s t h a t s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s must become av.'are of themse.lves 
and t h e i r e x i s t e n t i a l s o c i a l p o s i t i o n as Maquet c a l l s i t . And i n the end they 
are f o r c e d t o r e a l i s e t h a t t h e i r knowledge of socie"by cannot d i f f e r i n quaJ.itj'-, 
although i t may do so i n quantitjr, from t h a t o f the people they"- observe. 
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This type of approach i s alread.y being used outside sociology. For 
instance. Professor Hu.dson i n h i s book "The Cult of the F.-ct" provides 
an autobiography i n v;hich he attempts t o understand an.d ex p l a i n h i s 
own motivations and •\alues i n terms of h i s l i f e experience. I t i s not 
a t o t a l l y nev/ o r i e n t a t i o n , but i s one v/hich has suddenly ga,.ined adherents 
i n recent yea.rs. 
Jack B, Douglas has e d i t e d a book of a r t i c l e s on 'Understanding Everjrday 
L i f e " i n which the p o i n t i s f o r c i b l y made t h a t u l t i m a t e l y a l l s t a t i s t i c s 
ajid o ther a b s t r a c t i o n s are based f i r m l y on the commonsense understandings 
of the p a r t i c i p a n t s , 
"There i s no v/ay of g e t t i n g a,t the s o c i a l meanings from, which one 
e i t h e r i m p l i c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y i n f e r s the l a r g e r patterns esrcept 
through some form of comm.unication v/ith the members of t i a t s o c i e t y 
or group, and, t o be v a l i d and r e l i a b l e exij such communication vrith 
the members presupposes an un.derstanding of t h e i r language, t h e i r 
own understandings of v.'hat the people doing the obse.rvations are 
up t o , and so on almost endlessly," ^,B, Douglas^ 1971^ ?•= 9^ 
Thus, the aim of making knowledge t r a j i s s i t u a t i o n a l v.fhich i s the declared 
aim o f e x i s t e n t i a l phenomenological sociolog;'-, r e s t s f o r i t s .fulfi^jn.cnt 
upon the understanding the observer has of the societ;'- and cultii.re he 
i s s t u d y i n g . 
Once the r i g h t of everry i n d i v i d u a l t o a p a r t i c u l a r p h i l o s o p h i c a l space 
(Poole) i s recognised, the r i g h t of t i e s o c i a l sciences t o demarcate a 
p a r t i c u l a r area of study as t h e i r ov/n, comes vmder question. Since everjr 
man understands the s o c i e t y i n v/hich he operates a t l e a s t enough to .function 
v / i t h i n i t , hov/ can the s o c i o l o g i s t claim a d i s c i p l i n e based on the stiid;'-
of s o c i a l systems? I t seems t h a t the p o s i t i o n of s o c i a l science i s 
precariouso 
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On a f a r more a b s t r a c t l e v e l Foucault has also p r e d i c t e d the demise 
of the humaji sciences; 
"One t h i n g i n any case i s c e r t a i n ; man i s n e i t h e r the oldest 
nor the most constant problem t h a t has been posed f o r hiunan. 
knowledge, Man appeared because of a fundamental change in. the 
ajrrangements of knov/ledge. As the ajrchaeologj'- of our thought 
ea.sily shov/s man. i s an i n v e n t i o n of recent date. And one perhaps 
meaning i t s e n d , " ( l 9 7 l 9 P o 3 8 7 ^ 
" I f the a.rrange-^ent of kn.ov/ledge v/as t o s h i f t again, "then one 
can c e r t a i n l y v/ager t h a t man v/ould be era^rsed, l i k e a face iravna 
i n sajid a t the edge of the sea," ( l 9 7 1 ^ P o 5 8 7 ) 
" i t i s comforting, hov/ever, and a soiijrce of profoimd r e l i e f to 
• t h i n k t h a t man i s only a r e c e n t i n v e n t i o n , a f i g u r e not y e t ti'/o 
c e n turies o l d , a nev/ v/rinkle i n OVJC knov/ledge, an.d t h a t he V/.T11 
disappear again as soon as t h a t knov/ledge has discovered a new 
f ormi' ( l 9 7 1 ^ p , x x i i i ' ^ 
Faucault's argument i s extremely complex and only marginal t o the 
c e n t r a l them.e of h i s book 'The Order c f Things', He suggests th.^t 
there are three 'sciences' v/hich cover the dom.aln of the hum?ri sciences •= 
b i o l o g y , economics ajid p h i l o l o g y . Prom these 'sciences' are derived 
three models of explanation used i n the human sciences - from biologj'-
comes the n a t i o n of the f u n c t i o n s possessed by m.an, and h i s e v o l u t i o n 
t o adapt t o an environment = from economics man appears as havijig needs 
andcfesires, which he s a t i s f i e s by e n t e r i n g i n t o a s i t u a t i o n of opposi-
t i o n t o other men, ir r e d u c a b l e c o n f l i c t r e s u l t s | - from philolog;^r "on 
the p r o j e c t e d surface of language man's behavioiir appeaj?s as an attempt 
to say something," 
"Thus, these three p a i r s of f u n c t i o n and norrn, and c o n f l i c t and 
r u l e , s i g n i f i c a . t i o n aid system completely cover the e n t i r e doma.in 
of what can be knov/n about m3JX."Q.911, P c . 3 5 7 ) 
The development of anthropologj'- can be seen i n terms of these three rnodels. 
Evolutionism derived from b i o l o g y , i n the v/orks of Fraser, l^jlor and l a t e r 
V/hite, needs and economic man appears i n Malinov/ski' s stridies and l a t e r 
i n exchange t h e o r i e s and Barth's t r a n s a c t i o n s , \le are nov/ mbving i n t o 
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the realm of philologj'- and concern v/ith meaning, signs and s i g n i f i c a -
t i o n are c e n t r a l t o the new model. VJith Freud and Dumezil the s h i f t 
has been toward langixage. 
The problem of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and i t s r e l a t i o n to the conscious and 
unconscious i s a major ones-
" i t i s easy t o understand v;hy every time one t r i e s t o use t^e 
human sciences- to philosophise t o pour back i n t o the space of 
thought wha,t one has been able to l e a r n of man, one f i n d s one 
s e l f i m i t a t i n g t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l posture of the eighteenth centurj'-, 
i n which, nevertheless, man had no place; f o r by extending the 
doma,in of knowledge about man. bjrond i t s l i m i t s one i s s i j n i l a r l j ' ' 
extending the r e i g n of representa.tion bej^ond i t s e l f , and thus 
t k a i n g up one's p o s i t i o n once more i n philosophy'- of the c l a s s i c a l 
type. Tb.e other consequence i s t h a t the human sciences,v:'^.en 
d e a l i n g with, what i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ( j j i e i t h e r consciour, or uncon-
scious form) f i n d themselves t r e a t i n g as t h e i r o b j e c t what i s , i n 
f a c t , t h e i r c o n d i t i o n of positivi"bj'-o "(1971^0363-4) 
I n f a c t , Foucault sees r e f l e x i v i t y as e n t e r i n g philosophy at the same 
time as man appears as an obj e c t of study. 
" I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , not man's i r r e d u c i b i l i t y , what i s designed as 
h i s i n v i n c i b l e transcendence, nor even h i s excessively great com.-
p l e x i t y t h a t prevents him from becoming an object of science. 
Western c u l t u r e has consti-buted, under the name of "^an, a bein.g 
who, by one and the same i n t e r p l a y of reasons, must be a p o s i t i v e 
domain of knowledge, and cannot be an object of science."(1971? P°367J 
Foucault demonstrates t h a t the human sciences e.xist i n a c e r t a i n 
s i t u a t i o n of ' v i n i n i t y ' w i t h regard t o b i o l o g y , econom.ics and philology-
( f o r l i n g u i s t i c s ) ; they e x i s t i n s o f a r a.s they dwell side by side w i t h 
those sciences - or r a t h e r beneath them-, i n the space of t h e i r p r o j e c -
t i o n s . 
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"The human sciences are not, then any analysis of v/hat man 
i s by nature; but r a t h e r an analysis t h a t extends from, what m.an 
i n h i s p o s i t i v i t y ( l i v i n g , spea.king, laboviring, being) t o what 
enables t h i s Same being t o know ( o r seek t o know) v/hat l i f e i s ^ 
i n v/hat the; essence of l a b o i i r and i t s laws consists, and i n 
what v/ay he i s able t o speak. The hfman sciences thus occupj/ 
the distance t h a t separates (though not without connsct.ing them) 
biologj'-, economics and p h i l o l o g y from t h a t v/hich gives them p o s s i -
b i l i t y i n the very being of m.an, 
o, o t h i s i s v/hy v/hat characterises the hi.iman sciences i s not 
t h a t they are d i r e c t e d a t a c e r t a i n content ( t h a t s.ingii.lar o bject 
the human being) i t i s much more a purely formal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ; 
the simple f a c t t h a t i n r e l a t i o n t o the sciences t o v.fhich the 
human being i s given a.s an obj e c t (exclusive .iji the case of eco-
nomics or p h i l o l o g j r , o r p a r t i a l i n t h a t of b i o l o g y ) they are i n 
a p o s i t i o n of d u p l i c a t i o n , aid t h a t t h i s d u p l i c a t i o n serves a f o r t i o r i 
f o r themselves," (iSJl, P=354^ 
I n the end the inward t u r n i n g of subjectivity'- must be seen as a d u p l i -
c a t i o n of what i s ^ nyT'/ay already e x i s t i n g . I n t r o s p e c t i o n must tvjcn 
outv/ard. As Tom Stoppard s a i d - "we must act even though _we cannot 
•knov/ anything," I t i s onl;"- t h i s v/ay t h a t the deadening i r r a t i o n a l i t y ' -
t h a t T o f f l e r f ears w i l l be avoided. 
Manners and Kaplan forsee a second major t r e n d i n anthropology - tov/ard 
i n c r e a s i n g relevance and a p p l i c a t i o n to p a r t i c u l a r problems. I n t h i s 
I would agree v/ith them., i n t h a t i t i s OT^Jy, as Schutz has said , v/ith 
reference t o a p a r t i c u l a r problem t h a t v/e ca.n a l i g n ourzclves in any 
study. 
The r o l e o f the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t must become t h a t cf a ccmmujiication 
channel between people who arc planned f o r and planners. I n t h i s he 
must and should loose the trappings of cminipotence which .he has a t 
present and must be i n a p o s i t i o n t o understand h i s ov/n motives and 
values. 
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This discussion of the f u t u r e of the s o c i a l sciences has l e d me t o 
the conclusion t h a t once Methodological Dualism as a thesis i s d i s -
placed. 
The second r e a c t i o n t o the apparent change i n status of the s o c i a l sciences 
i s t o attempt t o r e i n f o r c e the view of the s o c i a l sciences as, p r o v i d i n g 
i n s i g h t s vrhich are not a v a i l a b l e t o the layman. 
This may take various forms but b a s i c a l l y i t requires t h a t s o c i a l science 
i s made inacc e s s i b l e t o anyone except those v;ho are conversant w i t h the 
th e o r i e s of the academic d i s c i p l i n e . A closed shop i s set up i n t o which 
only those who have shorn they conform t o the moves of tho d i s c i p l i n e 
by t a k i n g exams and so on, can enter. 
Bob Roshier has su.ggested (Few Socie-by^ August ,1972) t h a t ethn.ometho-
dology i s a means of e l e v a t i n g sociology above the understandings of 
a l l v:ho are not commJ.tted to the d i s c i p l i n e s 
"These techniques Qhe u.se of complex sentence str u c t u r e s and 
or d i n a r y vrords i n e x t r a o r d i n a r y contexts^ amount to a systematic 
and apparently d e l i b e r a t e attempt to disguise what are e s s e n t i a l l y 
simple p o i n t s . At the same time ... i t provides a 'langiia.ge' 
which i s a t l e a s t p o t e n t i a l l y ajrailable t o those vjho are .keen enough 
t o l e a r n i t , made up of key terms whose meanings are not a.vailable 
t o o u t s i d e r s . " 
"Perhaps i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t i n t h i s respect t h a t there seems to be 
a l i n k betvreen the USG of e s p e c i a l l y obscutantist m.odes of expres-
sion and the r e v o l t a.gainst p o s i t i v i s t ( i . e . na"bural science based) 
methods i n sociology. The r e j e c t i o n of p o s i t i v i s m and the conse-
quent emphasis on the su b j e c t i v e u n i v e r s a l l y accessible nature of 
s o c i o l o g i c a l understanding has brought sociology, i n i t s Q\-rn. terms 
dangerously close t o the age-old c r i t i c i s m of i t - t h a t i t i s j u s t 
'common-sense' and thus a v a i l a b l e t o everyone (the v/orst t h i n g t h a t 
could happen t o any aca,demic d i s c i p l i n e ) I n p r a c t i c e , then, the 
only e x p e r t i s e t h a t the nev; sociology can f a l l back on t o meet t h i s 
t h r e a t i s i t s use of a h i g h l y s p e c i a l i s e d , obscure langu.age." 
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Within anthropology netv/orks seem to have been used i n a s i m i l a r 
v/ay to i n v e s t the d i s c i p l i n e v/ith a raj'-stiqne v.'hich l i f t s i t bey'-ond 
everyday -understandings, The attem.pts to q u a n t i f y data, and r e f i n e 
concepts seem to provide a,m.ple evidence of t h i s o c c u r r i n g . 
Ba.mes (1968 and 197^) does not a.ppear to be trying h maJce h i s methods 
tinderstandable and a c c e s s i b l e to o t h e r s , but r a t h e r to demarcate a 
sphere of i n v e s t i g a t i o n f o r h i m s e l f , M i t c h e l l (1969), Wolfe (1970) 
and s e v e r a l others seem to be u s i n g netv/orks i n a s i m i l a r o b s c u r a n t i s t 
way. 
Network analj'-sis v/hich r e l i e s on the use of terms v/hich cT^e i n a c c e s s i b l e 
to a l l but an i n n e r sanctTum of a v i d u s e r s of the technique i s aJ.ready-
b r i n g i n g the method i n t o d i s r e p u t e . As a r e s u l t such s-tudies are un.lilcely 
to have any l a s t i n g i n f l t i e n c e on anthropology'- or the method's developm.ent, 
I n t h i s context they merely provide a means of cai'ving an academic nic ^ e 
f o r some a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s v/ho are l i k e l y to becom.e more iso.la+ed .f.rom the 
main developments i n anthropology. Pre c i s e l y - v.rhy nctv.'orks provide such 
an e x c e l l e n t means of demarcating a sphere of s-tudy i n anthropology v.'as 
o u t l i n e d i n Chapter I , I t i s not necessary- to consider t h i s type of 
study i n a d i s c u s s i o n of the netvTOrk methods c o n t r i b u t i o n to s o c i a l 
anthropology's development, s i n c e i t provides merely a d i v e r s i o n .from, 
a more f r u i t f u l type of network anaVsis, 
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The C o n t r i b u t i o n of Netvrork A n a l y s i s to the f u t u r e of S o c i a l AnthropoloQ?,'-
Si n c e we must now i n e v i t a b l y espou.se the nev/ paradigm v/e must consider 
network a n a l y s i s w i t h i n the new frames of r e f e r e n c e , and accept t h a t 
any attempt to un.ite i t w i t h the o l d paradigm e f f e c t i v e l y removes any 
i n t e r e s t the method ma.y hold f o r us. 
\Je are then f a c e d again vdth the obvious and c r u c i a l f a c t t h a t netv/ork 
' a n a l y s i s i s only a method and must be a l l i e d t c ^ t h e o r e t i c a l fra^iework. 
I n tho pa,st a l l too few of i t s p r a c t i t i o n e r s have made e x p l i c i t t h e i r 
assumptions, which has proved to be^enormous o b s t a c l e .in r e a l i s i n g the 
methods p o t e n t i a l . As Garbett h.a.s Said's 
"\«niich th e o r e t i c a , l pe.rspective i s adopted w i l l determ.-ijie tbe d.imen-
s i o n s of the si-tuation which are s t u d i e d , the kinds and l e v e l s of 
abstra.ction m.ade, and the nature of explanation of the events o " 
(1970, p.218^ 
The undeniable f a c t t h a t the p o t e n t i a l t h a t network anaJ.ysis was c r e d i t e d 
w i t h has not been f u l f i l l e d l i e s , a t base, i n the ina.dequacie'^ of the 
t h e o r i e s to vfhich i t has been a l l i e d , 
ri 
althoiigh the b a s i c a t t r a c t i o n of the netvrork approach i s t h a t 
i t prom.ised a v/ay of s-tudyin;: the problems of '^ocial change and 
p r o c e s s , v e r y l i t t l e t h e o r e t i c a l progress has been made i n t h i s 
d i r e c t i o n . T h i s i s due to the point Ifepferer makess'without an 
i n p u t of theory there can be no s e t of d e r i v e d hyT?otheses r e l a t i n g 
to change|'." ffioissevainjl972j 
As more evidence of the concepts f a . i l u r e I would c i t e the fa.ct t h a t 
EJpstein, one of i t s e a r l i e s t p r a c t i t i o n e r s , has not used the method i n 
any of h i s new data, and h i s I969 a r t i c l e i s a rehash of o l d data. S i m i l a r l y , 
Barnes, who i s a major f i g i i r e j.n the methods development has not v.seA i t 
i n the a n a l y s i s of any data a t a J l , s i n c e 1 9 5 4 o ' ' * I suggest t h a t i f the 
method had any g r e a t p o t e n t i a l i n the f o r m a l i s t i c a p p l i c a t i o n which Baomes 
e t a l suggest i t would not have been so neglected. 
see f o o t of ne±t page 
223 
In assessing tfie overall importance of netvrork analysis up to the 
present time i t seems to be possible, however, that i t has provided a 
major change in methods of presentation which has - as Jarvie fo^ S^3,w 
and hoped - provided a waj out of the c r i s i s situation which anthropo-
logy found i t s e l f i n a decade agOo Hov/evers 
"\«/hile there i s a need for some comprehensive theoretical tool 5 
some systematic a n a l y t i c a l framework 0 0 0 i t i s doxibtfuJ th^.t any 
single concept v ; i l l sufficeo" (piotnicov^l9679 P o l i o ) 
Undoubtedly the term i t s e l f ha.s passed into the lajnguage of the s o c i a l 
sciences, but i t has done so i n a general sense - a sense in which i t 
i s understandable to anyone i n fac t - and formalistic and jargonistic 
exercises are seen to have been singularly unfmitfulo 
For instance i n V/hitten's anthology, •Mro-American Anth'^opologj'-' (1970) 
Hannerz, Whitten, Nelkin a,nd Despres a l l use the network concept|( to 
consider various different problems» Only one of the a r t i c l e s presents 
•5^  from previous page 
On an extremelj'- c y n i c a l , but relevant note, one of the 'contributions ti^at 
network ana.lysis has made to the s o c i a l sciences i s to i n s t a l l John Barnes 
as Professor of Sociology'- at Cambridgeo 
"The sociological v;orld watched v/ith bated breath - vjas i t for 2 
years or 5? - v/hile Csjabridge decided on the appoLntm.ent to a Chair 
i n Sociology 0 0 0 The man f i n a l l j r chosen was John. Bames, who had 
achieved a reputation not only as a s o c i a l anthropologist and 
Africpjij-st, but also as the inventor -^f the concept " f 'netvrork' 
^ e r c y So Cohen, 1 ^ ^ 1 9 7 1 v o l o 6^ NOo 4^7.121) 
The concept of netvrork has attracted so much attention i n recent 3'-e?rs 
that to claim to be i t s inventor i s undoubtedly a prestigious point In 
Bame favour. This could accoujit for his return to the subject aft, r 
about f i f t e e n jrears' silence on the topico 
224 
s p e c i f i c netwrk d a t s o In the others the concept i s used raetaphorice.lly,, 
This type of usage i s already so prevalent i n sjithropologic?! studies 
as to no longer cause comment<> Neti-;orks have i n this sense hecome an 
important nev; element i n a^ithropolog^ro 
Earth has recently writtens= 
" t h i s perspective on scale does not attempt to derive struct^jxal 
principles by abstracting from network form, .•Ra.thor-j: i t seeks 
to identify the kinds of network that can be and vri l l tend to 
be generated by actors interacting by meajis of certain orgariisa-
t i o n a l a i d S o I ifould argue that i t i s not necessejry, or indeed 
possible, to reconstrijct those orgsjiisational elements from, a 
mere record of network form, i n a communitj'-o To provide such data 
i n a systematic v/ay i s most d i f f i c u l t and i n i t s e l f i n s u f f i c i e n t 
whereas the organj.sational elements are more readily identified 
by a close micro-saialysis of encounters where the opi'ortunitj'-
s i t u a t i o n of each actor can be observed,"(1972^Po218j 
I t i s i n t h i s general tjrpe of usage that network i s likel;'- to contiji.ue 
to be part of anthropology's vocabulary» Defining the term more and 
more s t r i c t l y i s i n f a c t making the vrhole idea f a r m.ore narrov; and 
r i g i d than i t s forebear - the group., I n this v/ay, netxrork ajis l y s i s 
has become a dyi-ng gasp of an old functionalist paradigm, as Aj?dener 
pointed out, concerned with c l a s ^ y i n g ezid describing for i t s own sakeo 
Personally, I f e e l that the idea has almost been discredited already 
by recent a^bstract and abstruse discussions of terminology'-o .1n.d I 'Trite 
from the point of \n.ew of one, v/ho, three or even two j^eajs ago, firml.y 
believed that the network concept had a great deal to offer snthropolog;^'-, 
and w^,s anxious to produce a v/orkable set of defined term.s„ Having worked 
with empirical data ajid t r i e d to rmke use of existing terms I p.m now firmly 
convinced that definitions have to be closely related to the topic under 
examination and that any uni.versal definition w i l l force information into 
an even more r i g i d set of preconceptions than that of group, role and so ono 
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Some more positive suspects of netvrorks'' contribution to s o c i a l anthjco-
pologjr are of a broader n' ture, and r e f l e c t the way i n which network 
analysis can be a part of the new paradigm i f i t i s not forced into 
the assum.ptions of the f i m c t i o n a l i s t school,, 
The recognition that description and an.alj'-sis are one a,nd the seme by 
network ajialysts brings the idea i n lijne i l t h schools of thought derived 
from phenomenology0 
"Indeed, we vrould sxgae that description i s 'merely' anal;'"sis losing 
yesterday's categories;, j u s t as analysis i s 'merely' description 
i n terms of tomorrow's categorieso" ^Barnes ajid Ep-rtein comment on 
Eisenstadt, 196l^Po210^ ^ 
They also remajrk that "others of us are content to describe s o c i a l l i f e 
as perceptively as we caji, v.dthout worrying too much about the d.isco\^j 
of s o c i a l l a v j S o " 
This- f i t s firmly into the new paradigm v/hich allows for appears to be 
accepted rather than debunkedo As Po Cohen saj^s, "thciifference betvreen 
analysis and description i s a m.atter of decree» "(l969,Po2233 
The reorienta.tion to stress the individual's ca,pabilities and creativitj"-
i s a centra.l element of tho new s o c i a l sciences ajid networks clearlj"- c^n 
emphasise this„ They could also be used to separa.te emic and e t i c concepts 
however, aji area i n which t h e i r potential ha-s so f a r been nissed-o 
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"Social anthropologj'- compares from the ciitset, moving constan.tly 
from the individual to the general ajad back to a more refined 
understanding of the individualo And before tv^is caji be done 
s o c i a l anthropology mu.st liberate i t s e l f from the romantic c o n f l i c t 
of individual and societj'- and. effect the union of these opposers 
whose interaction i s the unit of study,"(Pocock^l96l, p,114^ 
Network ha.s e f f e c t i v e l y united these opposites, and i t i s probabljr i n 
doing t h i s thf t i t has made i t s greatest contribution to s o c i a l stu.dieSo 
I would not agree with Abner Cohen when he v/rites of action thecr;,'-
anthropologists thats 
'".'/hen t h i s orientation i s pushed to i t s Extreme and i s presented, 
as Boissevain ( 1 9 6 8 ) does, as a substitute for the 'old methods' 
i t becomes one-sided and thus ^ v e s a, distorted pictiijre o f s o c i a l 
r e a l i t y . To put i t metaphorically, the m.icrosGope tha.t t>i i s 
school holds i s so power .fii l i n disclosing the details of face-to-
face p o l i t i c a l intera.ction tha.t i t i s powerless, or out nf f o c i i s -
to r e f l e c t the wider s t n ' o t i L r a l .features of s o c i e t y , " ( I 9 6 9 , Do'PP.Aj 
On the contra,rj'' I would, see Eoissevain's major contribu+ion as being 
to push the orientation to i t s . extreme which i s w>iere i t will a,dd most 
to the development of new anth-ropological theories. 
I t i s not true tha.t a, concentra.tion upon the micro-processes of s o c i a l 
l i f e eliminates a consideration of the wider structi-ires, ID.tim.ately, 
our only experience of such s t r i c t u r e s must be through inte.raction vjith 
other people, althoiigh we ma.y read and hear about them i n d i r e c t l y . The 
problem with mucjy network anaJysis up to teow i s that the a,ssumptions 
which i t has been linked to have cut i t off from m.eaningful elerrents 
of interaction. By not embracing the f u l l significance of the "^^.ings 
of interactions^ a l l sjnnbolic aspects, and thus the hidden understandings 
vrhich ethnomethodology pa'^ticula.rljr i s so concerned to imeajth, have been 
jettisonedo Bj a l l y i n g with a theory such as symbolic interactionism-
t h i s becomes central to any analysis, and i n this way netvjork analysis 
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could take on a quite different ajid fax more constructive complexiono 
The STjmbolic order i s present i n the interrelationships ve conduct with 
other peoples 
"Social anthropologists analyse symbolic forms i n order to discover 
theiir symbolic functionso One of the most important of these functions 
i s the o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of relationships between individuaJs a^d groups 
\-Ie can observe individuals objectively i n concrete r e a l i t y , but the 
relationships betv/een them are abstractions t h a t c-n be obsei^ed on.ly 
through sjrmbolso Social relationships develop through and a.re 
maintained b; symbolso ^-le 'see' groiips only through their sjCTbolismo 
Values, noms, rules and abstract concepts axe made tangible through 
symbolism, and men i n society are thus helped to be a,waj-e of their 
existence, to comprehend them, and to r e l a t e them to t h e i r dailj-- l i f e o " 
(A CohenJ 1969, P o 2 2 0 ) 
Cohen here provides a scheme vrhich demonstrates cleaxly hovj relationship 
symbols and values r e l a t e to one anothero Bj'' f i t t i n g network as a. method 
into t h i s scheme a r e a l l y interesting and meaningful aritbjropological stiidj'-
could be producedo V/hitten (1968) has done so, by using networks to 
analyse the 'symbolic expression of s o c i a l rela,tionships' 
I t would b a s i c a l l y provide insights into exactly how an anthropologist 
learns about the new s o c i a l sj'-stem he enters „ This vrould resemble the 
v/ay i n which langua.ges are novr tanght - th_rough. t)taJ Imjnersion cciLrses 
vjhich t r y to teach a language as a native would speak: it<, 
Ultimately, such an approach rests U2pn the recognition th?.t any person 
le a r n S about h i s society through interaction v/ith other individuals„ 
In these interactions defiAiifiions of r e ^ ^ t y a r e tested and agreed upon. 
I t i s only i n t h i s vjay - thjcough shared lar)gi;.a.ge and sj^mbols - tha.t 
society or culture e x i s t s . From this premise the new paradignn. i n s o c i a l 
s c ^ c f f i follows, with a l l i t s numerous ramifications-, some of v.'hich I 
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have pointed out, others of which remain hidden as background assumptions. 
In order for neti^ork analysis to become a satisfactory'- m.ethod of s o c i a l 
anthropology i t i s es s e n t i a l for certa,in elements to be inco7rp"r?.ted 
into each study, 
1. A statement^as f a r as i s possible, of the assuj^ptions and theories 
of the ana.lj'-st. I n i^feq^uet's terns what i s required .here i s a state-
ment of the anthropologist's e x i s t e n t i a l position, 
2. A c l e a r l y formulated problem vfhich i s to be exa,m.inedo V/ithout this 
i t i s impossible to understand why particular variables are being 
regarded as relevant. 
These two elements should make i t possible for the reader to unde-'stand 
the pa,rticular framework, within which the analyst i s operatin.g|and thu.s 
his b i a s . They axe not merely an ess e n t i a l .fact of a network analyrsis, 
but of exij anthropological s-tu-dy. 
Beyond these c r u c i a l general requirements networks provide an excellent 
wa.y of presenting a cleax account of hov7 information i s leaxnt, 
3o The c l a r i f i c a t i o n of acting where each impression i s ga,.ined provides 
a, c l e a r basis for the presentation of the actor's viev.'point on the 
s o c i a l system which can be related to his e x i s t e n t i a l position. 
I t i s only i n t h i s v/ay that we can begin to apprecia-te the subtleties 
of any socia,l system. 
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4o An awareness of th^- observer as a person existing at the centre 
of a p a r t i c u l a r netvrork must also be communicated, He i s inevitablj'-
a part of the s o c i a l processes which occur around him, and can be 
conceptualised as usiirping povrer from other s o c i a l retworkso 
I t i s apparent that basica.llj'" v/ha.t i s essential i s a far greater attention 
to the presence of the ego i n any situation of participant observation. 
The recognition of the importance of the individual's perceptions and 
h i s ovm s o c i a l role v : i l l prevent any f a c i l e and oversimplified statement 
about the nature of r e a l i t y . 
The quantification of data, on s o c i a l relationships i s peripheral to any 
such presentation, and i n f a c t , remov^from consideration the nuances 
implied i n s o c i a l interaction. 
The anthropologist may be i n a position to describe societies perceptivelj--
becsuse of his awareness of alternative s o c i a l forms but ultimately his 
understanding i s not of a different order from that of the natives o 
I^ie concept of Methodological T>ualism is me vAiich raises a difference 
I 
i n q,^ ^a-ntity of knovrledge to one of q\ug,lity. 
Once the analyst becomes avrare of his basic humanity v.'hich he shares 
with those he ohsey^es, he must pay due attention to their understandings 
and consciousnesso I t i s only v/ithin this context that netvrork analysis 
w i l l provide a means of presenting descriptions and explanations of a l i e n 
s o c i e t i e s and culttires which axe available to members of ovx own culture. 
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APPENDIX I 
The ^Manchester School' of Anthropology 
I n c r i t i c i s i n g the assumptions underlying netirork analysis " 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the supposed need f o r empirical, objective studies = 
a p a r t i c u l a r school of thought associated with Jlax Gluckman and 
Manchester University has become apparent. Since th i s group of an-
thropologists have provided muc^ of the impetus f o r the development 
of the network concept i t i s necessary to consider t h e i r work - other 
than i n network analysis - i n more d e t a i l , 
UhiBy themselvesI regard themselves as a d i s t i n c t school within B r i t i s h 
social anthropology and are iirell aware of t h e i r cohesiveness. Sluckman 
wrote i n his introduction to the 2nd edition of Elizabeth Bott's book 
that when i t f i r s t appeared he said: " I wish that book had come out 
of our group". M i t c h e l l has also recognised the existence of a 
p a r t i c u l a r Manchester School of thought, with which networks are i n t i -
mately associated. 
"That several of us had been interested i n social net^rorks i s 
not d i f f i c u l t to explain. Several of the s t a f f at the University 
College had had close associations with the Department of Social 
Anthropology and Sociology at Manchester where John Barnes had 
been a Senior Research Fellow at the time when he was studying 
Bremnes and v;here he had developed his paper^ published i n 1954s 
which provided the point of depairture £>r Bott's seminal s-fcudy. 
The notion of the social had remained a constant topic of con-
versation i n the department i n Manchester ever since. As a group 
we f e e l p a r t i c u l a r l y indebted to Max Gluckman who has been the 
main i n s p i r a t i o n i n many direc t and i n d i r e c t -v-rays to the studies 
that are presented here."(Mitchell^pp.vi and v^ 1969) 
This close-knit ne-twork of academics provides an atmosphere i n which 
ideas are developed to the f u l l and carried to extremes by continual 
(e) 
reinforcement by colleagues. I t i s apparent that not a l l social 
anthropologists at Manchester share i d e n t i c a l world views but 
such an environment encourages the adoption of ideas held by the 
group. I n e f f e c t , i t i s possible to create a pa r t i c u l a r view of 
r e a l i t y w i t h i n such a cohesive group, and i t seems that t h i s has 
i n e v i t a b l y occurred. How f a r , the following ideas are held by a l l 
the Manchester social scientists i s debatable, but they do seem to 
provide the hallmarks of a pa r t i c u l a r school of t h o \ i ^ t . 
The essence of the mode of t h o u ^ t associated with Manchester i s that 
there exists a 'hai^' r e a l i t y w i t h i n which we exist and which can 
be analysed accurately and s c i e n t i f i c a l l y , A corollary of t h i s 
b e l i e f i s that empirical r e a l i t y can be described and such descrip-
tions can be judged - being better as i t f i t s more closely \}ith r e a l i t y . 
"Beliefs i n magic and witchcraft help to d i s t r a c t attention 
from the r e a l causes of natural misfortune. They also help to 
present men from seeing the r e a l nature of c o n f l i c t s between 
social allegiances. V/e can only hope that i t may yet be 
possible to run society without any of t h i s kind of d i s t r a c t i n g 
obscxirity^,"(Gluckman, 1955* P.108^ 
Societies are also gradable on the c r i t e r i a of how f a r they face up 
to ' r e a l i t y ' and do not retreat behind magic and so on. The i n d i v i -
dual's understanding of the s i t u a t i o n i s not seen to be p a r t i c u l a r l y 
important, i t i s more essential to describe ' r e a l i t y ' . A ctirious 
mixture of emic and e t i c description tends to r e s u l t . 
M i t c h e l l , f o r instance, vn:itesj 
i f ) 
"The underlying postulate of what follows i s that the percept-
ions of c i t y and country l i f e w i l l depend to some extent upon 
the social positions of the observers and that we can understand 
these images not so much as representations of r e a l i t y but as 
reflections of the social positions of those who hold them," 
I n f a c t , the images are jus t as v a l i d , and probably more interesting 
i f they are seen as representations of r e a l i t y . Such a view i s not 
i n accord v/ith attempts to describe ' r e a l i t y ' hovfever. M t c h e l l 
has w r i t t e n a s t a t i s t i c a l l y extremely competent study of images 
of town and country l i f e . However, he categorises aspects of these 
l i f e - s t y l e s i n terms which he has picked up completely subjectively. 
Clearly t h i s i s inevitable but the f a c t that the shared l i m i t a t i o n s 
of the social s c i e n t i s t and those he obseives f i n that both derive 
t h e i r view of r e a l i t y from in t e r a c t i o n - are overlooked i s a corollary 
of the search f o r a 'hard' r e a l i t y . 
Stemming from t h i s i s a view of Vi^stem science and the understanding 
of the social s c i e n t i s t as superior to non-\^stem modes of thought 
and the world views of non-social s c i e n t i s t s . Rebellions are seen as 
reaffirmations of the social order and so on, 
Nadel has c r i t i c i s e d such theories and pointed out that they ov/e t h e i r 
popularity to a desire to omit any considerations of explanation or 
consciousness. 
"When we conceive of certain behaviour patterns as 'co-adaptive' 
and as rec-urrent or standardised, we mostly t a c i t l y assume that 
they express aims - that they are intended to be v/hatever they 
are. This seems elementary; i f I see people regularly celebrating 
funerals, or growing com, or having wrestling matches, then suirely 
I assume that they want to have funerals, or grow com, or engage 
i n wrestling. But often students of anthropology seem reluctant 
is) 
to say so openly. They are quite prepared to look f o r u l t e r i o r 
sims or even f o r the ultimate social purpose i n such a c t i v i t i e s | 
or they readily name basic organic needs and drives as the 
motivating force behind social action. But the reference to 
aims as i t were, i n the middle region, between ultimate social 
purpose and animal drive i s viev/ed with suspicions i t seems 
to introduce an imwarranted explanatory element, as i t also 
introduces the d i f f i c u l t and nowadays unfashionable category 
of consciousness."(lJadel-,p.52, 1951^niy emphasis) 
The social s c i e n t i s t i s pres-umed by some Manchester anthropologists •• 
to be better able to understand the si t u a t i o n than the participants, 
to-'be bet'ljer ablu Lu uiiduxji.Lmid tho oituation thaa lAio parbioipaiitot 
V,V/, Simer writes i 
"How then can a social anthropologist j u s t i f y his claim to be 
able to interprete a society's r i t u a l symbols more deeply and 
comprehensively than the actors themselves?" 
He answers that the use of part i c u l a r f i e l d techniques and the observer's 
lack of bias allows t h i s to happens 
"His ghe actor's] v i s i o n i s circumscribed by his occupation 
of a pa r t i c u l a r position or eiren a set of si-tuationally c o n f l i c -
t i n g positions ,,, Moreover the participant i s l i k e l y to be 
governed i n his actions by a number of interests, purposes, 
and sentiments, dependent upon his specific position, which 
impair his understanding of the to-tal s i t u a t i o n . 
But the anthropologis-fc ,.. has no particular bias and can observe 
the r e a l interconnexions and c o n f l i c t s between groups and persons," 
(1964,fP.28 and 29.) 
I n f ^ c t the anthropologist occupies a p a r t i c u l a r l y bizarre position -
he i s obligated f i n a n c i a l l y and morally to i n s t i t u t i o n s and people 
i n his own axjiety, but he also has to interact with those he described. 
He i s , thei^efore, also obligated and emotionally involved as are the 
acdiOrs. I n f a c t the value of his information must vary proportionately 
with the af f e c t of his interactions. To pretend that he i s an impartial, 
unemotional recorder of fa c t i s a gross d i s t o r t i o n of the t r u t h . I t i s CKj 
tenet of Methodological Dualism which enables such a viev/ to be held. 
Outer or 
extended 
network 
Kaswende ^ 
// 
MrsMutwale/^ 
Monica 
'—I 
Nicholas 
harles 
Simon ^ 
Epstein 
Same tribe or linguistic group 
Attended same school 
+++++++++++++ Attended same church 
— Neighbours 
- > Chain of gossip 
* * * * * *Pseudokjnship 
'EpTtTiTirseSi^^i"^^^ network' (centred on Margaret) 
A reanalysis from the ethnography Fig.4 
(h) 
Mitchell^ writing on the concept of tribe-^says: 
"The anthropologists construct of a 'tcibe' i n the sense of a 
definable cluster of cultural t r a i t s may have l i t t l e s i g n i f i -
cance to the people to \ihom i t refers. The people concerned may 
not have access to the technical detail upon which the anthro-
pdbgist legitimately, for his own purposes classifies the people 
into tdbes." (l970^p,85^ 
The rejection of the actor's understanding and i t s ^ replacement by 
that of the anthropologist's is not so easily justif i e d in fact. 
Manchester has seen the growth of a particular school of anthropology 
some of whose least attractive aspects I have mentioned above. In 
fact, the empiricism which is espoused has i t s positive side i n that 
there is a richness of factual data i n ethnographies from this school 
which is sometimes missing elsewhere. (Hieir claims to present enough 
information for reanalysis of data are met to a greater extent than 
by more 'intuitive' anthropological studies - as my redrawing of 
Epstein's diagram shows. However, a great deal of the subtlety of 
meaning and interaction is lost by an adherence to a vievi of a 'hard' 
r e a l i t y . The close-knit network which seems to exist at I-Ianchester has 
enabled a view of rea l i t y which is aberrant, i n the terms of the new 
paradigm prevailing i n most academic disciplines, to prevail there. 
APPENDIX I I 
"Strategy and Transaction i n an African Factory' Bruce Kapferer 
Manchester U.P. 197:2 
Since I finished writing, Bruce Kapferer's took - "St3:?ategy and Trans-
action i n an African Factory" - has appeared. I have mentioned his 
methods of quantification and the enormous problems of definition 
andlmeasurement that they imply i n an earlier chapter. There are 
other aspects of the book which i l l u s t r a t e most of my arguments. 
In the introduction, which is written by J.C. Mitchell, i t is pointed 
out that; 
"Althou^ i n this book, Kapferer reports on the material he 
collected i n one factory situation, i t is apparent from his 
analysis that he had followed the protsigonists i n the events 
back into their places of residence and to their places of 
residence and to their places of recreation ... But this is 
only a fraction of the f i e l d work he managed to accomplish .. 
These (intensive) techniques of study required ... a very 
complete recording of inter-personal behaviour and conver-
sation. This indefatigable recorder v/as able to accumulate 
a mass of extremely detailed observations ..."(l972^ P«xi^  
The netvrork analysis is based on a far wider and de^r Icnowledge 
than is presented to the reader. Also the incredible amount of 
detail required i s stressed, but the implication is that the anthro-
pologist can act as a camera and record pure fact. 
The level of detail is seen as of i t s e l f praiseworthy.. 
"studies of the kind Kapferer presents i n this book require 
a meticulousness i n recording, an assiduity and a discipline 
which few ordinary fieldworkers can attain." (p xi) 
The "data are the observer's f i r s t level of abstraction froa the 
t o t a l i t y of the situation. Since no f i e l d worker, hov;ever 
able and gifted is able to record everything that is going on 
some exhcnages or some events have been either excluded or gone 
unnoticeds" (x$i) 
The fieldworker seems to be aiming at simply recording everything, 
and then chooses ta discuss interaction i n one context only, althou^ 
he has far wider information, 
Mitchell again says ( p . x i i i ) that the reader can check the analysis 
because'felthou^ i t (the book) is essentially about the theory of 
personal interaction, i t is very solidly grounded in actual events so 
that theory and data have an intimate relationship" (xiii)„ 
Kapferer himself explains that he chose the particular factory because 
he already knew people there (scvii). He employed an African research 
assistant with whom he was able to check his observations. They both 
recorded their information on the spot as Kapferer found that this 
made people less suspicious. He was presented as a research student 
from the University of Zambia, a category of person which v/as originally 
devoid of meaning for the workers (x x i ) . Kapferer stresses ^fea* fact 
that to be seen taking notes by the workers was an advantage i n that this 
made him more acceptable to them. Beyond this he gives no details of how 
he interacted with the workers. 
'*Ehe description I present is also intended as a general contribution to 
research i n urban anthropology and sociology i n developing countries," (p.2) 
The distinction between anthropology and sociology is not seen as p a r t i -
cularly important. The implication is that methods - such as netvrark 
analysis^should be used i n both disciplines. 
(1) 
The theories which Kapferer uses are 'decision theory, game theory, 
symbolic interactionism and the theory of social exchange", (p.4). 
l a t t e r predominates. The emergence of social properties through trans-
action i s a mg.jor theme of the book 
"My f i r s t aim is to describe and explain what I recorded i n the 
course of f i e l d observations." (p.8) 
Kapferer then presents a description of the town and of the factory 
system. This is illustrated with s t a t i s t i c a l tables. The details on 
the factory are miniscule, and some seem to add l i t t l e to the actual 
understanding of the sociad system (jp,28-9). The varying number of 
hours vrorked i s also explained. Prestige rankings are gained by 
administering a questiojmaire to the factory employees. The mixture 
of emic and etic concepts appears here ... "many of my analytical 
points of reference i n describing the factory context are also used 
by the factory v/orkers, thou^ often expressed i n differing forms i n 
their perception of their work place." (p.59)» This confusion is most 
apparent i n the definition and description of network links - as I 
pointed out i n an earlier chapter. 
The attempt to avoid the theoretical inputs to the description of the social 
composition of the factory i s again emphasised. "The description ... does 
not derive from any preconception regarding what should be included i n 
an Eidequate monographic analysis." (p,62). In fact i t must rest on some 
preconceptions since otherwise apparently irrelevant factors such as 
h e i ^ t of workers for instance would be just as important for the 
•3HJ-
description as age, which is considered i n detail. Kapferer is relying 
^ H e i ^ t might well be relevant i n prestige rankings - apparently a l l the 
Presidents of the United States have been t a l l e r than their defeated opponents. 
(m) 
upon his own commonsense to choose the variables which he includes 
i n his analysis, but he refuses to admit this. 
Kapferer then embarks/a^series of occupational histories. He does not 
explain how he or his assistant gained access to this information. 
In Chapter 4 he introduces the terms 'arena' and ' f i e l d ' vMch, he says, 
"Both Bailey and Strauss used i n an attempt to overcome some of 
the limitations of conventional nomative structural/functional analysis" 
(p,121J The j u s t i f i c a t i o n for these new approaches is that they supersede 
the old paradigm. The definitions which are given of 'arena' and ' f i e l d ' 
are Confusing and the distinction between emic and etic concepts is 
particularly blurred ^.122-125). The arena seems to be the hard reality, 
as perceived by the anthropologist while the perceptual f i e l d is the image 
the individual has of the resources at his disposal, and the action f i e l d is 
the activiated resources. 
A detailed description of disputes i n the factory follovra. 
Chapter 5 on interaction patterns I have mentioned in my Chapter 5. The 
confusion of emic and etic becomes maxked i n this context. For instance, 
"... an individual can escape obligations incurred throu^ transactions 
by simply not recognising that he is obligated." (p.166) I t i s not clear 
at a l l whether Kapferer means that the individual knows he is obligated 
ajid ignores that fact or whether he is not aware that he is obligated, i n 
which caae the question arises as to who|i i s aware that he is obligated? 
(n) 
In deciding which relationships are imbalanced (p. 168) i n that one 
partner contributes more than the other^ i t i s also unclear whose 
opinion this i s . I t seems, that i t i s Kapferer's based upon his 
observations. The actor's perceptions do not seem to be regarded as 
relevant. Problems such as these beset a l l the following data. In 
my experience simply establishing vAiich language was used i n inter-
action between different people i n different contexts is almost 
impossible, and measures of multiplexity and so forth are far more 
complex. Ultimately we are presented with Kapferer's perception of 
the interaction which omits the meanings given to relationships by the 
actors, 
In the f i n a l chapters (6 and ?), Kapferer iss 
"concerned with the processes which lead and allov/ certain 
individuals to control the perceptions of and the behaviour 
of others, and with the processes which generate changes i n 
their perceptions and related social activity. In pursuing 
these general aims I intend to develop and demonstrate the 
value of an approach which makes \ise of concepts directed 
towards the analysis of social behaviour as process. By 
doing so I depart from a tendency current i n much anthro-
pological and sociological analysis to treat social process 
thro\igh conceptual constructs which are better suited to the 
study of social statics, and v/hich view process as a special 
and separate problem."" (p,205) 
The problem of change is a major element i n prompting Kapferer to use 
ego-oriented approaches. In fact, he uses events to illu s t r a t e process 
rather than networks, although he analyses networks at two points i n 
time. 
The a b i l i t y of the individizal to control his social environment i s 
stressed. However, he also upholds the superior a b i l i t y of the anthro-
pologist i n understanding this environment. He adheres to the thesis of 
Methodological Dualism i n fact. 
(o) 
" I t i s basic to my conception of social process that individuals 
are, i n varying degrees, able to shape their own destinies 
and the destinies of others. Social structures and social systems 
as far as they are the analytical constructs of anthropologists 
and sociologists are also the creations, though by no means 
necessarily identical, of the individuals and groups these social 
scientists obscure. The constructs which indivickials and groups 
make of their participation are as important and perhaps more so, 
in understanding why individuals behave as they do as are the 
constructs made by the social scientist. The latter often includes 
contextual components and relations between them v/hich l i e outside 
the comprehension, knowledge, and experience of the individual 
participant." (p.206) 
One hundred pages of detailed records of events follow, which are summarised 
by analysed i n four pages. The pursuit of power and status is the major 
focus of interest. 
A postscript reiterates points I have already made - particularly that 
"The major and important criticism of so-called structural-functional 
and i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t orientations rests i n their failure adequately 
to explain social change," (p,356) 
The choice of theories and conceptualisation "has been motivated above 
a l l else by a wish to present as accurately as possible the empirical 
r e a l i t y I observed," (p.556) This type of empiricism is i n marked contrast 
to the type of iihderstanding which Ronald Laing (whom Kapferer quotes on 
pages556-7) would seek. 
I t i s impossible to empathise with the people Kapferer describes or v/ith 
the anthropologist. The meaning of a l l interaction is subordinated to 
the desire to present an accurate view of 'empirical reali'ty' and the 
use of particular concepts - the major one being network. The people 
(p) 
of the Narayan factory and the social l i f e they lead are not available 
to the reader as experience by the use of these methods. I t is hard 
to avoid concluding that ultimately a l l we are reading is Kapferer's 
projected commonsense -understandings of social l i f e . 
